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Banking regulation and, in particular, macroprudential regulation have gained signif-
icant interest since the crisis that began in 2007. At the centre of banking regulation
is a deep-rooted concern that the economic and social costs of systemic crises are
significant and their implications are far-reaching. Banks play a number of crucial
roles in the functioning of any economy. However, the banking system in which
they operate is inherently fragile, and after many painful experiences, regulators are
quite convinced that this is particularly true during economic downturns. As such,
it is important to explore and assess prudential policies that could be designed or
improved to prevent banking crises from occurring and to make the system more
resilient.
This thesis uses panel micro-econometric methods to explore factors that could
have an impact on financial stability and suggests policies that could be used to
address them. The first essay empirically analyses how the capital buffer held by
banks behave over the business cycle after financial factors have been accounted
for. Using a large panel of banks for the period 2000-2014, it documents evidence
that capital buffers behave more pro-cyclical than previously found in the literature.
Furthermore, it also shows that this relationship is more pronounced for large com-
mercial banks where access to bail-out and equity markets incentivise an increase in
credit exposure and reduced capital reserves accordingly.
The second essay notes that a common feature within a lot of corporate income
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tax systems is the long-standing bias towards debt finance. That is, the cost of
debt has been deductible as an expenditure when calculating taxable profits. An
unintended consequence of this tax distortion is the creation of under-capitalized
firms - raising default risk in the process. Using a difference-in-differences technique,
this essay demonstrates that with a more equal treatment of equity and debt, banks
capitalisation significantly improves. The essay takes advantage of the exogenous
variation in the fiscal treatment of equity and debt as a result of the introduction
of an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system in Italy, to identify whether
an ACE positively impacts banks’ capital structure. The results demonstrate that
a move to an unbiased corporate tax environment leads to better capitalised banks,
fuelled by equity growth rather than a reduction in lending activities. The change
also triggers a decrease in the risk-taking of ex-ante low capitalised banks.
The third essay analyses the impact of liquid asset holdings on bank profitabil-
ity. Using a large sample of banks, the essay documents evidence of a non-linear
relationship between additional liquid asset holdings and bank profitability. That
is, banks’ profitability is improved with the holding of some liquid assets. How-
ever, evidence suggests that there is a point at which holding further liquid assets
diminishes profitability. The essay also finds that growth in credit and asset prices
is more important for bank profitability than output growth, suggesting that bank
returns respond to the financial and not the business cycle. Another important find-
ing of this essay is that long-term interest rates tend to increase bank profitability,
whilst short-term rates tend to lower bank profits - via increasing funding costs.
These findings are homogeneous across countries with different development status
as these results appear consistent for advanced and emerging market economies.
Overall, the findings from this thesis provide important implications for regula-
tors seeking to provide stability and resilience to the financial system. They provide
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further evidence that supports the call for the use of countercyclical capital buffers,
but more importantly, they highlight the need for a more rigid approach to the
setting of the countercyclical capital buffer rate. The thesis also suggests that an
allowance for corporate equity system that eliminates or significantly reduces the
tax-induced distortions in banks, might be worth considering as a macroprudential
policy tool that targets capital standard. Finally, it also highlights the importance
of finding the right balance between policies geared toward mitigating liquidity risk
and maintaining bank profitability.
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Section 1.1 Chapter 1
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
The pervasive nature of banking crises amplifies the need to continuously monitor
and regulate the banking sector. These crises are important not only due to the
direct impact they have on the banking sector, but also due to the fact that they
typically affect the entire economy. As the quintessential example, the global finan-
cial crisis which began in 2007 negatively impacted the financial systems of most
developed economies and seriously threatened those of emerging economies. This
severe crisis not only caused a collapse in the financial sector, but its lag effect
permeated through to the real sector of the economy, causing a “Great Recession”.
This crisis originated in the United States, but quickly spread to most of the global
economy.
During these periods of financial stress, the typical credit channel via monetary
policy may not be as effective in stimulating credit growth since banks are likely to
be burdened by non-performing loans that deplete their capital buffers. This means,
banks may be reluctant to increase lending in response to monetary accommodation
because this will further decrease their capital ratios, putting them at risk of falling
below the regulatory minimum and facing subsequent supervisory fines. By con-
trasts, macroprudential policy, and in this specific case, the countercyclical capital
buffer would have built up capital buffers during booms that could then be released
in stress periods, thereby easing the strains on credit supply.
Macroprudential regulation is meant to protect the banking system from these
problems, or at least to limit their frequency and impact. There have been on-
going calls in recent times for financial regulators and supervisory authorities to
strengthen their macroprudential framework. As Hellmann et al. (2000) highlight,
the term macroprudential has become so widely accepted that, just as Milton Fried-
man claimed, “we are all macroprudentialists now”. However, not long ago, the
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term was hardly ever mentioned. In fact, it would have been difficult for regulators
to recognise that their duties involved a significant macroprudential dimension, let
alone a need to strengthen it (Hellmann et al., 2000).
In fact, the term is not new. It has been broadly defined in an early Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) paper as a policy that seeks to promote financial
system soundness. It denotes a systemic or system-wide orientation of regulatory
frameworks and the link to the macroeconomy. The term or the concept of macro-
prudential regulation has become more commonplace since the financial crisis of
2008. As Baker (2013) points out, it went from being largely unpopular and un-
used, to being at the forefront of the policy agenda and came to represent a new
Basel consensus. It became the principal interpretative tool for financial regulators
attempting to diagnose and understand the financial crisis and to advance institu-
tional blueprints for regulatory reform.
Traditionally, prudential regulation consisted of a mixture of monitoring individ-
ual transactions, capital requirements, and entry requirements. Concerns regarding
bank runs have also forced a number of countries to provide deposit insurance and
to establish a central bank to act as a lender of last resort. However, in recent times,
several changes have been made in the system of prudential regulation. Amongst
these changes, two in particular have taken great importance. First, there has been
greater emphasis on monitoring banks’ risk management systems, and less emphasis
on monitoring individual transactions. Second, there has been greater emphasis on
capital requirements, typically using the BIS standards of the Basel Accord.
In what follows, I develop some reflections on a theme in supervision and regu-
lation that has come to prominence in the wake of the recent global financial crisis.
The three essays in this thesis aim to identify developments in the financial sector
that have the potential to affect the economy as a whole, and suggest macropruden-
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tial policy tools that can be used to circumvent these problems. The first essay is
motivated by the fact that the typical credit channel via monetary policy becomes
inefficient, particularly during periods of stress or crises. As such, it creates a role
for the use of macroprudential policy tools to stabilise the economy. In addition, it
is motivated by the fact that, in assessing the cyclical behaviour of banks’ capital
ratio, the literature tends to ignore the role of the financial cycle or financial sec-
tor activities. This essay addresses the issue of the pro-cyclicality of banks’ capital
buffer. While this particular topic is not new, as it has been previously analysed
in the financial stability literature, the studies fail to account for the role of the
financial cycle in observing the cyclical behaviour of capital.
Therefore, the first essay seeks to re-examine the following questions:
• Are banks’ capital buffers pro-cyclical?
• Do financial variables exacerbate the cyclical behaviour of capital buffers?
• Is there heterogeneity among banks in holding capital buffer?
The answers to these research questions have important implications for the design
and development of macroprudential policy tools for the global financial system.1
The second essay is motivated by the introduction of an Allowance for Corporate
Equity in Italy. The ACE is a reform of the corporate income tax system that
sections of the financial stability literature have suggested could be a potential tool
to complement the current macroprudential framework aimed at addressing issues
concerning the treatment of bank capital (see for e.g. Schepens (2016)). The recent
global financial crisis demonstrated that bank capital structure is one of the most
important determinants of financial stability, as better capitalised banks tend to be
more resilient to economic and financial shocks. Accordingly, it becomes important
1A previous version of this first essay has been revised and resubmitted to the Journal of
International Money and Finance (JIMF).
4
Section 1.1 Chapter 1
to understand the determinants of bank capital structure. Most of the literature on
capital structure mainly explores the bank-specific determinants. Consequently, the
question of whether corporate taxes are important in explaining changes in bank
capital structure is largely unexplored.
Because tax changes usually forms part of an overall tax reform, it is usually
difficult to disentangle and isolate the exact effect of a tax shield. However, the
exogenous change in the corporate tax laws in Italy allows for testing such an impact.
Thus, the second essay exploits exogenous variations in the tax treatment of equity
and leverage due to the implementation of an ACE in Italy, to identify whether it
positively impacts banks’ capital structure. The second essay therefore attempts to
answer the following questions:
• Does the introduction of a tax shield for equity increase bank equity ratios?
• Does the allowance for corporate equity cause banks to reduce their level of
riskiness?
The output of this essay will shed some light on the robustness of the ACE as a
potential macroprudential policy tool.
The third essay of this thesis is motivated by the call of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to strengthen its liquidity framework, an action
that has been strengthen since the recent global financial crisis. Recent studies
have shown that during the crisis, banks that were more exposed to liquidity risk
contracted their supply of credit more sharply (see for e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010) and Cornett et al. (2011)). This prompted various regulatory authorities
to implement a standard that consistently and continuously monitors and improves
banks’ liquidity position. Consequently, it was recommended by G20 that the BCBS
develop a global framework for promoting stronger liquidity buffers.
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Meanwhile, actions taken by banks to address this issue and remain liquid - for
example, ‘fire sales’ or overpaying for additional funds, can lead to a reduction in
profits or even cause losses which undermine their capital position. Further, while
holding a buffer of liquid assets will help to mitigate liquidity risks, they are also
low yielding and as such have a significant opportunity cost. Therefore, it becomes
important to ascertain what the impact is of a change in banks’ liquid asset holdings
on their profitability. Using a robust empirical approach, the third essay addresses
the following issues:
• Is the relationship between liquid asset holdings and bank profitability non-
linear?
• What is the role of the business cycle in explaining bank profits?
• Does the financial cycle predict bank profitability better than the business
cycle?
• Is the reaction by banks homogeneous across countries with different develop-
ment status?
The answer to these questions may have implications for the implementation of
regulatory policies aimed at mitigating liquidity risks and the calibration of policy
tools to account for the associated costs at the bank level. Answers to the last two
questions in particular could inform counter-cyclical policies aimed at limiting the
rapid deterioration of bank profitability during a downturn.
6
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1.2 Thesis Overview
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first empirical essay
which assesses the cyclical behaviour of bank capital buffer in a finance-augmented
macroeconomy. Chapter 3 presents the second empirical essay. This essay examines
the impact of an allowance for corporate equity on banks’ capital structure. The
final empirical essay is presented in chapter 4. This essay examines the impact of
liquidity holdings on bank profitability and also assesses the role of the business and
financial cycles in explaining changes in bank profits. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis
by providing a summary of the main findings from all three essays. It also provides
key policy implications, and proposes scope for future research.
The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of each essay in the thesis.
1.2.1 Chapter 2 Overview
The aim of this chapter is to empirically analyse how the capital buffer held by
banks behaves over the business cycle after financial factors have been accounted for.
Studies have shown that the Basel Accord on capital requirements is not sufficient
to prevent an amplification in business cycle fluctuations, especially the decrease
in banks’ lending activity during a downturn in the cycle (e.g. Repullo and Suarez
(2013) and Behn et al. (2016)). The chapter attempts to introduce a novel approach
to capturing the business cycle by incorporating financial sector variables in its
approximation. Drawing on recommendations from the empirical literature, the
study considers, along with GDP, three additional financial variables to construct
what is termed a “finance-augmented cycle”. Specifically, it uses; residential property
prices, credit-to-GDP ratio, and credit to the private, non-financial sector. The
filter-based approach proposed by Hamilton (2017) is used to estimate the cycles.
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The study utilises bank-level data retrieved from the Bankscope Database.2 A
generalised method of moments (GMM) technique is then used to test the pro-
cyclicality hypothesis. That is, it first tests whether banks’ capital buffers respond
to the traditional business cycle in a pro-cyclical manner. It then tests whether
this potential pro-cyclical behaviour is amplified by the introduction of the financial
cycle. The results suggest, on average, banks’ capital buffers are negatively related
to the business cycle, which implies pro-cyclicality of the capital buffer. More im-
portantly, the study finds that the capital buffer is even more sensitive to the cycle
when financial variables are incorporated in the cyclical measure. In addition to
the main findings, the study also observes that banks of different size (as measured
by total assets) behave in a different manner. That is, only larger banks display
this negative relationship - a concept that is consistent with the “too big to fail”
hypothesis.
This chapter is unique in two ways. First, it differs from much of the empirical
literature on banks’ capital buffers, as most of these studies focus on a single country.
This study is cross-country and provides results for countries across all three income
levels. Second and more importantly, the majority of this literature solely focuses
on the business cycle, disregarding the potential impact of financial sector activities.
This analysis uses a proxy for the business cycle which accounts for developments
in the financial sector. The inclusion of information about the financial side of the
economy can provide more reliable estimates of the output-gap than the conventional
filter-based approach used in the literature.
The results provide some important policy implications. From a macropruden-
tial policy standpoint, regulators might want to adopt more flexible instruments to
mitigate credit risk in banks globally. This recommendation is motivated by the fact
2The name of the database has since been changed to Orbis Bank Focus by the host, Bureau
Van Dijk.
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that even with the prudential framework set out in the new Basel accords (Basel
III), the pro-cyclical behaviour of banks’ capital buffers still persists. The analysis
in this chapter demonstrates that it is not always safe to assume that regulatory or
supervisory capital standards automatically constrain banks. The findings of this
chapter also suggest that the approach to setting the countercyclical capital buffer
rate might need to be a bit more rigid.
1.2.2 Chapter 3 Overview
Similar to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 seeks to address the capital structure decision of
banks. Specifically, it aims to identify whether the introduction of a tax shield for
equity leads to an increase in the equity ratio of banks. It also attempts to identify
whether this allowance for corporate equity will cause banks to reduce their level
of risk taking. The recent global financial crisis demonstrated that bank capital
structure is one of the most important determinants of financial stability, as better
capitalized banks tend to be more resilient to economic and financial shocks. At the
same time, a common feature within the corporate tax environment is the tendency
to have deductibility on the cost of debt as an expenditure in the calculation of
taxable profits. An unintended consequence of this tax distortion is the creation of
under-capitalized firms - raising default risk in the process.
As such, this chapter makes a comparison between the change in capital struc-
ture of Italian banks with that of a comparable group of European banks that did
not experience a similar change in their tax environment. The introduction of an
allowance for corporate equity in Italy provides an ideal scenario to carry out this
experiment.
This chapter also uses bank-level data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope Database.
A difference-in-differences (DiD) method is used to check how this tax reform influ-
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ences the capital structure of banks. The results suggest that treated banks, in this
case Italian banks, significantly increase their capital ratios following the reform.
The experiment further demonstrates that both high and low capitalised banks in-
crease their equity ratios following the implementation of the tax shield. Another
important finding coming out of this experiment is that the observed increase in
equity ratios is driven by an increase in common equity rather than a reduction in
assets. Finally, regarding the risk-taking behaviour of banks, the experiment shows
that only under capitalised banks reduce their level of riskiness in response to the
tax reform.
This paper therefore builds on two broad strands of the literature. First, it adds
to the literature discussing the determinants of banks’ capital structure, and capital
structure decision. More importantly, it contributes to the relatively new literature
surrounding the introduction of a tax shield for equity, to reduce the relative tax
advantage of debt. The nature of Italy’s banking system and the timing of the
introduction of the ACE makes the findings of this study even more relevant for
policymakers.
The key policy implication coming out of this chapter is the recognition that
an ACE system that eliminates or significantly reduces the tax-induced distortions
in banks, might be worth considering as a macroprudential policy tool that targets
capital standard.
1.2.3 Chapter 4 Overview
This chapter of the empirical thesis explores the relationship between liquidity hold-
ings and bank profitability. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there was
a growing concern that liquidity risk management and the implications of such risk
for individual banks, and also the banking system as whole, should take more im-
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portance. It led to widespread calls to strengthen the BCBS liquidity framework.
However, highly liquid assets such as cash and government securities tend to have
relatively low return, hence holding them imposes an opportunity cost on banks. It
is therefore reasonable to expect that banks will only hold these assets to the extent
where they contribute to maximizing profits. Beyond this, regulators may still re-
quire banks to hold further liquid assets if it improves the banking system’s ability
to withstand shocks arising from economic and financial stress. Against this back-
ground, the main aim of this chapter is to test empirically whether banks’ holding of
liquid assets significantly affect their profits. The chapter will also try to understand
whether the financial or the business cycle better predicts bank profitability.
The data source for the bank-level data used in this chapter is the SNL Financial
Database, which is maintained by S&P Global. The chapter also relies on macroe-
conomic data retrieved from the OECD Databank. The GMM estimator is used to
explore the impact of liquidity on bank profitability. The results emerging from the
empirical analysis suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between liquidity
and bank profitability. That is, profitability increases for banks that maintain some
liquid assets, however, at some point holding more liquid assets starts to negatively
affect profitability. The other important finding emerging from the analysis is that
profitability responds to measures of the financial cycle, while there is no evidence
to suggest that the business cycle predicts profitability.
This chapter makes two important contributions to the literature. First, while
a limited number of papers control for liquidity when estimating bank profits, this
specific relationship is hardly ever the main focus of the paper. However, given
the BCBS move to develop new standards aimed at reducing liquidity risk, it be-
comes important to study whether banks’ liquid asset holdings significantly impact
their level of profits. Second, it contributes to the literature surrounding the cycli-
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cal behaviour of bank profitability by exploring the role of the financial cycle, a
phenomenon that has been largely ignored.
Some important policy implications emerge from this chapter. First, it might
provide valuable information to regulators who continuously attempt to address
liquidity risk. It provides information suggesting that these regulators might need to
find the right balance between mitigating liquidity risk and maintaining profitability.
Another implication coming out of this chapter concerns the macroeconomic cycle.
For regulators and macroprudential policymakers, it might be more useful to use
countercyclical policies that are geared toward smoothing credit cycles than those
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2.1 Introduction
Following the recent financial crisis, bank capital requirements have become one of
the key instruments of modern day banking regulation, providing both a cushion
during adverse economic conditions and a mechanism for preventing excessive risk
taking ex ante. Nonetheless, studies have shown that the Basel Accords (Basel I
and Basel II) on capital requirements are not sufficient to prevent the pro-cyclical
behaviour of capital buffers especially the decrease in banks’ lending activity during
the bust phase of the cycle (see for example; Gordy and Howells (2006), Repullo
and Suarez (2013), and Behn et al. (2016)). This study considers as pro-cyclical
(countercyclical) a bank capital ratio that is negatively (positively) correlated with
the cycle. This means, other things being equal, the ratio tends to decrease (in-
crease) when the economy or financial asset valuation is growing.1 The financial
turmoil of 2008 has forced the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to update
the regulatory requirements in order to mitigate risks and practices that would ex-
acerbate this cyclical behaviour. To this end, one of the main objectives of the new
regulations (Basel III) is to target pro-cyclicality through the building up of buffers
in boom phases to be drawn down in bad times.
The main motivation behind the Basel III regulatory framework was influenced
by the realisation that even banks with a good level of capitalisation suffer from sys-
temic risk. This strengthened the call for a macroprudential dimension to augment
firm level supervision and more stringent regulation of the banking system. The
countercyclical capital buffer (CCCB) of Basel III would seek to build up buffers
during booms that could then be used by banks during periods of stress. By in-
creasing the capital buffer when risks are perceived to be low, banks will have an
1Capital buffer is the difference between the observed capital ratio in bank i in period t and
the Basel Accord minimum regulatory capital. Pro-cyclicality in the financial system refers to the
mutually reinforcing interactions between the real and financial sectors of the economy that tend
to amplify business cycle fluctuations and that are often the cause of financial instability.
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additional cushion of capital with which to absorb potential losses, enhancing their
resilience and helping to ensure the stable provision of financial intermediation ser-
vices. When credit conditions become weak and banks’ capital buffers are judged
to be more than sufficient, the buffer can then be drawn down. This will help to
mitigate a contraction in the supply of credit to households and businesses.
This study shows that when the estimation of business cycles accounts for move-
ments of financial variables, banks’ capital ratios tend to behave more pro-cyclical
than previously thought. The topic of pro-cyclical effects of bank behaviour as a
consequence of capital requirements is not new and has also been previously anal-
ysed in the financial stability literature.2 However, these studies neglect the role of
the financial cycle when observing the cyclical behaviour of capital. There are two
main reasons for this - the first is that for most of the post war period, the financial
cycle was considered to be relatively unimportant in mainstream macroeconomics.
The second reason is that there is no real consensus about the actual definition of
the financial cycle, hence its subsequent measurement and approximation becomes
difficult. Regarding the first reason, the view on the business cycle in traditional
macroeconomics, which dates back to Okun (1963), define deviations from potential
output with reference to developments in inflation. The assertion is, ceteris paribus,
inflation falls when output is below potential and vice versa. This conceptual asso-
ciation grew so strong that it was hardly challenged in any regard. As a result, the
role of financial factors have been largely ignored. However, the relationship between
output and inflation has weakened over recent decades, thereby compromising the
usefulness of inflation as a sole indicator of potential output. Accordingly, estimates
of the output gap that rely on this relationship (the Phillips curve) may prove to
be unreliable and inaccurate. In recent times, there has been evidence of inflation
2See for example: Jokipii and Milne (2008); Coffinet et al. (2012); Brei and Gambacorta (2016);
and García-Suaza et al. (2012).
Section 2.1 Chapter 2
being low and stable yet output grow on an unsustainable path due to a build up
of financial imbalances. This was quite evident during the global financial crisis of
2008.
The experience of the global crisis suggests that financial sector activities should
be taken into account when estimating the level of potential output. In fact, the crisis
came as a reminder that the real and financial sectors of the economy are inextricably
linked. It is from this standpoint that Borio et al. (2016) argue, “if the ebb and
flow of the financial cycle are associated with economic booms and busts, then
surely assessments about the sustainability of a given economic trajectory should
take financial developments into account.”3 This prompted new research in trying
to incorporate financial factors in any assessment of potential output. Borio et al.
(2016) estimate what they refer to as a “finance-neutral” cycle, which is a measure of
the business cycle that takes into account private sector credit and property prices.
Against this background, this study examines the cyclical behaviour of banks’
capital buffer over both the traditional business cycle and what this essay will refer
to as a “finance-augmented business cycle”. This study contributes to the litera-
ture by providing novel estimates on the relationship between banks’ capital buffer
and the finance-augmented output gap. As previously mentioned, most, if not all
of the empirical studies undertaken in this literature, ignore the role of financial
sector activities. In addition, a large share of this literature tends to focus on the
determinants of bank capitalisation within a single country (see e.g. Shim (2013),
Coffinet et al. (2012), Tabak et al. (2011), and Stolz and Wedow (2011)). This paper
uses a sample of 33 low, middle, and high income countries to conduct the analysis.
However, estimations using the finance-augmented output gap are carried out with
a reduced sample of G7 countries, due to data availability.
3Borio et al. (2016) further argue it is simply impossible to understand business fluctuations
and their policy challenges without understanding the financial cycle.
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The results suggest, on average, banks’ capital buffers are negatively related to
the business cycle, hence suggesting pro-cyclicality of capital buffer. More impor-
tantly, it finds that the capital buffer is even more sensitive to the cycle when it
incorporates financial variables (residential property prices, credit to the private,
non-financial sector, and credit-to-GDP ratio) in the cyclical indicator. The magni-
tude of the coefficient on the finance-augmented cycle is markedly greater than that
of the business cycle, suggesting some propagation of shocks to the real economy
caused by financial sector activities. This result is consistent with the implication
of the financial accelerator model where endogenous developments in credit markets
can exacerbate and propel shocks to the real economy. In addition to the main
findings, the study observes that the behaviour of capital buffers across banks is
heterogeneous. That is, the negative relationship with the cycles is particularly pro-
nounced for larger banks, consistent with the “too big to fail” hypothesis. Due to
the perception that the creditors of large banks will be bailed out in case of bank
distress, the cost of debt for large banks is lower. This makes larger banks more
willing to use leverage and unstable funding, and to engage in risky market-based ac-
tivities. Finally, the study finds that only savings and commercial banks display this
negative relationship, with the latter being the main driver behind the pro-cyclical
impact.
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives an exten-
sive overview of the literature and the hypotheses. It also discusses the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of our empirical framework. Section 2.3 describes the statistical
methodology used to estimate the cycles. Section 2.4 describes the dataset. Sec-
tion 2.5 presents the econometric methodology to estimate the capital buffer. The
empirical results are presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Overview and Theoretical Under-
pinnings
This section aims to clarify issues concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the
empirical framework. In particular, it focuses on explaining the concept of pro-
cyclicality, why banks hold excess capital, known as a capital buffer, and what are
the determinants of capital buffers.
The recent financial crisis has brought to the forefront of banking regulation
discussion the potential pro-cyclical effects of risk sensitive regulation. One of the
primary aims of the Basel II accord was to link capital requirement to risks. However,
estimates of risks tend to be higher in recession than in expansions. Therefore,
under the Basel II accord, capital requirements are expected to increase during a
recession, when building reserves becomes difficult while raising new capital is likely
to be expensive. In this set up, banks would have to squeeze lending, which in turn
would exacerbate a recession. This vicious cycle ultimately would undermine both
the stability of banking and the macroeconomic system. As a result of this link
between capital requirements, risk and business cycle, a widespread concern about
Basel II is that it might amplify business cycle fluctuations, forcing banks to reduce
credit when the economy enters into a recession. At the same time, there is a major
concern that low capital requirements during upturns will generate credit expansion
above a sustainable path which in turn will lead to asset price bubbles sewing the
seeds for the next financial crisis.4
Although the Basel II accord has mainly focused on quantifying the likely vari-
ation of capital requirement implied by pillar 1, well functioning banks hold capital
well above the minimum requirement on loan portfolios.5 This suggests greater im-
4This is why capital requirements are said to be pro-cyclical despite actually increasing (de-
creasing) during a downturn (upturn).
5Note that under pillar 2 regulators are allowed to demand a buffer of additional capital during
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portance of managing capital buffer across the business cycle than the management
of capital requirement implied by pillar 1. In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision introduced the new Basel III capital requirements. The introduction of
this new framework was driven by the need to address the issue of pro-cyclicality. In
this study, pro-cyclicality is considered as the negative interaction between business
cycle and the capital buffer, which tend to amplify the former. Along similar lines,
Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008) and Jokipii and Milne (2011) associate
pro-cyclicality with the negative correlation between capital buffer and economic
activity. On the other hand, Brei and Gambacorta (2016) and Adrian and Shin
(2010) define pro-cyclicality as the positive interaction between the leverage ratio
and business cycle.
There is an extensive body of literature that investigates what is viewed as the
pro-cyclical impact of the Basel II accord. For example, Repullo and Suarez (2013)
investigate the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital regulation. They find that un-
der cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements, banks hold more buffers in
expansions than in recessions. Nonetheless, these buffers are insufficient to prevent
a significant contraction in the supply of credit when there is a recession. Their
empirical results show that with cyclical adjustments to the Basel II requirements,
this pro-cyclical effect on the supply of credit can be reduced without compromis-
ing banks’ future solvency targets. The macroprudential framework of this newly
implemented accord targets the building up of buffers during booms which could,
in turn, be released during periods of stress.
Other papers that attempt to address the issue of pro-cyclicality have done so
by highlighting the inverse relationship with the economic cycle. Coffinet et al.
(2012) assess the extent to which capital buffers exacerbate rather than temper the
cyclical behaviour of credit for French banks. Using both panel data econometric
economic expansion.
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estimations and Granger causality tests, they find that both capital buffers and
credit growth of French banks, depend on the output gap in a pro-cyclical manner.
That is, the capital buffers intensify the cyclical credit fluctuations arising from
output gap developments. The bi-directional causality that was identified between
the buffer capital and loan growth further emphasizes the call for a countercyclical
policy framework. Similarly, Tabak et al. (2011) provide evidence of pro-cyclicality
among banks in Brazil. Their analysis of the relationship between the economic
cycle and capital buffers held by banks reveal that capital buffer is negatively as-
sociated with the business cycle. It further demonstrates that these buffers tend to
negatively impact loan growth. This is against the background that lending becomes
particularly risky during stress periods.
Jokipii and Milne (2008) document a negative relationship between the capital
buffer and the cycle. However, this largely depends on the size of the bank in
question. Using a large sample of European countries over the the period 1997-
2004, they find that bigger banks tend to hold less capital buffer and exhibit an
inverse association with the business cycle. The opposite holds true for smaller
banks, their capital buffer rises with the economic cycle. This finding for smaller
banks is attributed to their ability to quickly react to periods of booms by increasing
their loans, consequently their reserves increase since loan assets rise at a slower pace
than for larger banks.
The differing behaviour of big and small banks is further explored by García-
Suaza et al. (2012). They find that the capital buffers of small banks tend to vary
over time, while those of big banks display a strong countercyclical behaviour. They
explain that these banks behave differently due to the different access they have
to equity markets. While larger banks can take advantage of the better access to
capital markets, and as such reduce their capital buffers during booms, small banks
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find it more costly to restore their capital stocks, with their limited access to equity
markets.
Using data on U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1992:Q1 to 2011:Q3,
Shim (2013) demonstrates how banks actually adjust their capital buffers and risk
over the business cycle. Consistent with other findings, he finds a negative relation-
ship between the business cycle and capital buffers, indicating that banks tend to
increase capital buffers by reducing their risk-weighted assets during cyclical down-
turns. Deriantino (2011) empirically demonstrates that there exists strong evidence
of pro-cyclicality in capital buffers among banks in ASEAN countries. Specifically,
the results suggest that loan growth is reduced when there is a contraction of the
economy because of restrictions on lending influenced by the need to hold more
capital buffers in order to mitigate credit riskiness.
2.2.1 Why do banks hold excess capital?
There are three main reasons why banks hold capital buffers. First, holding capital
reduces the probability of default, which involves the loss of charter values, repu-
tation costs, and legal cost of bankruptcy (see e.g. Acharya (1996)).6 Second, and
related to the literature on real investment, the changing of capital levels involves
adjustment costs. Specifically, aside from pure transaction costs, the main adjust-
ment costs are those associated with informational asymmetries in capital markets.
With issuers holding an informational advantage over potential buyers, the result-
ing signals in the market would increase the cost of the desired adjustment (see, for
example, Myers and Majluf (1984) or McNally (1999)). Third, Milne and Whalley
(2001) highlight that though equity capital is expensive relative to debt, the poten-
6Lindquist (2004) argues that poorly capitalised banks are at a risk of losing market confidence
and damaging their reputation. Similarly Estrella (2004) claims that excess capital acts as an
insurance against costs that may occur due to unexpected loan losses and difficulties in raising
new capital.
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tial costs of a breach of the capital requirement is more detrimental. Coffinet et al.
(2012) refer to these as “precautionary” reserves that serve to avoid adjustment costs
that are associated with raising equity on short notice or supervisory penalties if
they approach the regulatory minimum. They also argue that if regulatory capital
is only an imperfect reflection of the risk of losing charter value, then capital buffers
act as a cushion that protects its going concern value.
Note that designing the optimal level of capital buffer is not an easy task.
Nonetheless, the theoretical literature is scant. Kashyap et al. (2004) suggest a
simple conceptual framework that takes into account the trade-off between the cost
and benefit of bank capital regulation. In particular, they argue that if the shadow
value of bank capital is low in recession and high in expansion, then optimal capital
charges should account for the state of the business cycle. One of the issues that
have not been addressed by Kashyap et al. (2004) was whether in the presence of
risk-sensitive capital regulation banks have an incentive to build up capital buffer in
expansion that can be used to neutralise the effect of recession on capital require-
ments. To address this issue, Repullo and Suarez (2013) construct a model which
shows that under risk-based capital requirements, banks hold larger buffers in ex-
pansion than in recession but these buffers were insufficient to prevent contraction
in the supply of credit during recessions.
2.2.2 Determinants of bank capital buffer
Although Kashyap et al. (2004) and Repullo and Suarez (2013) provide a theoreti-
cal framework to analyse the interaction between capital buffers and the phases of
business cycles, a consistent estimate of such interactions has to take into account
the impact of other determinants of capital buffer. Following the partial adjustment
model with quadratic cost of the adjusting capital suggested by Ayuso et al. (2004)
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and Estrella (2004), the literature on banks’ capital buffer, though diversified, tends
to maintain a common set of explanatory variables. Banks return on equity (ROE)
– a proxy for the cost of capital, bank size – often measured by banks’ total asset, a
risk variable – commonly proxied by some ratio of non-performing loans, and loan
growth, are all utilised by, amongst others Brei and Gambacorta (2016), Coffinet
et al. (2012), and Tabak et al. (2011).7
Holding excess capital involves a direct cost that has to be remunerated. This
cost is approximated by institutions’ ROE and is expected to have a negative sign.
Milne (2004) argues that banks with a strong financial backing will demonstrate
a negative relationship between capital buffers and ROE, pointing to the fact that
exorbitant income acts as a substitute for capital buffer against unanticipated shocks.
See also Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008), and Tabak et al. (2011).
The relationship between the risk profile of an institution and its capital buffer is
less clear. Salas and Saurina (2003) argue that for a risk averse institution there is a
negative relationship between risk and the capital buffer, while for a low risk averse
bank this relationship can be positive. They highlight the relationship between risk
and capital buffer from a franchise value perspective. They argue that a decrease
in franchise value of banks brings about an increase in the proportion of riskier
loans. In this context, banks with a very low risk aversion may have an incentive to
maintain a level of buffer capital that is closer to the regulatory minimum compared
to more conservative banks. In contrast, Jokipii and Milne (2008) argue that for an
ex-post measure of risk, such as non-performing loans to total loans ratio, a positive
relationship is expected to be seen between risk and capital buffers. In particular
they argue that for ex-post measures of risk, if banks’ capital are consistent with
their actual level of riskiness, then a positive relationship is expected to be seen with
capital buffer.
7See also Ayuso et al. (2004), Boucinha et al. (2007).
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Turning to loan growth, Ayuso et al. (2004) argue that an increase in loans implies
an increase in capital requirements, and in a context where the cost of adjusting
capital is very high, is likely to transitorily reduce capital buffers. Therefore, there
is a much anticipated negative relationship between the growth of loans and banks’
capital reserves. Earlier studies such as Sharpe et al. (1995) and Jackson et al.
(1999) conclude that, at least in the short-run, adverse shocks to capital cause low-
capitalised banks to cut back on new lending during recessions. Among others,
Ayuso et al. (2004) highlight that big banks tend to hold relatively lower capital
buffers, consistent with the well-known too big-to-fail hypothesis. In particular,
these studies predict the bank’s size and capital buffer move in the opposite direction
(see Jokipii and Milne (2008), Coffinet et al. (2012) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998).
2.2.3 The link between the financial and business cycle
To gauge the cyclicality of capital buffers, a proxy reflecting the phase of the busi-
ness cycle has to be constructed. A fundamental concept in both understanding and
estimating a proxy of a business cycle is the potential output, defined as the level of
output produced when available resources are fully and sustainably utilised. Poten-
tial output is unobserved and econometric estimation traditionally relies heavily on
inflation. The conceptual association between inflation and the output-gap became
so widely accepted that the literature has ignored the impact of financial variables
on business cycle fluctuations. The basic idea was that deviation of actual output
from the potential level will drive inflation. Therefore, inflation is the symptom of
unsustainability. However, while variation of inflation might signal output deviation
from its potential level, the pre-crisis experience indicates that this view might be
myopic.
In particular, the recent financial crisis showed that low and stable inflation
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could coexist with unsustainable output growth, fuelled by the build up of financial
imbalances. Even though inflation was low, credit and property prices grew at high
levels, sewing the seeds for the last financial crisis. See Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004)
for a pre-crisis analysis between asset prices development, financial stability and
monetary stability. Borio et al. (2016) argue that there are four reasons for this.
First, financial booms could coincide with positive supply shocks. This will lead to
lower inflation and higher asset prices that weaken credit constraints. The ultimate
result will be higher investment and economic growth and low inflation. The second
reason stems from the fact that economic booms have the potential to weaken supply
constraints either through higher participation rates or immigration. Injection of
new capacity will boost economic growth without destabilising inflation. Third,
financial booms are often associated with appreciation of the exchange rate, which
puts a downward pressure on inflation. A final and frequently neglected point is that
unsustainability may be generated by a sectoral misallocation of resources (see Borio
et al. (2016)). Therefore, financial and real development might provide a wrong
signal concerning the robustness of economic activity. A recession amplified by credit
constraints make the recovery of economic growth a difficult task. Campello et al.
(2010) and Drehmann et al. (2012) show that during downturns a debt-overhang
magnifies the difficulty of labour and capital distribution. In so doing, the correction
of resource misallocation build-up during the boom is hindered.
The fundamental implications of Borio et al. (2016) are that cyclical variation in
output is influenced by financial developments. Therefore, it is important to account
for the extent to which financial conditions have an impact (positive or negative) on
the business cycle when a judgement about the sustainability of economic activity is
formulated. From a measurement perspective, Borio et al. (2016) show that ignoring
financial developments which may contain valuable information about the cyclical
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component of output, may produce a less reliable estimate of potential output. They
argue that the crisis revealed that problems that originate in the financial sector can
spill over and quickly permeate through sectors of the real economy and therefore
further amplify initial economic shocks. It also revealed that there is insufficient lit-
erature on the identification of the financial cycle and its possible effects on the real
economy. Borio et al. (2016) suggest a framework for measuring potential output
that can be seen as an extension of a growing literature that seeks to investigate
the link between, financial cycles, business cycle, and banking crisis (see Claessens
et al. (2012); Aikman et al. (2015)). Based on the findings of Borio and Drehmann
(2009) and Drehmann et al. (2012), Borio et al. (2016) extend a conventional stan-
dard HP-filter in a multivariate framework accounting for the impact of credit and
property prices. In doing so, they compute the so-called “finance-neutral” potential
output. They argue that this new “finance-neutral” output gap will: (i) show that,
irrespective of how inflation behaved, actual output was much higher than potential
before strong financial booms; (ii) be approximated with more precision; and most
importantly, (iii) will be more robust in real time – that is, the real-time gap will
be more in line with ex-post gap unlike other measures. This allows for real time
detection of booms before the onset of the financial crisis.
2.3 Business cycles and finance-augmented busi-
ness cycles
To gauge the impact of business cycle on capital buffers in this study, the analysis
uses both univariate and multivariate statistical models. In particular, it applies
the univariate HP filter and compare it to an unobserved component (UC) model,
both in a univariate and multivariate framework. The next subsection presents a
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state-space representation. The study also implements the recent filter proposed
by Hamilton (2017).8 Despite its popularity, the HP-filter has some important
drawbacks that should restrict its application. In particular, Hamilton (2017) argues
that the HP-filter involves several levels of differences, so that for a random walk
process, subsequent observed patterns are the by-product of having applied the filter
rather than reflecting the underlying data generating process (DGP).9 Hamilton
shows that: i) the HP-filter produces spurious dynamics which are disconnected by
the true DGP; ii) the HP-filter produces a cyclical component with observations at
the end of the sample differing from those in the middle of the sample; iii) estimates
of the smoothing parameter of the HP-filter produce values vastly at odds with the
common practise.10
Hamilton (2017) suggests an alternative proxy for the cyclical component that
avoids those problems. In particular, he assumes that the cyclical component of a
possible non-stationary series should address the question of how different the value
at time t+ h is from the value we expect to observe based on its behaviour at time
t. Hamilton’s proxy does not require knowing the nature of stationarity and to have
the correct model to forecast the series. Instead, he establishes that we can run an
OLS regression of yt+h on a constant and the 4 most recent values of yt.11
yt+h = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3yt−2 + β4yt−3 + vt+h (2.1)
8It also computes the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). Moreover,
to correct for the uncertainty about these estimates at the sample end-points it follows the Watson
(2007) methodology.
9Cogley and Nason (1995) show that HP filter can be approximated by taking the fourth-
differences of the original data and then take a long, smooth weighted average of past and future
values of these differences. See also King and Rebelo (1993).
10Hamilton (2017) wrote the HP-filter in a state-space form and estimates the smoothing pa-
rameter λ using maximum likelihood. Estimates of λ based on quarterly data were close to 1,
therefore far away from the conventional λ = 1600.
11Proposition 4 of Hamilton (2017) provide a general framework of (4.1).
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where the estimated residuals, v̂t+h, offer a reasonable way to construct the tran-
sient component for a broad class of underlying processes. The proposed procedure
has a number of advantages compared to the HP-filter. First, unlike the cyclical
component of the HP-filter, v̂t+h, is unpredictable.12 Second, the value of v̂t+h is
model-free. More formally, Hamilton (2017) argues that regardless of how the data
have been generated, as long as (1−L)dyt ≤ 4, there exists a population projection
of yt+h on (yt, yt−1, yt−2, yt−3, 1)’, which can be used to construct a cyclical compo-
nent. Furthermore, for large samples, OLS estimates of (4.1) converge to β1 = 1
and βj = 0 for j = 0, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the resulting filter becomes equal to
the difference v˜t+h = yt+h − yt. Because v˜t+h does not require estimation of any
parameter it can be used as a quick check for v̂t+h being model free. Third, any
correlation of v̂t+h with macro-variable x, reflects the true ability of y to predict
rather than being an artefact of the filter. In light of this, this study accounts for
Hamilton’s suggestion and also produces a cyclical component given by v̂t+h.
2.3.1 Unobserved Component Models
This section presents the univariate and multivariate UC model used to compute
the business cycle and “financial-augmented cycle”, respectively. In particular, it
applies a version of the Clark (1987) unobserved component model to quarterly GDP,
credit supply, house prices and credit-to-GDP ratio. To distinguish between trend
and stochastic trend of real output, Clark (1987) considers the following unobserved
component model:
12Hamilton (2017) show that an application of the HP filter to consumption and stock prices
generates proxies of the cyclical component which were extremely predictable from their own lagged
values as well as each other. Note, under the assumption that both consumption and stock prices
follow a random walk process, then the first difference of these series, in line with the Hamilton
(2017) approach, should be unpredictable.
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yt = nt + xt (2.2)
nt = gt−1 + nt−1 + vt (2.3)
gt = gt−1 + wt (2.4)
xt = φ1xt−1 + φ2xt−2 + et (2.5)
where yt is the log of real GDP, nt is the stochastic trend and xt is the stationary
cyclical component; vt, et and wt are shocks that follow a white noise process. This
study follows Clark (1987) in modelling the drift term (gt) in the stochastic trend
component as a random walk. Equations 2.3 to 2.5 can be written in state-space
form to estimate a univariate UC model.13 Assuming that the financial variables
follow a unit root process, they can also be decomposed into trend and cyclical
components:
zit = Lit + Cit (2.6)
Lit = Lit−1 + vlit (2.7)
Cit = α0ixt + α1ixt−1 + α2ixt−2 + ecit (2.8)
where i indicates the financial variables that are used to capture developments
in financial markets.14 Lit and Cit represent the permanent and cyclical component
of the ith financial variable. Note that (2.8) allows the cyclical component of real
13For further details see equations 3.97 and 3.98 in Kim et al. (1999).
14i = 1, 2 in this specification, but it could be expanded to include a number of variables to
capture the financial cycle.
30
Section 2.3 Chapter 2
GDP to influence the cyclical component of the financial variables but not vice versa.
Here, it is assumed that expected output and lagged values of GDP will have an













1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 φ1 φ2 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0




























1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 α01 α11 α21 0 1 0 0

















We can write (2.9) and (2.10) in compact form as follows:
15Note that data on GDP are published with a delay of at least one month after the end of the
reference quarter. Thus, contemporaneous values of GDP will have an impact on future values of
financial variables.
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ξt =Fξt−1 + vt
vt˜N(0,Qt)
(2.12)
where (2.11) and (2.12) are the observation and measurement equations of the state-










σ2vt 0 0 0 0 σv1t σv2t
0 σ2et 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2wt 0 0
σv1t 0 0 0 0 σ2v1t 0
σv2t 0 0 0 0 0 σ2v2t

where σ2eit for i = 1, 2 is the observed variance of the financial variables, σ2vt and σ2et
are the variances of the trend and cyclical component of real GDP, while σ2vit for
i = 1, 2 indicates the variance of the trend component of the financial variables. The
key extensions of this particular model are the covariances σv1t, and σv2t between
the shocks affecting the trend component of real GDP and the trend component of
the two financial variables included in the model. Unlike Clark (1987), this study
allows shocks concerning the trend component of real GDP to be affected by shocks
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concerning the trend components of the financial variables. This is consistent with
Borio et al. (2016), which explain that financial crises that follow a boom phase of
the cycle, tend to permanently leave a negative impact on output, and therefore
also on potential output. In particular, Borio et al. (2016) argue that the extent to
which financial variables affect the cyclical component of output will significantly
impact any approximation of potential output.
2.4 Data
There is no consensus in the literature about the variables to be included in the
construction of a financial cycle and how to combine them in a single measure.
Moreover, there is no agreement on the most reliable econometric method to analyse
its statistical properties. This is frequently left to the personal preferences of the
researcher. Ideally, one would like to extract a measure of the financial cycle by
exploring information from a large number of variables across a large set of countries
and a long time series. Some studies, such as Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012), Jordà
et al. (2013) and Taylor (2015), among others, have used credit on the grounds
that credit captures the boom-bust of the financial sector.16 The Basel Committee
published for consultation the countercyclical capital buffer (Committee et al., 2010),
which suggested the credit-to-GDP ratio as a reference point that would drive the
behaviour of the capital buffer.17 However, the guidance document also warns about
the possibility that this variable might give misleading signals. For further details
see Repullo and Saurina Salas (2011).
16Among the type of credit, total credit has been shown to be relevant for the US, where credit
to private non-financial sector, is not supplied by banks (see e.g. Dembiermont et al. (2013)).
17The rationale for the choice of the credit-to-GDP ratio as a reference point for taking buffer
decision can be found in Drehmann et al. (2010).
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Claessens et al. (2011) have a look at measures of credit and asset prices such as
real estate and equity while Drehmann et al. (2012) used credit-to-GDP ratio, house
prices and equity prices.18 Note that Drehmann et al. (2012) identify the financial
cycle with the joint fluctuations of credit, credit -to-GDP ratio and property prices.
They omitted equity prices because they behave differently from house prices and
credit variables. They argue that equity prices tend to exhibit far greater short-term
volatility and their medium-term cycles are less associated with crises. Borio (2014)
also argues that equity prices can be a distraction as they co-vary with the other
variables much less. Furthermore, Drehmann et al. (2012) also show that equity
prices have different characteristics from the other series according to a concordance
index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2006). Stremmel (2015) also shows that for
11 European countries the best fitted financial cycle measure includes the following
financial ingredients: credit-to-GDP ratio, credit growth and house prices-to-income
ratio.
Following Borio (2014), Stremmel (2015), and Drehmann et al. (2012), this essay
considers, along with GDP, three additional financial variables to construct both a
measure of financial cycle and finance-augmented cycle. These are; (i) residential
property prices; (ii) credit to the private, non-financial sector; and (iii) credit–
to–GDP ratio. These variables are considered to be the most parsimonious way
of capturing the financial cycle. In particular, using a multivariate unobserved
component model, the study extracts a measure of the financial cycle from credit;
credit-to-GDP ratio; and house prices. Alternatively, a measure of the finance-
augmented cycle is computed by replacing credit with GDP.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Data on property prices, credit to non-
financial sector, and credit-to-GDP ratio are retrieved from the BIS database. Data
18Drehmann et al. (2012) also highlight the usefulness of debt-to-GDP ratio.
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on the consumer price indices (CPI) was also retrieved to deflate the series. All the
series used to capture both cycles are in real terms (deflated by CPI) and in logs. The
only exception is credit-to-GDP ratio, which is expressed in percentages. Further,
the series are normalised to their respective values in 1985 to ensure comparability of
the units. All macroeconomic data spans the period 1975 – 2015. This is a deliberate
attempt to get the best possible approximation of the cyclical components and to
avoid the well documented end-point problem associated with the use of statistical
filters that are applied to the data.19
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the output gap estimates derived using the unob-
served component model.20 We can observe the difference in amplitude between the
finance–augmented cycles (labelled FACa and FACb) and the standard univariate
business cycle. This is particularly evident during periods of financial booms. The
key reason behind this difference is supported by the idea that developments in the
financial sector has the potential to explain variations in the cyclical component of
output.
19A typical issue with the use of the HP-filter is that it becomes asymmetric at the extremes of
a time series. As such, the series are extended beyond the actual end date of 2014. The filter is
then applied to the extended series to alleviate the end-point problem.
20Table A5 presents a cross-correlation matrix showing the various correlations among the dif-







Figure 2.1: Output gaps - Unobserved Components Model
.
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the output gap movement derived using the unobserved component model for the G7 countries. The figure compares the output gap of the







Figure 2.2: Output gaps - Unobserved Components Model
.
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the output gap movement derived using the unobserved component model for the G7 countries. The figure compares the output gap of the
finance-augmented cycle and the business cycle. Components of FACb include private credit, property prices, and credit-to-GDp ratio.
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2.5 Capital buffer: econometric methodology and
data
Following the partial adjustment model with quadratic cost of adjusting capital
suggested by Ayuso et al. (2004) & Estrella (2004), this study employs the following
empirical model:
BUFFi,j,t = µ+ αBUFFi,j,t−1 + βROEi,j,t + γRISKi,j,t + δSIZEi,j,t + θCY CLE
+ ϕ∆LOAN + φi + θt + i,j,t
(2.13)
where BUFFi,j,t indicates the capital buffer for bank i in country j in year t, ROE
denotes return on equity, while SIZE and CY CLE are variables reflecting the size
of the bank and the proxy of business cycle respectively. The lag of the dependent
variable is used to capture adjustment cost and the sign of this coefficient is expected
to be positive. ROE reflects the greater cost of capital funding relative to deposit or
debt. The SIZE is included to detect differences in the buffer according to the size of
each bank. RISK, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, is included since
a bank’s probability of failure is partially dependent on its risk profile. ∆LOAN
denotes credit growth. CY CLE represents the business cycle. It is the key variable
of interest and is used to address the main question concerning the pro-cyclicality
of capital buffers. Finally, φi is a bank fixed effect, θt is a time fixed effect and i,j ,t
represents the error term.
The empirical analysis in equation (2.13) is based on an unbalanced panel, drawn
from an international sample of 578 banks from 33 countries for the period 2000 to
2014.21 I select banks by country in descending order of size (total assets) in order
21See Table A1 for details on the number of banks per country in the sample.
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to capture the vast majority of the domestic banking system. Further, I restrict
the sample to banks that record a minimum of eight consecutive observations for
the dependent variable. The bank-level data are extracted from Bureau van Dijk’s
Bankscope which provides information on consolidated and aggregated statements
of banks and their specialisation. There are two major advantages in using this
source. First, the sampled banks account for up to 90 percent of the total assets in
each country, hence providing a fairly comprehensive coverage. Second, the bank-
level information is reported in standardised formats, after adjusting for country
differences. Consolidated data is used for most banks. The scope of information
provided by consolidated balance sheets is wider and information about banking
subsidiaries operating outside of the home country is also included. In addition,
consolidated data captures interdependence between macro factors and therefore
make prudential data more consistent with real outcomes. Where consolidated data
is not available, the aggregated data is used. The study focuses on three specific
bank specialisations, namely; commercial, savings and co-operative banks. The main
variable of interest is the capital buffer, which is the difference between the observed
capital ratio of bank i in country j, in period t, and the Basel III minimum regulatory
capital. Table 2.1 provides definitions of the variables used in the estimations while
Table 2.2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample of banks.
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Table 2.1: Description of Variables
Variable Description
BUFF Total capital ratio minus Basel III regulatory minimum
RISK Ratio of NPLs to Gross Loans
NET LOANS Loans over total assets
SIZE Natural log of total assets
ROE Return on equity
PROFIT Profit after tax over total assets
∆LOAN Annual loan growth
BUSINESS CYCLE Cyclical component of real GDP
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for regression variables
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Bank variables
Buffer 6,363 6.021 5.316 -1.200 41.640
Return on equity 6,620 0.069 0.108 -0.606 0.317
Risk 5,989 4.699 5.398 0.000 89.980
Loan growth 6,333 9.536 17.698 -36.710 108.630
Macroeconomic variables
Output gap (HP-filter) 8,220 0.0005 0.0292 -0.1456 0.1265
Output gap (Hamilton) 8,220 0.0013 0.0702 -0.5842 0.3968
Output gap (UC model) univariate 4,029 -0.0023 0.0072 -0.0335 0.0309
Output gapa (UC model) multivariate 4,029 -0.0015 0.0095 -0.0348 0.0167
Output gapb (UC model) multivariate 4,029 -0.0004 0.0095 -0.0287 0.0261
Notes: Buffer is the difference between the observed capital ratio of bank i in country j, in period t, and
the Basel III minimum regulatory capital. Return on equity is the ratio of net income to equity. Risk is the
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Loan growth is the growth rate of total loans. Output gap is
the cyclical component of GDP derived from the HP-filter, Hamilton approach, and unobserved component
model, respectively. The components of Output gapa are GDP, credit–to–GDP, and house prices. The
components of Output gapb are private credit, credit–to–GDP ratio, and house prices.
It is worth noting, in (2.13) when the time dimension of the panel T is fixed,
the Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) estimators are biased. This bias is
known as Nickell bias, because it was Nickell (1981) who first showed that the FE
estimator of α was biased. The Nickell bias is of order T and disappears only if
T →∞. It could be large if T is small and α close to unity:
bias = −(1 + α)
T
+O(T−2)
For further details see chapter 4 of Hsiao (2014) and chapter 27 of Pesaran (2015).
Ample literature of consistent instrument variable (IV) and Generalised Method of
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Moments (GMM) estimators have been proposed as an alternative for the FE esti-
mator. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest to remove the individual heterogeneity
(i.e. φi) by taking the first difference and use the second lag of the dependent vari-
able as an instrument for the differenced one-time lagged dependent variable. The
IV estimation delivers consistent but not efficient estimates of the parameters in the
model because it does not exploit all the available orthogonality conditions. Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) argue that additional moments can be obtained by exploiting
the orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged values of the dependent
variable and the disturbances. In particular, if yit = BUFFit then we can write
(2.13) as 22
yit = αyit−1 + β′xit + vit (2.14)
where i = 1, .., N, t = 1, ...T , xit = [ROEi,t, RISKi,t, SIZEi,t, CY CLE, ∆LOAN ]′
is a vector of possibly endogenous variables and vit = φi + i,t. Arellano and Bond
(1991) suggest a GMM estimator to the stacked observations of
∆yi. = α∆yi−1 + β′∆Xi. + ∆it (2.15)
where ∆yi. = [∆yi2,∆yi3, ...∆yiT ]′,∆yi−1 = [∆yi1,∆yi2, ...∆yiT−1]′,∆xi. = [∆xi2,∆xi3, ...∆xiT ]′
, ∆it = [∆i2,∆i3, ...,∆iT ]′ and the number of instruments increases with each ad-
ditional time period:23
dg(Wi) = diag(yi1, yi1yi2, ...yi1yi2...yiT−2)
Wi is a diagonal matrix of instruments. The moment conditions can be expressed
compactly as E(W ′i it) = 0.
22For ease of exposition we dismiss the country indicator j.
23∆ = 1− L is the difference operator.
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However, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Binder et al. (2005) show that the IV
and the one-step and two-step GMM estimators deteriorate as the variance of the
individual effects φi increases relative to the variance of the error term i,t, or as
the lag coefficient α approaches 1. In particular, the covariance of the lagged levels
with the first-differenced variables (i.e. E(∆yi−t−1, yi,t−s ) for s > 1) is an inverse
function of α. Therefore, it is possible to show that the instruments yi,t−s are weakly
correlated with the first differences ∆yit.24 Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano
and Bover (1995) get around the weak instrument problem by including in the set
of instrumental variables not only the lagged levels but also the lagged differences
of dependent variable. The original Arellano and Bond (1991) method is known as
“difference GMM” while the expanded estimators are known as “system GMM”. But
as Pesaran (2015) points out, the number of orthogonality conditions r = T (T−1)/2
tends to infinity as T → ∞. In this case, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) show that
although the GMM estimators remain asymptotically normal, unless lim(T/N) =
0, they become biased. This study circumvents the proliferation of instruments
generated by the difference and system GMM by using as instruments only certain
lags instead of all available lags. Furthermore, Monte Carlo studies by Hansen
et al. (1996) and Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the estimated asymptotic
standard errors of the two-step and iterated GMM estimators may have a severe
downward bias in small sample, especially when the number of instruments is equal
to or greater than the number of cross-sectional units (Beck and Levine (2004)).
Windmeijer (2005) have proposed a finite sample correction for the estimates of
the asymptotic variance. As such, this study ensures that for each specification,
the number of instruments are fewer than the number of banks in the sample and






clear that yi,t−2 as an instrument will be weakly correlated with ∆yi,t−1 as α approaches to 1.
Note that the IV/GMM approach breaks down for α = 1. For further details see Pesaran (2015).
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also apply Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. Another important point to note
is that the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the errors being serially
uncorrelated i.e., E(∆i,j,t,∆i,j,t−2 = 0). Hence, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest
to test that the second-order auto-covariances for all periods in the sample are zero.
The chosen instruments consist of the full complement of lags of the regressand
(BUFF ) and two to four lags of RISK and ROE variables. These lags have been
chosen to avoid correlation with the error term i,j,t (which now appears in first
differences) while simultaneously minimising the number of lost observations. Vari-
ables representing the business and financial cycles are treated as exogenous. The
study reports two main post-estimation tests to validate the appropriateness of our
dynamic GMM estimations. The first is the Hansen (1982) J test statistic for over-
identifying restrictions. The J-test is related to the order condition of identification
and tests the null that instruments being uncorrelated with the error term.25 The
other test is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of errors, as described above.
2.6 Empirical results
The study firsts examine the cyclicality of banks capital buffer using the full sample
of banks. Subsequently, the impact of the finance-augmented business cycle on
capital buffer is discussed. However, because of data-availability, the latter focuses
only on G7 countries.
2.6.1 Traditional business cycles
Table 2.3 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the baseline model
described in equation (2.13). The first two sets of results in Table 2.3 were car-
ried out using the HP-filter to compute the cycle variable while the remaining two
25Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the instruments are exogenous.
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columns present the estimates of the capital buffer model where the Hamilton (2017)
methodology was used to construct the proxy of business cycles.
Table 2.3: Baseline model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HP-Filter HP-Filter Hamilton Hamilton
Buffi,j,t−1 0.460*** 0.530*** 0.483*** 0.511***
(0.091) (0.077) (0.093) (0.081)
ROE 0.821 3.320*** 1.928 3.545***
(1.092) (1.001) (1.953) (0.998)
Risk 0.276*** 0.118* 0.137* 0.217***
(0.083) (0.069) (0.078) (0.069)
Size 0.003 0.486** 0.406 0.173
(0.300) (0.247) (0.295) (0.276)
∆Loan -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.004)
Business cycle -4.235** -3.994*** -2.251*** -3.449***
(1.654) (1.290) (0.662) (0.545)
α(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.66 0.40 0.49 0.27
Hansen J 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.26
Observations 4,508 4,468 4,320 4,471
No. of instruments 147 149 149 147
No. of Banks 577 577 577 577
Notes: This table provides results for the baseline specification of our model. The
first two columns use a cyclical component of the output gap derived using the HP-
filter. The final two columns use estimates of the output gap derived by the approach
proposed in Hamilton (2017). The dependent variable (BUFF) is the bank’s capital
buffer ratio. All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference
GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, α(1) and α(2)
are first and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis of the
AR(2) test is that errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order
serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are
valid. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 2.3 provides evidence that, after controlling for other determinants, there
is a negative and significant relationship between the capital buffer and the phase
of the business cycle. The estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2) suggest
that a 1% increase in the growth rate of GDP is associated with a decrease of
approximately 4% in banks’ capital buffer. In other words, as real economic activity
declines banks build up their capital buffers. This implies that banks are more
likely to hold more precautionary reserves during periods of uncertainty.26 The bank
specific controls also provide some interesting results. First, we focus on the cost
26The findings of Coffinet et al. (2012), Jokipii and Milne (2008) and Ayuso et al. (2004) are also
consistent with this result.
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of adjustment variable, i.e. the lagged dependent variable, which appears positive
and significant in all four specifications. This finding is consistent with the view
that the cost of capital adjustment is important in determining how much capital
banks hold. The estimated coefficient on ROE in Table 2.3 appears positive and
statistically significant in specifications (2) and (4). The positive impact of ROE
on capital buffer indicates the importance that banks place on retained earnings
to increase their capital buffer. Furthermore, the positive coefficient on RISK in
all four specifications suggests that banks with risky portfolios tend to hold more
capital in reserve. Such behaviour would influence increases in total capital buffer
and therefore has ramifications for the cyclical behaviour of bank capital. The
impact of credit growth in columns (2) and (3) (i.e. ∆LOAN) is significant at
the 1% level and, as expected, enters with a negative sign. This suggests that a
contemporaneous increase in credit growth reduces the capital buffer (Ayuso et al.,
2004). Also, the study considers whether these results might be influenced by the
fact that ∆LOAN could be a cyclical variable. If it is, it could influence the sign
and significance on the business cycle variable. This is tested for each approach
by excluding the ∆LOAN variable in columns (1) and (4). Finally, contrary to
expectations, the bank SIZE carries a positive and significant coefficient in column
(2). Note that, consistent with the “too big to fail” hypothesis, it was expected that
this coefficient would be negative, which would indicate that, ceteris paribus, larger
banks tend to hold less capital in reserve. This will be investigated further with a
split sample, separating big from small banks and carrying out separate estimations.
The regressions pass both the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 and
the Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions.
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Table 2.4: Estimation by specialisation and size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commercial Cooperative Savings Large Small
Buffi,j,t−1 0.590*** 0.468*** 0.619*** 0.628*** 0.487***
(0.061) (0.091) (0.117) (0.068) (0.088)
ROE 2.975** 3.058* 5.130** 0.138 4.032*
(1.153) (1.748) (2.426) (1.627) (2.231)
Risk 0.097* 0.129*** 0.089 0.293*** -0.064
(0.053) (0.045) (0.074) (0.109) (0.147)
Size 0.467 -0.173 -0.537
(0.285) (0.791) (1.121)
∆Loan -0.035*** -0.026** -0.036*** -0.017* -0.088**
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.042)
Business cycle -2.444*** 1.237 -4.249* -4.675** 0.771
(0.533) (0.872) (2.442) (2.030) (1.828)
α(1) 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.28 0.92 0.33 0.43 0.40
Hansen J 0.06 0.98 0.52 0.75 0.73
Observations 2,992 270 318 401 1,119
No. of instruments 69 35 43 43 52
No. of banks 433 41 50 65 203
Notes: This table provides results by bank specialisation and size. The first, second and third columns
highlight the results for commercial, cooperative and savings banks, respectively. The fourth column
provides results using large banks. Large banks are those that fall in the highest decile of the size
distribution of total assets. The fifth column provides results for small banks, those that fall in the
lowest 30 percentile of the size distribution. The cycle variable used in each specification is derived
using the Hamilton (2017) approach. The dependent variable (BUFF) is the bank’s capital buffer ratio.
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses, α(1) and α(2) are first and second order residual autocorrelation
tests. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) test is that errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no
second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are valid.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Next, the study considers the possibility that the capital ratios of different types
(commercial, savings and co-operative) and size of banks may react differently to
business cycle conditions. It classifies big banks as those that fall in the highest
decile of the size distribution of total assets, while small banks are those that fall
in the lowest 30 percentile of the size distribution. Table 2.4 reports estimates
accounting for the type and size of banks. It first discusses results concerning the
type of banks as presented in the first three columns of Table 2.4. Although there is
still evidence of pro-cyclicality in capital buffers for commercial and savings banks,
for co-operative banks the cycle enters with a positive coefficient, albeit statistically
insignificant. These results suggest that the pro-cyclicality of capital buffers observed
in Table 2.3 is being driven by commercial and savings banks. The study takes
into consideration the possibility that the results concerning savings banks could
be driven by the relatively small number of observations. However, using a sample
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of nearly 500 German savings banks (4346 observations), Stolz and Wedow (2011)
find that the capital buffer of these banks are negatively associated with the cycle.
The consistency of the findings in this study with those of Stolz and Wedow (2011)
eases this concern regarding the small sample size. The ∆LOAN is negative and
significant across all bank types, with the sensitivity approximately being the same
for all three categories. Therefore, irrespective of product specialisation, credit
growth will have a negative impact on capital buffer. The RISK coefficient remains
positive for all three categories, but statistically insignificant for savings banks. The
impact of bank SIZE on capital buffer is in line with results in Table 2.3 as it
remains insignificant across all types of banks. Next the study analyses estimates
accounting for the bank size as presented in the last two columns of Table 2.4.
In these two specifications SIZE is removed from the setup. As expected, the
CY CLE variable for big banks carries a negative sign, while for small banks it
carries a positive but insignificant coefficient. This is consistent with the too-big-to-
fail hypothesis.
To summarise the results using the business cycle as the cyclical indicator, the
study finds evidence of pro-cyclicality in capital buffer. The pro-cyclicality of capital
buffer is driven by commercial and savings banks, but the impact is more significant
for commercial banks. Big banks display pro-cyclicality in capital buffer while for
smaller banks, the evidence suggests that capital buffer is not pro-cyclical.
2.6.2 Finance-augmented business cycles
This section discusses the results of the relationship between a bank’s capital buffer
and the financial-augmented output gap as the cyclical indicator. Given the lim-
ited availability of data, the sample is restricted to the G7 countries. Though re-
duced, the sample remains sufficiently large enough to carry out the estimations.
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For comparability, in column (3) of Table 2.5, the paper also presents the results
for the univariate business cycles computed using the UC model. As previously
mentioned in section 2.4, the study derives two measures of a finance-augmented
cycle (presented as FACa and FACb in Table 2.5) using a multivariate unobserved
components model. The model composition of FACa includes GDP along with two
financial sector variables. As a credit aggregate, it uses credit-to-GDP ratio as a
proxy for leverage, and property prices as a measure of available collateral. FACb
comprises of private credit growth, credit-to-GDP ratio and property prices. The
estimations maintain all the bank-specific control variables and simply replace the
cycle indicator in the model. The findings are presented in Table 2.5 below.
Table 2.5: Estimation using G7 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HP Hamilton UC Model Multivariate UC Model Multivariate UC Model Multivariate UC Model
Buffi,j,t−1 0.635*** 0.643*** 0.498*** 0.692*** 0.605*** 0.716***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.0756) (0.0813) (0.079) (0.085)
ROE 4.230*** 4.435*** 4.847*** 5.167*** 4.458*** 5.767***
(1.078) (1.062) (1.216) (1.315) (1.172) (1.234)
Risk 0.221** 0.221** 0.242*** 0.249** 0.170*** 0.264***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.081) (0.104) (0.065)
Size 0.479 0.341 0.465 0.299 0.329 0.115
(0.371) (0.354) (0.432) (0.500) (0.495) (0.529)
∆Loan -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)








α(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.67 0.59 0.39 0.29 0.88 0.33
Hansen J 0.94 0.98 0.10 0.91 0.56 0.92
Observations 2,540 2,540 2540 2,324 2,324 2,324
No. of instruments 132 132 132 132 118 133
No. of banks 281 281 281 281 281 281
Notes: This table provides results for G7 countries using cyclical approaches from the HP-filter, Hamilton (2017), and the unobserved component model. The
dependent variable (BUFF) is the bank’s capital buffer ratio. FACa: components (GDP, credit-to-GDP ratio, house prices); FACb: components (Private credit,
credit-to-GDP ratio, house prices). All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses, α(1) and α(2) are first and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) test is that errors in the first-difference
regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are valid. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Focusing on columns 4 and 5, where the new cyclical measures are introduced,
negative coefficients are once again observed, but they are much more sensitive, as
reflected by their magnitude.27 Therefore, capital ratios are even more pro-cyclical
when we account for financial sector developments in the business cycle. With
respect to the other determinants, the signs of the coefficient are predominantly the
same. The study also tests the direct impact of the financial crisis on capital buffer.
It does so by introducing a crisis dummy which takes the value of 1 in the years
2008-2012 and 0 otherwise. This crisis dummy returned statistically insignificant.
Note that the crisis dummy reflects the impact of a structural break, and as such it
is considered exogenous and unpredictable. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
crisis dummy does not have a significant impact on the capital buffer.
In an attempt to attenuate the possibility that the argument of more pro-cyclical
might simply be as a result of scaling, I compute the marginal effects of each of
the cyclical variables in Table 2.5. These effects are presented in Table A5. The
results, however, suggest a general negligible effect. However, a further attempt to
alleviate fears of scaling issues proved more successful using standardised versions
of the cyclical variables. I standardise all cyclical variables used in Table 2.5 and re-
estimate each specification. These results are presented in Table A3. Results from
these estimations are broadly consistent with the main findings. Specifically, model
4 provides evidence that the response of capital buffer to the finance-augmented
cycle is stronger than the response to the standard cycles.
27Before doing any estimations with the new cyclical measure, the study first runs regressions
using the business cycle to ensure the results are consistent (with the full sample in Table 2.3)
using the G7 sample. The results, as shown in columns 1 and 2, are largely consistent with that
of the full sample in Table 2.3. In addition, a further specification using the Christiano-Fitzgerald
filter to estimate the output gap, is presented in Table A2 of the appendix.
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Table 2.6: Estimation by specialisation and size using G7 Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commercial Cooperative Savings Large Small
Buffi,j,t−1 0.712*** 0.362** 0.673* 0.688*** 0.803***
(0.096) (0.144) (0.343) (0.086) (0.103)
ROE 4.409*** 5.804 4.803 3.420** 3.898*
(1.349) (3.512) (5.022) (1.480) (2.300)
Risk 0.136* 0.111* 0.015 0.394*** 0.113
(0.080) (0.061) (0.179) (0.114) (0.166)
Size 0.871** 0.020 3.049
(0.408) (0.926) (2.881)
∆Loan -0.050*** -0.023 -0.076 -0.016 -0.095***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.044) (0.010) (0.028)
FACa -11.917*** 7.720 14.427 -23.788** 8.867
(4.138) (10.967) (23.240) (10.849) (9.053)
α(1) 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.49 0.91 0.31 0.19 0.49
Hansen J 0.24 0.96 0.44 0.75 0.40
Observations 2,013 212 126 322 527
No. of instruments 96 43 16 64 51
No. of banks 228 30 14 56 78
Notes: This table provides results by bank size and specialisation. The first column provides results
using large banks. Large banks are those that fall in the highest decile of the size distribution of total
assets. The second column provides results for small banks, those that fall in the lowest 30 percentile
of the size distribution. The third, fourth and fifth columns highlight the results for commercial, coop-
erative and savings banks, respectively. The cycle variable used in each specification is derived using
the unobserved component model. The dependent variable (BUFF) is the bank’s capital buffer ratio.
FACa: components (GDP, credit-to-GDP ratio, house prices). All estimations are based on the Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses,
α(1) and α(2) are first and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis of the AR(2)
test is that errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null
hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are valid. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 2.6 provides a comparable breakdown to Table 2.4. It examines the cyclical
behaviour of banks’ capital buffer by size and specialisation using the G7 sample.
Similar to the results of Table 2.4, the capital reserves of big banks are pro-cyclical,
whilst there is no evidence to suggest the same for smaller banks. Furthermore,
there is evidence that only commercial banks exhibit this pro-cyclical behaviour.
In summary, the results based on the finance-augmented cycle are broadly consis-
tent with those of the business cycle. The pro-cyclicality of capital ratios appear,
however, significantly stronger over the finance-augmented cycle.
2.6.3 Robustness
This section discusses the robustness checks done on the empirical approach to en-
sure that the key results are consistent. To do this, the study replicates estimations
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from Table 2.3 and Table 2.5, using the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM
estimator. The system GMM estimator tends to perform well in the presence of
highly persistent variables. The results are shown in Table 2.7 of the Appendix. All
the main results remain largely consistent with those presented in the previously
mentioned tables. The cyclical indicators remain negative and significant through-
out.
Table 2.7: Robustness checks using system GMM estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Hamilton Hamilton (G7) UC Model
Buffi,j,t−1 0.738*** 0.933*** 0.928***
(0.055) (0.044) (0.040)
ROE 5.594*** 4.016** 5.348***
(1.991) (1.566) (1.961)
Risk 0.092** 0.106*** 0.104***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.033)
Size -0.056* -0.026 -0.021
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032)
∆Loan -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.060***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.013)




Constant 1.562*** 0.290 0.320
(0.568) (0.352) (0.453)
α(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.20 0.59 0.36
Hansen J 0.06 0.07 0.46
Observations 5,001 2,925 2,631
No. of instruments 87 166 149
No. of banks 577 281 281
Notes: The dependent variable (BUFF) is the bank’s capital buffer ratio.
FACa: components (GDP, credit-to-GDP ratio, house prices). All estima-
tions are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, α(1) and α(2) are first
and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis of the
AR(2) test is that errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-
order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the
instruments are valid. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Further, the study also considers the fact that expectations might affect how and
when banks adjust their capital buffer. The question of whether banks react to ex-
pected changes in regulation remains largely unexplored. This issue raises concerns
about the understanding of banks’ behaviour, especially during times of significant
regulatory change. For example, expectations of forthcoming policy changes might
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lead to earlier reactions by banks. To test this, the study creates dummy variables
to represent the announcement dates of the Basel Accords. In June 1999, the Basel
Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to replace the
1988 Accord. This led to the release of a revised capital framework (Basel II) in
June 2004. The announcement of Basel III was made in 2010, and subsequently its
implementation began to phase-in in 2013. With the current dataset spanning the
period 2000 - 2014, it captures the announcement of both Basel II and Basel III
capital standards requirements.
As such, the study uses an event study to test whether these announcement dates
were significant in determining the timing and nature of adjustment of banks’ capital
buffer. These announcements turn out to be statistically insignificant. There are two
possible reasons for this. First, the frequency of the data used in this study might
not allow for accurately capturing the expectation effects. Banks are likely to make
adjustments to their buffer stock over monthly or quarterly intervals, in anticipation
of a policy change. The second reason is that the implementation process of Basel
capital regulations is not homogeneous across countries. Some countries or regions
are much slower in implementing these regulatory changes than others, which makes
it difficult to capture the effect of expectations or anticipation across this panel data.
2.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study examines how the capital buffers of banks behave over the business cy-
cle. The study uses two cyclical measures to examine this behaviour. It relies on
the widely used business cycle measure, proxied by GDP, and also introduces a
novel approach in the form of a finance-augmented cycle. The study applies the
Arellano-Bond GMM difference estimator to control for adjustment costs, unob-
servable heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The
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essay is unique in two ways. First, it differs from much of the empirical literature
on banks’ capital buffer, as most of these studies focus on a single country. This
study uses panel data and provides results for countries across all three income lev-
els. Second and more importantly, the majority of this literature solely focus on the
business cycle, disregarding the potential impact of financial sector activities. This
analysis uses a proxy of the business cycle which accounts for developments in the
financial sector. The inclusion of information about the financial side of the econ-
omy can provide more reliable estimates of the output-gap than the conventional
filter-based approach used in the literature.28
The results indicate a negative relationship between the capital buffer and the
business cycle. That is, during an economic downturn banks increase their capital
buffer, whilst in booms they reduce it. Furthermore, it finds that this negative
relationship is particularly related to large banks. The reason for this is owing
to the fact that Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) or big banks hold
less capital with the expectation that, in the event of a financial crisis, they will
inevitably be bailed out. On the other hand, small banks are more reliant on retained
earnings as a protection against insolvency, as such, they increase capital buffer
during booms. Further analysis indicates that this negative relationship is being
driven by commercial and savings banks, with the former being more sensitive to
the business cycle. The results also highlight that capital ratios are even more
pro-cyclical when using a finance-augmented output gap. While it is understood
that the task of disentangling credit cycles from business cycles and measuring both
accurately is quite difficult, it is important to capture as much information about the
financial sector if we are to discover the true impact of macroprudential regulation.
An important implication of these findings is the key role of monetary authorities
28For further details on reliable estimates of output-gap accounting for the information of finan-
cial variables see Borio et al. (2016).
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in the supervision of risk management practices. Particularly, from a macropruden-
tial policy standpoint, regulators should adopt more flexible instruments to mitigate
credit risk in banks globally. This recommendation is motivated by the fact that
even with the prudential framework set out in the new Basel accords (Basel III),
the pro-cyclical behaviour of banks’ capital buffer will still persist.
The analysis in this study shows that it is not always safe to assume that regula-
tory or supervisory capital standards automatically constrain banks. Market power,
for example, may induce banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum required,
thereby reducing the power of capital requirements as instruments of financial sta-
bility.
A major step towards mitigating the pro-cyclical impact of capital ratios is the
introduction of capital conservation buffer (countercyclical capital buffer). This
particular tool is designed to ensure that banks build-up sufficient capital buffers
in the banking system during booms and to encourage their use during stressful
periods, thereby easing the strains on credit supply. The finding of a greater degree
of pro-cyclicality of banks’ capital ratios would suggest that the approach to setting




Corporate Tax-Shields and Capital
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3.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis demonstrated that bank capital structure is one of
the most important determinants of financial stability, as better capitalized banks
tend to be more resilient to economic and financial shocks. Consequently, regula-
tors have significantly focused their atention on banks capital adequacy in order to
enhance the stability of the financial system. The realization of this importance
has prompted many researchers to try to identify and understand the determinants
of bank capital structure. An often overlooked or underestimated determinant is
corporate income taxation; interestingly, studies have shown that taxation was one
of the possible sources that might have indirectly contributed to the 2008 financial
crisis (see for e.g. De Mooij (2012), Turner (2010)). Yet, there is scarce evidence
on the impact of corporate taxation on bank stability, with most of the existing
literature focusing on the relationship between taxes and leverage.1 Previous work
on capital structure focuses primarily on bank-specific factors. As a consequence,
the question of whether corporate taxes play a crucial role in the capital structure
decisions of banks remains largely unanswered. This essay seeks to address this gap
in the literature by examining the impact of corporate tax shields on the capital
structure of banks.
As Schepens (2016) points out, one particular challenge in empirically analysing
the impact of tax shields on bank capital structure is that tax shields are generally
constant over time, and marginal tax rates tend to be endogenous. That is, changes
to the tax rate are usually part of a broader tax reform, which then makes it difficult
to isolate the direct impact of the tax shield. To circumvent this, this study exploits
an exogenous change in corporate tax laws in Italy in 2012 that tackled this tax
1See DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Dwenger and Steiner (2014),Heckemeyer and de Mooij
(2017).
57
Section 3.1 Chapter 3
advantage of debt finance by introducing an allowance for corporate equity.2 The
introduction of this ACE allows for examining the direct impact of a tax shield for
equity on bank capital structure, the implications it has for the risk-taking behaviour
of these banks, and finally, the important role this tax shield has to play in the make
up of tools available to prudential regulators.
The analysis yields several distinct set of results. First, it finds that treated
banks which have been affected by this new tax regulation, significantly increase
their capital ratios by approximately 8.5%. The main intuition behind this finding
is that the ACE ensures a cut in the effective tax ratio (tax liability on profit), hence
freeing up resources. As a result, banks can now rely more on internal or external
equity and less on leverage. This result is corroborated by the ‘trade-off theory’
for capital structure, as the creation of a tax shield for equity reduces the marginal
benefit of debt. Second, it finds that this reaction by banks to the tax shield is
homogeneous. That is, both high- and low-capitalized banks increase their equity
ratios following the implementation of the tax shield.3 Third, the study examines the
main factors influencing this change in the equity ratios. By definition, bank equity
ratios can increase either by increasing their equity, or by reducing their assets, or
indeed by a combination of both. The results reveal that the observed increase in
equity ratios is as a result of an increase in common equity rather than a reduction in
assets. This result is of paramount importance due to the far reaching implications
had it been as a result of a reduction in bank activities. Empirically, it confirms
that the increase in equity ratios is due to the exogenous change in corporate tax
laws, which reduces the tax debt bias. However, more importantly, it dismisses any
concerns about the treatment having any pro-cyclical effect. The recent financial
2The Italian ACE was presented by the government in December 2011 and decreed by the
Ministry of Economy and Finance in March 2012.
3Banks are regarded as being highly-capitalized if they have an equity-to-assets ratio that is in
the 75th percentile of the size distribution. Those with equity ratios below the median are classified
as low-capitalized or financially more constrained.
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crisis demonstrated that higher capital requirements could potentially harm the
real economy if they significantly reduce bank loan provision.4 This finding can also
relax any concern about the observed changes in equity ratios being as a result of a
reduction in loan demand, since the ACE was also enforced for non-financial firms
(see Célérier et al. (2017)).
Finally, examining the risk-taking behaviour of the banks, this essay documents
that not all treated banks react in a similar manner. The reaction depends on
how well capitalized the banks are. Only under-capitalized banks reduce their level
of riskiness (as measured by a non-performing loans ratio). The study finds that,
following the introduction of the ACE, ex-ante high-capitalized banks increase their
riskiness.
Overall, the results in this essay illustrate that both ex-ante high and low-
capitalized banks adjust their capital structure in a similar manner following the
introduction of the allowance for corporate equity. However, the risk-taking be-
haviour is heterogeneous across these bank types, as only ex-ante low-capitalized
banks reduce their riskiness.
This essay therefore builds on two broad strands of the literature. First, it adds
to the literature discussing the determinants of banks’ capital structure, and capital
structure decision (see amongst others; Gropp and Heider (2010), Allen et al. (2015),
and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015)). More importantly, it also contributes to the
burgeoning literature surrounding the introduction of a tax shield for equity, to re-
duce the relative tax advantage of debt (see for example; Schepens (2016), Célérier
et al. (2017), and Panier et al. (2013)). By focusing on the Italian banking sector,
this paper builds on the findings of Schepens (2016) by evaluating the robustness
of an ACE as a new macroprudential policy tool. While Panteghini et al. (2012)
4There is also an extensive literature on the potential pro-cyclical effects of capital requirements.
See for e.g. Jokipii and Milne (2008), Coffinet et al. (2012), Shim (2013), and Brei and Gambacorta
(2016).
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tested the impact of an ACE on Italian firms, the focus on banks in this study
serves to contribute to the macroprudential debate, particularly regarding the de-
sign of countercyclical policy tools. The nature of Italy’s banking system and the
timing of the introduction of the ACE make the findings of this study even more
relevant for policymakers. Unlike Belgium, the Italian banking sector suffered from
the Eurozone government debt crisis which began in 2010 - a delayed unfolding
of the global financial crisis. Italy’s economy also performed poorly in the years
preceding the crisis and held a very high debt-to-GDP ratio. Further, Italy’s ACE
was implemented after the global financial crisis whilst Belgium’s tax reform was in
2006. These particular features of Italy’s banking sector and economy provide an
ideal opportunity to test the robustness of the ACE as a potential macroprudential
policy tool.
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows. Section 3.2 gives an extensive
overview of the literature. Section 3.3 describes the Italian ACE system and develops
the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.4 describes the data and empirical method
used. Section 3.5 discusses the results from the empirical analysis. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Literature overview
There is an ongoing debate on the role taxes play in the capital structure decision
of institutions. In the mid-1970s, the general academic view was that the optimal
capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present
value of bankruptcy costs. Miller (1977) presented a new challenge by showing
that under certain conditions there is a trade-off in tax advantage between the firm
and household. That is, the tax advantage gained by firms through debt finance is
exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the household level. Since then,
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studies have sought to reconcile Miller’s finding with that of the balancing theory.
Beyond this, a number of studies have attempted to explain the role taxes play in
determining capital structure.
In an early paper, Fischer et al. (1989) use a continuous-time framework to mea-
sure capital structure choice. The model derives closed-form solutions for the value
of a firm’s debt and equity as a function of its dynamic recapitalization decisions.
The results from the model highlight the risks of viewing observed debt ratios as
“optimal", and as such use the range over which the firm allows its debt ratio to vary
as the measure of capital structure relevance instead. In doing so, the model then
provides distinct predictions relating firm-specific properties to the range of optimal
leverage ratios. Smaller, riskier, lower-tax, lower-bankruptcy-cost firms will exhibit
wider swings in their debt ratios over time. Other earlier studies that contribute to
this debate include, among others, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); Ang and Peterson
(1986); Titman and Wessels (1988); Graham (1996a) and Graham (1996b).
Within the banking literature, most studies on capital structure mainly focus
on the bank-specific factors that affect bank capital structure (see for e.g. Flannery
and Rangan (2008); Berger et al. (2008); Gropp and Heider (2010); Antoniou et al.
(2008)). Interestingly, Gropp and Heider (2010) find that unobserved time-invariant
bank fixed effects are the most important determinants of banks’ capital structures
and that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were not as important
in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks. Octavia and
Brown (2010) on the other hand argue that the standard determinants of capital
structure do provide explanatory power with regards to the variation in both bank
and market capital above the minimum requirement. Adding that when asset risk is
controlled for, the overall significance of the standard determinants of bank capital
structure choice is unchanged. The authors however, focused solely on 10 selected
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developing countries.
Diamond and Rajan (2000) posit that in order to truly understand the determi-
nants of bank capital structure, it is important to firstly model the essential functions
that banks perform, and then ask what role capital plays. This approach demon-
strates that a bank’s capital structure affects both its ability to create liquidity and
credit, and also its stability.
Other studies within the literature tend to focus on how banks make capital
structure adjustment. To assess the cyclical behaviour of European bank capital
buffers, Jokipii and Milne (2008) rely on the ‘standard’ determinants of bank capital.
That is, they control for banks’ risk behaviour, size, and profitability - and then
demonstrate that banks tend to reduce capital in business cycle expansions and
increase capital in recessions. Lepetit et al. (2015) use similar bank-specific controls
along with market discipline and ownership to test whether banks’ capital ratios are
affected by the degree to which control rights are exercised by owners in pyramids.
The finding suggests that banks’ decisions on how to move to target capital ratios
vary according to the presence or absence of excess control rights. In the absence
of excess control rights, banks build their capital ratios by issuing equity and by
readjusting their assets without curtailing lending. In fact, these banks reduce
their capital ratios by repurchasing equity and lowering retained earnings and by
expanding their assets, particularly through lending. On the other hand, in the
presence of excess control rights, banks adjust by repurchasing equity when they are
above the target capital ratio. Of note, Lepetit et al. (2015) point out that instead
of issuing equity, these controlled banks increase their capital ratio by pulling on
earnings and by reducing their assets, particularly, their lending.
Using a partial adjustment framework with bank-specific and time-varying tar-
gets to model bank capital ratios, De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) present some
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distinctive findings regarding how banks adjust their capital. They show that these
adjustment decisions not only reflect the characteristics of the bank, but also the
environment in which it operates. They find that speed of capital structure ad-
justment is heterogeneous across countries. Specifically, in countries where there
are more developed capital markets, stringent capital requirements and supervisory
monitoring, and high inflation, banks tend to make faster capital structure adjust-
ments. Also, banks make capital structure adjustments significantly faster during
crisis periods.
Contributing to the debate on the design and calibration of international capital
standards, Francis and Osborne (2012) find that capital requirements that include
firm-specific, time-varying add-ons set by supervisors affect banks’ desired capital
ratios. They argue that as a result of this, the adjustments to capital and lending
depend on the gap between actual and target ratios. More importantly, their results
suggest that the impact of countercyclical capital requirements may be dampened
in trying to slow credit activity when banks can readily satisfy them with lower-
quality capital elements versus higher-quality common equity. In a similar study
Memmel and Raupach (2010) find that there is a high level of variation in capital
ratios across banks, but less so across non-financial firms. Further, they find that
private commercial banks and banks with a high degree of proprietary trading tend
to make tighter adjustments to their regulatory capital ratios.
While there is a wide range of work on capital structure adjustments, the impact
of corporate tax rates on these adjustments is far less researched. The exisiting
literature on tax rates and leverage mainly looks at the correlation between the two
on a cross-country level. Keen and de Mooij (2012) explore the impact of corporate
tax bias on bank leverage and regulatory capital ratios for a panel of over 14,000
commercial banks across 82 countries over the nine year period 2001-2009. They
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explore various forms of heterogeneity by estimating a second-order polynomial with
interactions of bank characteristics and the tax effect on leverage. Their findings
suggest that responses differ only by bank size. They find that large banks (usually
more highly leveraged), are less responsive to tax than small banks. This finding
concurs with the ‘too-big-to-fail’ hypothesis. Large banks being less responsive to
tax changes than smaller banks highlights their status that lowers their cost of debt
finance, inducing them to become more highly leveraged and leaving less scope for
tax effects. In a related study, De Mooij et al. (2013) show the implications of
corporate tax systems favouring debt finance over equity finance. They argue that
greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and
this then translates to greater risk of crisis.
Horváth (2013) uses GMM to estimate the effect of corporate income taxation
on bank capital structure and risk. Consistent with the literature, he finds that an
increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in the leverage ratio and a reduction
in average risk-weighted assets. Similar to Keen and de Mooij (2012), Gu et al.
(2015) find that banks that are subject to more stringent capital requirements are
less responsive to tax. More specifically, they find that there are two channels
through which a bank’s leverage depends on corporate income taxes. The first is
the ‘the traditional debt bias’, which is measured by the debt impact of the local
tax level in the host country of a subsidiary. The second is via ‘international debt
shifting’, which measures the debt impact of the cross-border tax difference vis-a-vis
other bank subsidiaries in the same multinational group. The study shows that the
impact of the tax effect is significant via both channels. However, the international
debt shifting effect is stronger. Thus, they suggest that tax policies worldwide
induce a large share of international debt structure changes through their impact
on multinational bank behaviour.
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Adding to this body of literature also is Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2014),
whose findings are largely consistent with previous studies. The authors examine
the effect of tax rate changes on leverage, dividend policies and earnings management
of banks, with results suggesting a significant impact on all three. Most importantly,
they find that leverage increases with the corporate income tax (CIT) reform within
the first three months of its implementation. They cite as the main reason, the
fact that a higher tax rate increases incentives to use debt finance when interest
payments are deductible from the CIT base.
An exception to the cross-country study is Schandlbauer (2017). He adopts the
difference-in-differences methodology to show the impact of changes in local state
corporate tax rates in the United States affect banks’ financing as well as their
operating choice. His study exploits U.S. bank holding companies that were subject
to 13 distinct state tax increases between 2000-2011. He finds that as a result of
the tax increase, banks significantly increase their non-depository leverage ratio,
pointing to the fact that they benefit from an enlarged tax shield which prevails
due to the higher tax rate. Another interesting finding, and one that is consistent
with Keen and de Mooij (2012) and Gu et al. (2015), is that it is predominantly
the better-capitalized banks that have the financial flexibility to increase their debt,
while those with less capital only partially increase their short-term debt. Finally,
Schandlbauer (2017) finds that these adjustments by better-capitalized banks are
only in reaction to income and franchise tax increases, with surcharge tax increases
having no significant effect.
Another U.S. focused study is Ashcraft (2008), which highlights the positive
cross-sectional relationship between the state tax rate and banks’ leverage ratio in
the U.S. The paper finds that banks facing higher state income tax rates tend to
have more debt in their capital structure.
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Evidence points toward a strong bias toward debt funding in corporate finance.
Furthermore, no compelling reason has been put forward to explain this tax ad-
vantage of debt finance in many countries. This bias not only creates significant
inequities but also causes economic distortions. One possible solution is to intro-
duce an allowance for corporate equity. This is one of the main motivations of this
paper, as it exploits the introduction of the ACE in Italy in 2012.
The closest work to this current essay is Schepens (2016), which exploits the
introduction of the tax shield for equity in Belgium in 2006. In the paper, the author
shows that tax shields significantly impacts the capital structure of banks. The
author uses a difference-in-differences approach to compare the capital adjustment
of Belgian banks that were subject to the tax treatment and a group of matched
European banks that did not experience this treatment. The results suggest that,
on average, a reduction in the tax bias towards debt relative to equity increases
the equity ratio of treated banks. In other words, a more balanced treatment of
equity and debt funding increases bank capital ratios, fuelled by movements in
common equity. The study further highlights that balancing the debt-equity bias
also significantly reduces the level of risk-taking by ex-ante low capitalized banks.
Kestens et al. (2012) test whether the notional interest deduction (NID) introduced
in Belgium in 2006 impacted the debt ratios of small and medium enterprises. They
find significant declines in tax rate and leverage ratios as a result of the reform.
Using German and French firms as controls against ‘treated’ Belgian firms, Prin-
cen (2012) finds a significant negative effect on the financial leverage of a company
following the introduction of the 2006 equity tax shield. Panier et al. (2013) confirm
these results using a broader and better defined control group. They use firm-level
data on Belgium’s neighbouring countries as a credible counterfactual. In decid-
ing the control group, they argue that firms in Germany, France, Netherlands and
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Luxembourg are geographically close, economically integrated and use the same cur-
rency as Belgian firms. As such, they are likely to be exposed to common aggregate
shocks. However, these countries did not introduce a reform for equity deductions.
The study documents four major findings. First, the introduction of the ACE leads
to higher capitalization rates in Belgium. Next, both incumbent and new Belgian
firms significantly increase their equity ratios. Third, large firms react more to the
new tax incentive, consistent with the notion that smaller firms may face major
refinancing cost. Finally, the increase in equity ratios of Belgian firms is explained
by a significant increase in the levels of equity and not due to a reduction in the
value of non-equity liabilities. Contrary to these findings, Van Campenhout and
Van Caneghem (2013) show that NID had no impact on the financial decision mak-
ing of a group of small firms.
To the best of my knowledge, this essay will be the first to examine the impact
of the ACE on banks’ capital structure in Italy. Previous studies have focused their
attention on non-financial firms. A study by ? looks at the 2012 ACE in Italy, and
its impact on a firm’s leverage. They find a negative correlation between the ACE
treatment and firms’ leverage, with the caveat that this also depends on location,
size, and the sector in which the firms operate. The ACE benefit thus allows firms
to reduce their tax burden and leverage, and inevitably cut system risk.
Staderini (2001) use company-level data on capital structure to analyse the reac-
tion of Italian firms to the business tax reform of 1997-98. This tax reform, termed
the Dual Income Tax (DIT) system, was introduced as a relief for equity finance. It
reduced the tax rate on profits with the abolition of the ILOR tax.5 By reducing the
bias against equity capital, this was seen as an initial step to eliminate the bias in
capital structure decision. Staderini (2001) find that firms reduce their leverage in
reaction to the introduction of the partial ACE. They also look at the composition
5The ILOR or Imposta Locale sul Reddito, is a local tax on income in Italy.
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of firms that benefited from the reform. The finding highlights that it is mainly the
profitable firms and those with high investment rates that benefited and issued new
equity, while less profitable companies were not fully incentivised by the improved
tax status of equity. However, the authors acknowledge the fact that the paper
only considers data up to 1998, and as such, might miss out on delayed effects of
the reform. A similar paper by Santoro (2005), with data up to 2000, also finds
the expected negative impact of Italy’s partial ACE on firms’ leverage. More in-
terestingly, he provides two possible arguments for the different reaction of smaller
(less-profitable) firms. The first argument, cited in Bordignon et al. (1999), says
smaller firms or firms located in the southern regions of Italy were just slower to
adjust to the changing tax environment due to short-run asymmetries of information
that would not exist in the long-run. The alternative argument is that it is in the na-
ture of smaller firms to favour debt finance since they have a family based property
structure which sets upper boundaries to both internal and external equity. Santoro
(2005) argues that in this case, even if the Italian partial ACE was not abolished,
it would have had the same adverse distributional impact, i.e., smaller firms would
never obtain tax reductions, with only the larger firms benefiting. Oropallo and
Parisi (2007) show that following the repeal of the tax reform, average tax burden
significantly increased.
An assessment of the impact of the ACE and the comprehensive business income
tax (CBIT) reveals that both are attractive propositions for European countries.
The CBIT, like the ACE, is aimed at mitigating the differential treatment of debt
and equity. De Mooij and Devereux (2011) find that if governments adjust statutory
corporate tax rates to balance budgets, profit shifting and discrete location make
CBIT a more attractive option for most individual European countries. However,
in a system of coordination, a joint ACE becomes more efficient than a joint CBIT.
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A combination of both improves welfare overall.
Another aspect of the introduction of these tax reforms is how they affect bank
lending. While this paper will not directly focus on banks’ subsequent lending
behaviour, such actions could have implications for regulators and policy makers.
Célérier et al. (2017) use loan level data from the German credit register to assess
the impact on lending in Germany by banks that were subject to tax reforms in
Italy (2000) and Belgium (2006). They find that implementing a tax shield on
equity leads to a significant increase in bank lending. The large magnitude of the
effect also implies a great degree of sensitivity between bank lending and the cost of
equity.
3.3 The Italian ACE system and hypothesis de-
velopment
The key source of identification in this study is the reform of corporate tax laws
in Italy in 2012. Standard corporate income tax systems favour the choice of debt
financing over equity financing as interest payments are tax deductible. Moreover,
Albert and Expert (2008) highlight that Italian firms are more exposed to debt
than other European companies, a claim echoed by Bias (2009) in an IMF study.
This excessive debt exposure has been favoured by existing corporate tax laws.
By guaranteeing the deductibility of interest on debt, many tax systems encourage
debt finance, thus creating under-capitalization and increasing the probability of
default risk. This discrimination against equity finance violates the Modigliani Miller
theorem.6 However, in the presence of market imperfections, this adjustment may
be slower or even impossible to follow (see for e.g. Almeida et al. (2004)). To reduce
6In frictionless capital markets, firms would have the necessary conditions to access the equity
market and adjust their capital structure when needed (Modigliani and Miller, 1958)
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this tax distortion in favour of debt financing, the Italian government introduced
an Allowance for Corporate Equity instrument, to be applied to both financial and
non-financial firms. The ACE allows for a notional return on equity, which, like
the cost of debt, can be deducted from taxable income, thus contributing to the
strengthening of firms’ capitalization.
Italy’s new ACE system shares some similarities with its previous Dual Income
Tax system, which was in force from 1998 to 2003. For example, profit is divided into
two components (ordinary and above-normal income) under both regimes. However,
whereas ordinary income is taxed at a lower rate under the DIT system, it is com-
pletely exempted under the new ACE system.7 A key feature in both systems is that
the ACE benefit is applied only to new equity. De Mooij and Devereux (2011) point
out that if the ACE benefits were applied to the whole net internal equity, then its
cost would be about 0.5% of GNP. Hence, he proposes a gradual approach aimed
at ensuring that ACE benefits only new wealth. Klemm (2007) further explains
that the introduction of an ACE narrows the tax base. To account for this poten-
tial loss in revenue, the government could increase corporate income taxes. This,
he explains, would put the country introducing the ACE at a disadvantage, given
a globalized world where capital is internationally mobile. As such, applying the
ACE to only new equity would be a more efficient approach. This is the approach
that was adopted by the Italian government with the introduction of the ACE tax
reform.
3.3.1 Hypothesis development
The role of taxes in determining the capital structure of firms have always been quite
significant. The main reason for this is the cost of debt is usually deductible as an
7See Bordignon et al. (1999) and Bordignon et al. (2001) for more details on the Italian DIT.
70
Section 3.4 Chapter 3
expenditure, while payments to equity holders are not. Introducing an ACE would
provide tax relief on the costs associated with using equity to finance investment.
The desired effect of the introduction of an ACE is to reduce the debt tax bias,
which in turn should lead to better capitalized banks. This is under the assumption
that banks will now rely more on internal or external equity and less on leverage.
Against this background, the study tests two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The introduction of a tax shield for equity increases bank equity
ratios.
The marginal benefit of debt is now reduced, allowing banks to free up resources
and rely more on equity.
Hypothesis 2. The allowance for corporate equity will cause banks to reduce
their riskiness.
3.4 Data and empirical design
The principal data source for the bank-specific data used in the empirical setup
is Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database. The sample is drawn from all EU-28
countries.8 See Table A6 for a complete list of the countries selected. I select
commercial, savings, cooperative and bank holding companies that have available
data for each year from 2008 to 2013 on all the key variables used in the empirical
analysis. This period coincides with four years before the introduction of the ACE
and two years whilst it was in place. The treatment period is restricted to two years
to reduce the possibility of capturing the impact of any other shocks that could
affect bank equity ratios.9 This selection resulted in a sample of 65 Italian banks
8I exclude Belgium from the sample given that they were subject to an identical tax treatment
in 2006.
9Consolidated data is used for most banks. Where this is not available, the aggregated data is
used.
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and 643 other banks from the European Union.
The main variable of interest is bank equity ratio, which is defined as the ratio of
total equity to total assets.10 Bank-specific controls include: profitability - proxied
by return on assets; bank size - defined as the log of total assets; bank risk - defined as
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, and bank diversification - proxied by
the ratio of non-interest income to total income. In order to analyse the underlying
drivers of equity ratio changes, the study looks at total loans and banks’ retained
earnings. As it relates to banks’ risk behaviour and stability, I focus on their non-
performing loan ratios and Z-score. To capture differences in the level of economic
development in each country, the study considers three macroeconomic controls from
the World Development Indicators database. These are: GDP per capita, the CPI
rate and also the growth rate of GDP.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis.
The average equity ratio for the treated and control groups is 16.8% and 14.9% ,
respectively. The average bank size is almost identical for both groups, with an
average of 9.3Mil and 9.4Mil for the treated and control groups, respectively. The
average loan ratio is approximately 60% for all banks. The non-performing loans
ratio is 10% for all banks. Regarding the macroeconomic controls, the average
inflation rate for both groups is approximately 2%, while average GDP per capita
stands at about 10.4 million for both groups.
10Table A7 provides a description of the variables used throughout the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Equity ratio Treated 318 16.860 35.958 0.188 219.950
Control 3,000 14.923 26.415 0.034 219.950
ln(Total assets) Treated 318 9.315 2.125 1.695 14.191
Control 3,000 9.453 2.223 3.847 15.124
Return on assets Treated 318 0.278 4.891 -42.141 34.219
Control 3,000 0.188 3.566 -41.411 101.358
Loan ratio Treated 304 0.609 0.246 0.011 0.947
Control 2,955 0.585 0.237 0.000 2.337
Non-interest income share Treated 316 0.454 0.626 -8.500 4.862
Control 2,982 0.409 0.366 -3.283 6.253
Risk Treated 263 0.090 0.074 0.000 0.646
Control 2047 0.082 0.100 0.000 1.000
ln(Z-score) Treated 312 3.046 0.953 0.133 5.519
Control 2908 3.054 1.368 -6.373 8.295
ln(Equity) Treated 318 6.722 1.053 5.048 8.052
Control 3000 6.729 1.073 5.048 8.052
ln(Retained earnings) Treated 55 6.245 1.988 3.457 9.918
Control 2131 5.921 2.285 -2.025 11.765
ln(Loans) Treated 304 8.602 2.607 -2.768 13.640
Control 2954 8.747 2.408 -3.640 14.363
Macro controls
CPI rate Treated 65 2.111 0.987 0.750 3.375
Control 643 2.360 1.829 -4.480 15.431
ln(GDP per capita) Treated 65 10.479 0.032 10.431 10.534
Control 643 10.414 0.541 8.812 11.582
GDP growth Treated 65 -1.966 2.400 -5.912 1.374
Control 643 -0.288 3.135 -14.56 10.281
This table provides summary statistics for the variables which are used throughout the analysis. The treated group refers
to banks which experience a change in their tax system, and the control group depicts the banks whose tax system does
not change. All variables are defined in Table A7.
Figure 3.1 depicts the kernel density estimates for the treated and control groups
and highlights the similarities. The figure highlights the similarities in bank char-
acteristics for both groups. Moreover, Table 3.2 provides further evidence that the
treated and control groups display similar characteristics prior to the introduction
of the ACE in Italy.
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Figure 3.1: Kernel Density Functions
To highlight similarities between treated and control groups, the plots display the main kernel density estimates for the different bank
characteristics for the two groups. The treated group refers to banks which experience a tax reform, and the control group depicts
the banks whose tax environment does not change.
The parallel trends assumption posits that in the absence of a treatment, on av-
erage, the treated and control group should exhibit similar trends in their character-
istics over time (Roberts and Whited, 2013). Satisfying this important assumption
is key to obtaining reliable difference-in-differences estimates. As such, I examine
the growth rates of the main variables used in the estimation in the pre-treatment
period. Table 3.2 displays the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of dif-
ferences. The bank characteristics of both groups appear to display a common trend
prior to the change in the tax environment for Italian banks.11
11The growth rate of bank size shows a dissimilar trend in both tests, whilst the growth rates of
the equity ratio and non-interest income share show a dissimilar trend in the Wilcoxon rank sum
test. Further analysis of these variables are carried out in the regression analysis.
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Table 3.2: Parallel trend assumption
t-test Wilcoxon test
Growth rate of equity/assets 0.10 0.00
Growth rate of ROA 0.76 0.08
Growth rate of NPLs/total loans 0.50 0.07
Growth rate of retained earnings 0.91 0.98
Growth rate of size 0.00 0.00
Growth rate of equity 0.60 0.56
Growth rate of loans/assets 0.73 0.25
Growth rate of non-interest income share 0.39 0.00
This table compares the growth rates of the main bank characteristics between the treated and control group. Growth
rates are calculated for the years prior to the introduction of the ACE (2008-2011). The second column provides the
p-values of a t-test of differences of the means. The null hypothesis for this test is that the difference in the means of the
two groups are not statistically different to zero. The third column shows the p-values of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The
Wilcoxon test tests the hypothesis that the two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution.
3.4.1 Empirical design
This section describes the methodology used in order to carry out the empirical
analysis.
Difference-in-differences methodology
The study employs a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation approach to examine
how a tax reform influences the capital structure of banks. Specifically, the study
employs this technique to compare capital structure changes of Italian banks with
that of a similar group of European banks that did not experience such a change
in their tax environment. The study exploits the introduction of an Allowance for
Corporate Equity in Italy in 2012.
The conventional DiD framework consists of identifying a specific intervention
or treatment. It then requires comparing the difference in outcomes after and before
the intervention for groups affected by the intervention to the same difference for
unaffected groups. In other words, you test the difference in the difference between
the treated group and the control group in the two periods. Therefore, a significant
difference in difference would suggest a significant treatment effect. Formally, a
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standard DiD framework can be described as follows. Let Yi,t be the outcome of
interest for individual i by time t (such as a year). The population is observed
in a pre-treatment period t = 0, and in a post-treatment period t = 1. Between
these two periods, a fraction of the population is exposed to the treatment. Denote
Di,t = 1 if individual i has been exposed to the treatment prior to period t, Di,t = 0
otherwise. Those individuals with Di,1 = 1 are known as the treated, while those
with Di,0 = 0 are the untreated (controls).
The conventional DiD estimator is commonly derived using a linear parametric
model. A model typically estimated takes the form:
Yi,t = λt + βi + αDi,t + γXi,t + i,t (3.1)
where λt and βi are time-specific and individual-specific components, α represents
the impact of the treatment, Xi,t are relevant individual controls, and i,t is an error
term.
DiD estimations have become an increasingly popular way to estimate causal
relationships due to its simplicity as well as its potential to circumvent endogene-
ity problems that typically exist when making comparisons between heterogeneous
individuals (see Meyer (1995) for an overview).
DiD estimation also has its limitations. Bertrand et al. (2004) argues that DiD
is appropriate when the interventions are as good as random, conditional on time
and group fixed effects. As such, much of the debate around the validity of a DiD
estimate usually focuses on the possible endogeneity of the intervention themselves.12
Another important concern has been whether DiD estimation ever isolates a specific
behavioral parameter (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Heckman (2000)).
In the context of this study, the treated group in the DiD analysis are Italian
12See Besley and Case (2000).
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banks that were exposed to the tax shield for equity. The control group is represented
by other banks in EU that did not experience such a change. Since the ACE was
introduced in 2012, the study uses 2012 and 2013 as the treatment period. The
treated group consists of 65 Italian banks and there are 643 banks represented in
the control group. A specification of the regression model is illustrated by the
equation below.
ETAi,t = φ+λ1 ∗Treatedi+λ2 ∗Postt+λ3 ∗Treatedi ∗Postt+λ4 ∗Xi,t+ i,t (3.2)
where
• i represents each bank in the sample;
• t denotes each year in the sample, spanning 2008 to 2013;
• ETAi,t is the equity ratio of bank i in period t;
• Treatedi is a dummy variable that takes the value one for all Italian banks in
the sample (treatment indicator);
• Postt is a dummy taking the value one in the treatment period (2012-2013);
• Xi,t contains the previously mentioned bank-specific and macroeconomic con-
trols;13
• i,t is the error term for bank i at time t
The main variable of interest is the coefficient on the variable λ3. It will highlight
the actual impact of the implemented ACE. Using a difference-in-differences method
ensures that the estimates will not be biased by any permanent differences between
13All control variables in the vector X are contemporaneous, with the exception of GDP which
enters with a one period lag.
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the treated and control group. The standard errors are all clustered bank level,
unless otherwise stated.
3.5 Results
This section analyses the difference in equity ratios between the treated and control
group of banks. Here, the interest is on the impact of the ACE on the capital
structure of Italian banks.
Table 3.3: Difference-in-differences regression
I II III IV
ETA ETA ln(ETA) ln(ETA)
DiD 5.282 2.668*** 0.082** 0.512***
(4.142) (0.945) (0.034) (0.087)
Post 0.885 -0.635* -0.018 -0.045**
(0.756) (0.382) (0.011) (0.021)
Treated 0.006 - - -
(2.915)
ROA 0.136 0.052*** 0.037***
(0.100) (0.013) (0.012)
ln(total assets) -17.732*** -0.800*** -0.541***
(2.709) (0.051) (0.023)
ln(Risk) 0.079 0.003* 0.004
(0.076) (0.002) (0.003)
Diversification -0.017** -0.000 0.002**
(0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Loan ratio 0.005 0.003** 0.003*
(0.049) (0.001) (0.002)
Retained earnings 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPt−1 11.120* 1.307*** 1.058**
(6.390) (0.269) (0.411)
CPI rate -0.831*** -0.034*** -0.023***
(0.200) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 14.601*** 68.068 -2.389 -4.152
(1.019) (69.932) (2.239) (4.253)
Observations 2,144 2,144 2,144 2,144
R-squared 0.002 0.330 0.451 0.871
Country FE No - - Yes
Bank FE No Yes Yes -
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Country
This table analyzes the impact of the change in tax regulation in a difference-
in-differences setup. The sample period is 2008 - 2013. The first column shows
the regression of the equity ratio (ETA) on a post-event dummy that equals one
in 2012 - 2013 (Post), a dummy indicating whether the bank is an Italian bank
(Treated) and an interaction term (DiD) between both dummies that captures
the actual impact of the tax change. In the first column, the model is estimated
using OLS. In the second column, bank fixed effects are added, which make the
Treated dummy obsolete, as it does not change within a bank. In the third
column, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the equity ratio.
Column 4 is similar to Column 3, but standard errors are clustered at the country
level instead of at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.1 respectively.
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Table 3.3 reports the results obtained from the difference-in-differences estima-
tion of (3.2). The models include country and bank fixed effects. Clustering of
standard errors are at bank level, unless otherwise stated. The first column of Table
3.3 reports a specification with no country or bank fixed effects. Furthermore, it
excludes all the bank specific and macro controls, and simply regresses the equity
ratio on the Post, Treated, and interaction dummies. The coefficient on the variable
of interest (DiD), which captures the impact of the introduction of the tax shield,
is positive but statistically insignificant in this case.
In the next setup, I add a set of bank and country-specific controls to the re-
gression. Specifically, I add proxies for bank profitability (ROA), bank size (natural
log of total assets), bank diversification, risk (ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans), asset structure (loan ratio), retained earnings, CPI rate, and the log of GDP.
The interaction variable (DiD) now carries a positive and significant coefficient of
2.668. This indicates that, on average, equity ratios for Italian banks increased fol-
lowing the implementation of the tax shield on equity. The results in column III
indicate this corresponds with an increase of 8.5% for the average bank in the sam-
ple.14 This finding is largely in-line with previous studies. Schepens (2016) shows
that such a reduction in the tax discrimination leads to a significant improvement
in the capitalisation of banks. He shows that, following the introduction of an ACE
in 2006, Belgian banks increased their equity ratios by approximately 13%. Panier
et al. (2013) document that non-financial firms have become better capitalized in
response to the reduction in the tax bias towards debt. Similarly, Panteghini et al.
14The correct interpretation of a log-linear equation with a binary dependent variable is derived
by Kennedy et al. (1981). He derives it as: g∗ = exp[cˆ− 1/2Vˆ (cˆ)]− 1, where g∗ is the percentage
change in the dependent variable given a change in the dummy variable from zero to one, cˆ is the
estimated coefficient on the dummy variable, and Vˆ (cˆ) is the estimated variance for this coefficient.
This transformed coefficient is used throughout the paper.
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(2012) show that, for non-financial firms, the implementation of the ACE reform
in Italy reduces but does not completely eliminate the financial distortion due to
interest dedcutibility. They show that despite the permanence of a tax advantage
toward debt, the ACE relief is estimated to significantly reduce leverage. Klemm
(2007) finds slightly contrasting results when studying an ACE system in Brazil. He
finds that, despite the reduction in the tax preference for debt finance, there was
no significant change in capital structures. Instead, it led to higher dividends and
an increase in debt-equity ratios. However, this might be attributed to peculiarities
within Brazil’s corporate tax system. In column IV, the standard errors are now
clustered at country level. This is done because the treatment varies at the country
level. The result is broadly consistent with the findings in the previous columns.
Overall, the results in Table 3.3 indicate that the tax policy reform brought
about the desired effect. That is, the introduction of the ACE that reduces the
tax bias between debt and equity, has a significantly large impact on banks’ capital
structure. Italian banks markedly increased their capital following the treatment,
relative to what would be expected without the ACE.
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Table 3.4: Equity ratio components
I II III IV V
ln(ETA) ln(Equity) ln(Total assets) ln(Loans) ln(Retained earnings)
DiD 0.082** 0.082** 0.037 0.076 -0.565
(0.034) (0.034) (0.066) (0.058) (0.354)
Post -0.018 -0.018 0.043*** 0.026 0.117***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.035)
Constant -2.389 -6.994*** 2.969 -1.877 -16.544**
(2.239) (2.239) (2.255) (3.327) (8.299)
Observations 2,144 2,144 2,144 2,144 1,823
R-squared 0.451 0.232 0.161 0.318 0.081
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
This table analyses the underlying drivers of the equity ratio after the introduction of the notional interest rate deduction.
The sample period is 2008 to 2013. The Post dummy equals one in 2012 to 2013, the Treated dummy equals one for the
Italian banks. The first column retakes the baseline result from Table 2 . Columns 2 and 5 analyse the impact on equity
and one of its sub-components, while Columns 3 and 4 look at the impact on the asset side. All left hand side variables are
in natural logarithms. Retained income share is the ratio of retained income over after-tax profits. All regressions include
bank-fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1,
respectively.
The next step is to identify whether the observed change in equity ratios are
being driven by the ACE, which reduces the tax bias, or by a decrease in bank
assets. This is done by examining the components of the equity ratio.
Table 3.4 provides the findings on the drivers of the equity ratio. The first column
merely repeats the main finding of Table 3.3, which shows that average equity ratios
for Italian banks increased by approximately 8.5% after the introduction of the ACE.
In column II, the equity ratio is replaced by the natural log of equity as the dependent
variable. The positive and significant coefficient indicates that the change in equity
ratios is indeed being driven by an increase in equity. Furthermore, this finding is
consolidated by examining the change in bank assets and loans, in columns III and
IV. The results reveal that there is no significant difference in the evolution of total
assets and loans between Italian banks and other European banks from the control
group. In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that there was a reduction
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in bank activities following the implementation of the ACE in 2012. In column V,
I attempt to identify whether banks are using their retained earnings to build this
capital buffer. However, the study finds no significant evidence of this. Overall,
the findings reported in this table show that the increase in equity ratios, following
the reduction in the tax bias, is being driven by an increase in bank equity, rather
than a decline in bank activities. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an increase in
retained earnings, which could potentially contribute to the building of this capital
buffer. However, other non-retained earnings factors (e.g. shareholder capital and
other reserves) could be fuelling this increase. The data set used in the study did not
allow for further breakdowns to capture the impact of these variables. Nonetheless,
the key finding of increases in equity rather than decline in assets limits the scope
for any negative externalities to bank activities. That is, it minimizes the incentive
to significantly reduce lending during downturns or to increase lending during credit
booms.
The analysis so far points to significant increases in bank equity ratios following
the implementation of the ACE. Yet, regulators might be interested to know whether
different types of banks react in a similar manner to this policy reform. Schepens
(2016) argues that if it were only the highly capitalized banks that react to this
policy change, then regulators might view the policy as less appealing compared
to a situation in which ex ante low capitalized banks are also impacted. As such,
Table 3.5 attempts to analyze the difference in behaviour of ex ante high and low
capitalized banks in reaction to the reduction in the tax bias. For this analysis,
I classify high capitalized banks as those with equity ratios that fall in the upper
quartile, and low capitalized banks as those that fall in the first and second quartile,
of the size distribution.
I also examine the ex ante risk taking behaviour of these banks in Table 3.5.
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There is an extensive literature on the relationship between capital and risk taking.
In theory, an unregulated bank will take excessive portfolio and leverage risks in
order to maximize its shareholder value at the expense of the deposit insurance (see
Benston (1986); Furlong and Keeley (1989); Keeley and Furlong (1990)). These
moral hazard incentives can be reduced by capital requirements if shareholders are
forced to absorb a substantial portion of the losses, thereby decreasing the value of
the deposit insurance put option. If the level of risk-taking is minimised, coupled
with higher capital levels, then it is expected that there will be lower probability of
default. However, the view that capital requirements reduce risks, thereby strength-
ening banking system resilience has been challenged in many quarters. Koehn and
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) find that the
bank’s expected return will be diminished by a forced reduction in leverage if cap-
ital is relatively expensive. Consequently, the owners of the bank may opt for a
higher point on the efficiency frontier, which is associated with greater returns and
more risk. The increase in the level of riskiness by the bank overcompensates the
increase in capital and translates to a greater probability of default.
Table 3.5 presents the findings on these relationships. The first column indicates
that low capitalized banks increase their equity ratio following the reduction in
the tax bias. The coefficient on the interaction term suggests that average equity
ratios are approximately 12.2% higher for Italian banks, compared to those in the
control group. Similarly, highly capitalized banks increase their equity ratio by
approximately 7.6% (see column 2) in response to the tax treatment. These results
indicate a degree of homogeneity across banks’ response and might satisfy regulators
as to the effectiveness of the policy.
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect and bank risk be-
haviour
Low-capital banks High-capital banks Low-capital banks High-capital banks
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(Risk) ln(Risk)
DiD 0.116*** 0.073** -0.152* 0.756*
(0.040) (0.033) (0.089) (0.434)
Post -0.036** -0.010 0.335*** 0.149
(0.017) (0.017) (0.041) (0.100)
Constant -1.263 4.238 66.355*** 28.416*
(3.217) (2.955) (7.985) (14.558)
Observations 1,369 503 1,243 420
R-squared 0.445 0.756 0.356 0.194
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
This table illustrates the difference in the impact of the ACE on high and low capitalised banks. The sample period is again
2008 to 2013. The Post dummy equals one in 2012 to 2013, the Treated dummy takes the value of one for the Italian banks.
The first two columns show the the impact of the ACE on (ex-ante) high and low capitalised banks. I classify high capitalised
banks as those whose equity ratio fall in the fourth quartile of the size distribution, and low capitalised banks as those that fall
in the first and second quartile of the size distribution. The sample for the highly capitalised banks now comprises of 12 treated
banks and 132 untreated banks. For the low capitalised sample, there are 36 treated banks and 254 untreated banks. In the
third and fourth column, I examine the ex ante risk-taking behaviour of these high and low capitalised banks. I use the ratio
of non-performing loans to total loans as the left hand side variable. All regressions include bank fixed effects, standard errors
are clustered at the level. ***, **, and * denote the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.
Next, the study turns attention to bank risk-taking behaviour in columns III and
IV, where the dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
The negative coefficient on the interaction term, in column III, suggests that banks
with relatively lower capital levels tend to reduce their level of risk-taking. On the
other hand, the results differ for highly capitalized banks. The positive coefficient
on the variable of interest, in column IV, points to higher levels of risk-taking by
these banks, following the reduction in the tax bias. This heterogeneous finding
in bank risk-taking behaviour is not unexpected. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) posit
that the relationship between risk and capital in banks is not strictly the result of
regulatory influence. They argue that it rather reflects the view that risk-taking
behaviour tends to be constrained by bank owners’ or managers’ private incentives.
They find that this is consistent with the leverage and risk-related cost avoidance
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and managerial risk aversion theories of capital structure and risk-taking behaviour
in commercial banks.
Overall, the results in Table 3.5 indicate that both high and low capitalized banks
increase their equity ratios after the implementation of the tax shield for equity.
However, only low capitalized banks decrease their riskiness after the implementation
of the ACE. High capitalized banks instead increase their levels of riskiness. This
finding is similar to that of Schepens (2016), who argues that a potential explanation
for this behaviour by high capitalized banks is that there are diminishing returns
to the screening and monitoring of borrowers. This view is in line with the work of
Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Carletti (2004) on convex cost functions of bank
monitoring, which argues that it is increasingly difficult for a bank to discover more
and more about a firm.
3.5.1 Robustness
To gauge the reliability of the results, a series of robustness checks are carried out.
The first is to ensure that the results do not suffer from a sample selection bias.
Estimations are done to see whether the results are being driven by outliers. In
addition, a placebo test is performed to confirm that the results do not hold under
a false treatment date. A placebo test is also done using one of the control group
countries as the country that received treatment.15 The results from these additional
tests will serve to buttress the main findings.
The results of the above-mentioned robustness checks are presented in Table 3.6.
The first column tests whether the main findings are being driven by sample selec-
tion. To do this, the number of countries from which the control group of banks are
selected is restricted to a set of countries with a similar macroeconomic environment.
15For completeness, this exercise is repeated using each of the remaining control group banks,
in turn. The results are presented in Table A9.
85
Section 3.5 Chapter 3
Specifically, the study uses the remaining members of the so called GIIPS countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). This group of countries experienced similar
economic climate before and after the crisis. The GIIPS countries were among the
European countries most severely affected by the global financial crisis. All five
countries experienced similar banking sector problems, credit crunches, and gov-
ernment debt crises. Similarly, in the decade prior to the crisis, all five countries
experienced rapid economic growth, stable inflation and rapidly growing domestic
credit. As such, limiting the control group to these set of countries helps to control
better for the common macroeconomic factors in the treated and the control group.
The result of this test is shown in the first column. The coefficient on the interaction
term remains positive and significant. The finding suggests that the introduction of
the ACE, on average, increases the equity ratios of Italian banks by approximately
11%.
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Table 3.6: Robustness checks
Control countries (GIPS) Outliers Outliers Placebo (year) Placebo (Spain)
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA)
DiD 0.106* 0.074** 0.079** -0.025 -0.057
(0.060) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.084)
Post -0.059 -0.018 -0.015 0.059*** -0.015
(0.059) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012)
Constant -5.986 -2.401 -3.300 -5.182* -2.040
(5.961) (2.239) (2.281) (3.133) (2.428)
Observations 560 2,143 2,104 1,543 2,113
R-squared 0.357 0.451 0.437 0.454 0.451
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
This table provides five robustness checks for the difference-in-differences results. For each robustness check, the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the equity ratio. All the regressions include the same set of control variables as used in the main setup
in Table 2, column 3. Standard errors are again clustered at the bank level. The sample period is once again 2008 to 2013. For
the first robustness check, in column 1, I restrict the countries from which the control group of banks are selected to four countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) with similar macroeconomic environment. In the second column, I remove the 10% of Italian
banks that had the highest growth in equity ratios after the introduction of the ACE. In the third column, I then remove the 10%
of control group banks that had the lowest growth in equity ratios after the the introduction of the ACE. In column 4, I perform a
placebo test where I assume the treatment took place in 2010 instead of 2012. In the final column, I perform another placebo test
where I assume the ACE was introduced in Spain instead of Italy. ***, **, and * denote p <0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.
The second and third columns of Table 3.6 test whether the main results are
being driven by extreme outliers. In the first instance, the 10% of Italian banks
that had the highest growth in equity ratios after the implementation of the ACE
are removed. In doing so, the idea that the overall growth in equity ratios is being
driven by only a few Italian banks can be dismissed. The 10% of control group
banks that had the lowest growth in equity ratios following the introduction of the
ACE were then removed. The results for these two scenarios are shown in columns
II and III, respectively. The coefficients on the difference-in-differences variable in
both columns are consistent with the main results.
In the next column of Table 3.6, a placebo test is performed under the assump-
tion that the ACE was introduced in 2010 instead of 2012. Under this assumption,
the treatment effect should not be significantly different from zero. If it is, this
would suggest that the difference-in-differences strategy might be picking up other
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unobservable differences between the treated and control group. In such an event,
estimations of the impact of the implementation of the ACE on equity ratios would
be biased. However, the result of this test, as shown in column IV, dismisses this
possibility. This test finds no significant evidence to suggest that banks increase their
equity ratio following the false treatment. The final column of Table 3.6 presents
another placebo test, this time assuming that the country that received the treat-
ment is Spain instead of Italy.16 Again, this returns no significant evidence that
would suggest that these banks increase their equity ratios. These findings validate
the setup of the difference-in-differences model used.
Finally, I check whether the results of Table 3.5 are robust to alternative classifi-
cations of low and high capital banks using country-based indicators. The results of
these tests are presented in Table A8 of the appendix. In this setup, high capitalised
banks are those whose equity ratio fall in the highest decile of the size distribution
within each country. Low capitalised banks are those that fall in the bottom 30
percentile of the size distribution within each country. The results presented using
this alternative classification are largely in line with the findings in Table 3.5. This
therefore serves to buttress the evidence that both ex-ante high and low capital
banks increase their capital because of the ACE, whilst low capitalised banks tend
to reduce their level of riskiness following this tax reform.
3.6 Conclusion
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the debate surrounding bank capital reg-
ulation has come under increasing attention. Indeed, capital requirements have
become one of the key instruments of modern day banking regulation, providing
both a cushion during adverse economic conditions and a mechanism for preventing
16For this estimation, Italy is removed from the sample in order to avoid any offsetting effect.
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excessive risk taking ex ante. Nonetheless, the discussion surrounding bank capital
regulation quite often ignores the tax deductibility of interest expenses on debt. A
tax-induced debt bias may contribute to the heavy reliance on debt finance - which
has the potential to severely impair macroeconomic stability and growth. As such,
this paper explores a potential avenue to level the playing field in debt versus equity
finance, by documenting the impact of a tax shield on bank capital structure. The
study exploits the exogenous variation in the tax treatment of debt and equity due
to the implementation of an allowance for corporate equity instrument in Italy.
The ACE is anticipated to reduce the relative tax advantage of debt and thus
encourage bank capitalization. Using a difference-in-differences approach this essay
compares the change in capital structure of Italian banks with that of a similar group
of European banks that did not experience a similar change in their corporate tax
system. The results suggest that, following the introduction of the ACE, the equity
ratio of the average Italian bank increases by approximately 8.5%. Since the ACE is
a tax shield for equity, equity funding becomes more attractive and banks increase
their equity ratio. It is important to highlight that the ACE does not increase banks’
equity ratios by merely reducing lending activities, which would have a negative spin
off effect on the real sector. Indeed, the results provide evidence that the increase in
equity ratios is being driven by an increase in bank equity rather than a reduction
in any loan activity by banks. Additionally, the study finds that this tax relief for
equity reduces risk taking for weakly capitalized banks.
Overall, this essay contributes to the debate on bank capital regulation, corporate
tax policy and financial regulation by investigating the effects of an ACE on banks’
capital structure. The study highlights the important role that an ACE instrument
can play in macroprudential regulation. While it is generally acknowledged that
the implementation of an ACE system can be challenging, it can bring about great
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advances in the economy. The prevailing debt bias of taxation distorts regulatory
efforts made to reduce leverage. On the other hand, ACE systems support capital
regulations in their pursuit of a well-functioning stable financial system.
Therefore, this study strongly recommends that an ACE system, that eliminates
or significantly reduces the tax-induced distortions in banks, should be on the agenda
of macroprudential policymakers. The reduction in the tax discrimination not only
leads to better capitalized banks, but it also decreases the risk-taking behaviour for
weakly capitalized banks, who are usually targeted by regulators. Furthermore, a
reform that is centred around the debt tax bias might have positive externalities,
since a better legal and regulatory system is positively associated with financial




The Impact of liquidity Holdings
on Bank Profitability
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4.1 Introduction
How does liquidity affect bank profitability? The recent global financial crisis
prompted the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to strengthen its
liquidity framework. They began this process by developing two minimum standards
for liquidity funding. The objective of these standards are to promote short- and
long-term resilience of banks’ liquidity risk profile and to create incentives for banks
to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis.1
An unintended consequence of this regulatory reform is the subsequent cost it may
impose on banks in terms of reduced profitability from holding these lower-yielding
assets.
Highly liquid assets such as cash and government bonds tend to have relatively
low return, hence holding them imposes an opportunity cost on banks. It is therefore
reasonable to expect that banks will only hold these assets to the extent where they
contribute to maximizing profits. Beyond this, regulators may still require banks
to hold further liquid assets if it will enhance the ability of the banking sector to
absorb liquidity shocks arising from economic and financial stress. Against this
background, the aim of this essay is to test empirically whether banks’ holding of
liquid assets significantly affect their profits. The results of such an investigation
will have important implications for the implementation of regulatory policies aimed
at mitigating liquidity risks and the calibration of policy tools to account for the
associated costs at the bank level.
The study also explores the cyclical behaviour of bank profits. Knowledge of
the link between cyclical fluctuations and banking sector profitability is crucial in
evaluating the stability and soundness of the financial system. Unfavourable eco-
1The committee introduced the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) to ensure that banks hold suf-
ficient high quality liquid assets to withstand acute stress scenarios lasting one month. The net
stable funding ratio (NSFR) was introduced to increase incentives for banks to fund themselves
using more stable sources on a structural basis.
93
Section 4.1 Chapter 4
nomic conditions have the potential to worsen the quality of loans and generate
credit losses, which in turn reduces bank profits. Depending on their level of cap-
italization, the ability of banks to sustain the activity of the private sector may
also be jeopardized, and the fluctuations of the business cycle may be exacerbated
(Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Whilst the impact of the business cycle on prof-
itability has been heavily explored in the empirical literature, until now, the role
of the financial cycle has been largely ignored. Given how closely domestic credit
growth usually mirrors global credit growth, it becomes important to understand
whether policies geared toward moderating credit growth could have a significant
impact on bank profitability. To some extent, the task of detecting any relationship
between the financial cycle and bank profitability is made difficult by the fact that
there is no “natural” financial cycle measure established in the literature. Following
Stremmel (2015), Drehmann et al. (2012), and Claessens et al. (2011), this essay uses
credit aggregates (credit-to-GDP ratio and credit growth) and asset prices (property
prices) as the key measures to capture the best fitted financial cycle.
To answer the key questions of how does liquidity affects profitability and what
are the relative roles of the business and financial cycles in explaining variations in
bank profits, the study exploits bank-level data of 843 banks from 33 advanced and
emerging market economies over the period 2005–2017. The results emerging from
this analysis provide some key insights that may be relevant for bank regulators
and policymakers alike. The first key result emerging from this study points toward
a non-linear relationship between liquidity and bank profitability. That is, prof-
itability improves for banks that hold some liquid assets, however, there is a point
where holding further liquid assets reduces profitability. Second, bank profitability
responds positively to measures of the financial cycle, while there is no evidence to
suggest that the business cycle has any significant impact on profitability.
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In the context of the ongoing regulatory reform of the Basel liquidity framework
and knowledge of the fact that the financial sector plays a major role in shaping
macroeconomic outcomes, these findings provide useful evidence that should be
considered in order to ensure that the financial system as a whole remains sound
and stable.
This essay makes important contributions to the literature. It focuses on a po-
tential determinant of bank profitability that has largely been overlooked. The few
studies that include liquidity as an explananorty variable for bank profits hardly
focus on this specific relationship. However, given the BCBS move to develop new
standards aimed at reducing liquidity risk, it becomes important to study whether
banks’ decision to hold liquid assets significantly impact on their profitability. Bor-
deleau and Graham (2010) explore this particular relationship for U.S. and Canadian
banks. This study builds on Bordeleau and Graham (2010) in three ways. First,
it extends the sample to include emerging market economies (EMEs). The eco-
nomic environment in which EMEs operate may differ substantially from those in
advanced economies, therefore it is important to identify whether this relationship
is homogeneous across banks irrespective of the development status of the country
in which they operate. Second, this paper also extends the work of Bordeleau and
Graham (2010) by assessing the role of the financial cycle in explaining changes in
bank profits. The literature surrounding the cyclical behaviour of bank profitability
solely focuses on the business cycle. By exploring the role the financial cycle, this
study has the potential to inform regulators about the design of policy tools geared
toward smoothing cycles. That is, if the financial cycle turns out to be a better
predictor of profitability than the business cycle, then policies aimed at reducing
the amplitude of the financial cycle would have the added effect of smoothing the
cyclical behaviour of bank profitability. Finally, this study uses an econometric ap-
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proach that accounts for the persistence of profits. Bordeleau and Graham (2010)
use a static model to carry out their experiment. However, since the profitability
indicators used in this study displays persistence and the control variables could
suffer from endogeneity, this paper employs a dynamic GMM approach.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the exist-
ing literature on why banks hold liquid assets, the determinants of bank profitability
and the relationship between the cycle and profitability. Section 4.3 describes the
data and methodology used in constructing the various cycles. The empirical design
used to carry out the estimation is presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses
the empirical results, and section 4.7 presents the conclusions.
4.2 Literature overview
While there is a large tranche of literature that analyses the liquidity holdings for
firms (this is briefly reviewed in section 4.2.1), the literature on why banks, in par-
ticular, hold liquid assets is scant. Nonetheless, related literature on bank liquidity
risk indirectly provide evidence on the main reasons behind this decision for these
financial intermediaries.
Banks need to hold and maintain a buffer of liquid assets in order to avoid liquid-
ity risks. According to Supervision (1997), liquidity risk is the risk that arises from
the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases
in assets. The study further explains that when a bank has inadequate liquidity, it
cannot obtain sufficient funds, either by increasing liabilities or by converting assets
promptly, at a reasonable cost, thereby affecting profitability. Liquidity risks can
take numerous forms but for banks it is primarily the risk of having a large number
of depositors and investors demanding a withdrawal of their savings all at once,
leaving the bank short of funds. If banks default, that is, being in a situation where
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they are unable to repay depositors whatever they are owed when these debts fall
due, they become ‘cash-flow insolvent’. It is predominantly for this reason why banks
hold a certain amount of liquid assets and why regulators (e.g. Basel Committee)
continuously try to develop and strengthen standards aimed at minimising liquidity
risks. Regulators are even more concerned because of the possible spillover effects
and the implications it might have for the banking system as a whole. For example,
the failure of one bank can have spillover effects if it causes depositors and investors
to assume that other banks will fail as well (Farag et al., 2013). This is due to the
fact that other banks may hold similar loan portfolios, which might also fail or be
written off, or even because they might have provided loans to the bank that has
failed.
Liquidity risk can be divided into two categories; funding liquidity risk and mar-
ket liquidity risk. Funding liquidity risk refers to a situation where a bank does
not have enough cash or collateral in order to meet payment obligations with cus-
tomers and other counterparties as they fall due. However, market liquidity risk is
the risk that banks are unable to easily unwind or offset specific exposures without
significantly lowering market prices because of inadeqaute market depth or market
disruptions (see Decker (2000) and Farag et al. (2013)). Farag et al. (2013) argue
that market liquidity risk is mainly a function of the market for an asset and not
necessarily the circumstances of an individual bank. Due to its nature, a market
liquidity risk can result in a particular bank eventually facing a funding liquidity
crisis.
Farag et al. (2013) propose two ways to mitigate both of these liquidity risks.
First, they suggest that banks can attempt to attract more stable funding sources
that are less susceptible to bank runs. The second way to mitigate these risks is for
banks to maintain a buffer of highly liquid assets that can easily be drawn down
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when liabilities fall due. They argue that this liquidity buffer becomes crucial if
a bank is not able to restore its existing funding sources or if other assets are not
easy to liquidate. This buffer of highly liquid assets would mitigate both types of
liquidity risk.
As mentioned before, these liquidity requirements which are designed to prevent
and mitigate liquidity risks are implemented by the BCBS. Hugonnier and Morellec
(2017) show that when faced by these requirements, banks voluntarily choose to hold
reserves in excess of the required minimum in order to avoid the costs associated
with breaches of the requirement. Further, Stolz and Wedow (2011) argue that
liquid assets have on average a non-zero risk-weight. Therefore, banks can increase
their capital buffer by liquidating these assets and, thus, banks with more liquid
assets have a lower optimum capital buffer.
4.2.1 Reasons why firms and intermediaries hold liquid as-
sets
This subsection of the literature review briefly gives an overview of the reasons
firms hold liquid assets. The motives discussed also relate to some of the underlying
principles regarding banks decision to hold highly liquid assets.
Early studies on liquidity holdings are framed around the benefits of holding
cash. The finance and economics literature highlight the transaction, precaution,
agency motive, and the tax motive as the four key reasons why firms and financial
intermediaries hold liquid assets. This section reviews these four motives and other
potential factors affecting firms’ decision to hold liquid assets.
The transaction motive. Early academic research by the likes of Baumol (1952),
Meltzer (1963), Tobin (1956), and Miller and Orr (1966) develop arguments based on
trade-offs motivated by transactions costs. These arguments suggest that firms hold
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cash to avoid the cost associated with being low on liquid assets. Much like their
non-financial counterparts, banks also hold cash and other liquid assets to avoid the
punishment associated with falling below the Basel minimum requirement. Further-
more, Farag et al. (2013) argue that banks that do not maintain a good level of liquid
assets might end up having to do ‘fire sales’ or overpay or additional funds in order
to meet thier financial obligations. Miller and Orr (1966) derive what they deem
the optimal demand for cash when a firm incurs transaction costs associated with
the conversion of a non-cash financial asset into cash and uses cash for payments.
Put differently, firms benefit from holding liquid assets by saving transaction costs
to raise funds and avoid having to liquidate assets to make payments. Mulligan
(1997) finds evidence suggesting that there are economies of scale associated with
the transaction motive, as such larger firms tend to hold less cash.
The precaution motive. Firms can use liquid assets to finance operations and
investments if other sources of funding are scarce or excessively costly. Consistent
with this standpoint, Opler et al. (1999) find that firms with riskier cash flows and
limited access to external capital hold more liquid assets. Their findings also suggest
that firms with better investment opportunities hold more cash because adverse
shocks to the economy and to the financial system are more costly for them. Almeida
et al. (2004) show that financially constrained firms increase cash holdings when cash
flow is high, or in other words, constrained firms invest in cash out of cash flow, while
unconstrained firms do not. A later study by Han and Qiu (2007) corroborates this
finding. Using a theoretical framework which allows for a continuous distribution of
cash flow, they demonstrate that an increase in the volatility of cash flow increases
cash holdings for firms that are financially constrained, but has no determinate
effect on other firms. Riddick and Whited (2009) however, challenge the findings on
firms’ propensities to invest in cash out of cash flow pointing out that the literature
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does not adjust for measurement error in q. Nonetheless, their model shows that
a firm’s risk and its level of cash are positively related. Finally, Acharya et al.
(2007) develop a model showing that firms accumulate cash instead of reducing
debt when the correlation between operating income and investment opportunities
is low. Other contributing studies to the precautionary motive for holding cash
include Bates et al. (2009) and Dittmar et al. (2003).2
The agency motive. The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) suggests that
managers would rather retain cash than to increase payouts to shareholders when
the firm has poor investment opportunities. For managers, cash reduces the pres-
sure to perform well and allows for investment in projects that best suit their own
interests, but not necessarily inline with the interest of shareholders. These discre-
tionary cash holdings are usually estimated as the excess liquidity holdings derived
from models accounting for the precautionary and transaction motives for holding
cash. Dittmar et al. (2003) find evidence which suggests that agency costs play
an important role in determining firms’ cash holdings. In a cross country setup of
over 11,000 firms, they find that corporations in countries with low protection of
shareholders rights hold up to twice as much cash as their counterparts in countries
with strong shareholder protection. This evidence is consistent with the perspective
that investors in countries with weak shareholder protection cannot force managers
to disgorge excessive cash balances. Guney et al. (2003) find similar results for firms
in France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. Using data for nearly 4,000
firms over the period 1983-2000, they find that a country’s legal structure and the
ownership structure of firms play a crucial role in determining cash holdings. Specif-
ically, they identify that a higher degree of shareholder protection is associated with
lower cash holdings and ownership concentration exerts a negative impact on cash
levels. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that cash is worth less when agency
2As this is not the focus of this current essay, these will not be extensively reviewed.
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problems between insiders and outside shareholders are greater.
The tax motive. Finally, the tax motive for holding cash appears far less re-
searched than the preceding three. Foley et al. (2007) examine whether the tax
costs associated with repatriations contribute to the desired level of cash holdings.
Using a large sample of firms drawn from Compustat over the period 1982-2004,
they document four key results. First, they find firms are subject to higher tax
when repatriating earnings tend to hold more cash. A one standard deviation in-
crease in the tax costs associated with repatriations result in the ratio of cash to
net assets increasing by approximately 8%. Second, the tax costs associated with
repatriations induce firms to hold more cash abroad. The third finding suggests
that affiliates who are faced with higher tax when repatriating earnings hold more
cash than other affiliates of the same firm. This particular finding indicates that
incorporated affiliates in lower tax jurisdictions have higher cash holdings, whereas
affiliates that are organized as branches hold lower levels of cash that do not vary
with host country tax rates. Finally, the authors find that firms that are financially
constrained domestically are less likely to defer taxes associated with repatriations
by holding cash abroad. For these firms, affiliate cash holdings are low and are not
related to the host country’s tax rates. However, firms that rely heavily on tech-
nology seem to have affiliate cash holdings that are very responsive to the tax costs
triggered by repatriations.
4.2.2 Liquidity and profitability
As shown in the previous sections, there is a broad body of literature looking at
the analysis of liquidity asset holdings for firms, and to a lesser extent for banks.
Nevertheless, its role as a determinant of bank profitability has hardly been ex-
plored. Most studies looking at the determinant of bank profitability do not include
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liquidity as an explanatory variable, while the few that include it do not focus on
this particular relationship. A notable exception to this is Bordeleau and Graham
(2010) who examine the impact that a change in bank’s liquid asset holdings has on
profitability for US and Canadian bank holding companies. Using a panel two-step
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach, they regress bank profitability
against a non-linear expression of relative liquid asset holdings, after controlling for
other bank and country specific determinants. Their findings suggest that banks
are rewarded profitably for holding some liquid assets, but at some point, these
low-yielding assets have a negative impact on profit because of the forgone opportu-
nity to invest in riskier assets. The results further suggest that GDP has a positive
impact on banks’ profitability, while the level of unemployment and inflation nega-
tively impacts profitability, owing to higher probability of default on loans and the
role of maturity transformation, respectively.
This essay seeks to build on the findings of Bordeleau and Graham (2010) and
to make a novel contribution to the literature by examining the potential role of the
credit cycle in determining banks’ profitability. Further, the study will look at the
impact of lending rates and assess whether short and long-term interest rates have
differing impact on banks’ profitability. Finally, the literature on the determinants
of bank profitability predominantly focuses on advanced economies (see for e.g.
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Bolt et al. (2012), and Dietrich and Wanzenried
(2011)), this study will also draw on banks from a number of EMEs as the economic
environment in which they operate may differ substantially from those in advanced
economies.
The section of the literature that includes liquidity as a determinant of profitabil-
ity is quite small and provides mixed results. Molyneux and Thornton (1992) find
a weak negative relationship between profitability and liquidity holdings, arguing
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that this is expected due to the fact that liquidity holdings imposed by authorities
represent a cost to the bank. In contrast, Bourke (1989) and Tan (2016) find that
liquidity positively impacts bank profitability. Despite the lack of sufficient research
into this relationship, reasonable comparisons can be drawn from related literature
surrounding the impact of capital on bank profitability.
Using Granger-causality analysis, Berger (1995) cites a strong positive relation-
ship between capital and earnings (ROE), suggesting that well capitalised firms face
lower expected bankruptcy costs. This in turn reduces their funding cost and in-
creases their profitability. Though this particular finding contrasts the well known
works of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) on perfect
capital markets with symmetric information, the author argues that the results are
consistent with the “expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis.” In a similar study, Lee
and Hsieh (2013) use bank-level data for 42 Asian banks to test the relationship
between capital and profitability. They find similar results to Berger (1995), with
capital exhibiting a positive and significant effect on profitability. However, Lee and
Hsieh (2013) attribute their finding to the “structure-conduct-performance hypoth-
esis.” A positive relationship between capital-assets ratio and profitability is also
found in Goddard et al. (2004). While Berger (1995) attributes his finding on the
capital-profit relaionship to the expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis, Bordeleau and
Graham (2010) argue that this concept is also applicable to the impact of liquid
assets on profitability. They posit that banks that hold more liquid assets might
benefit from a superior perception in funding markets, hence reducing the cost of
finance and increasing profitability.
In the context of this current essay, assuming the expected bankruptcy cost hy-
pothesis and the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis indeed holds, then the
holding of liquid assets should impact bank profitability positively. However, there
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is an opportunity cost associated with the holding of liquid assets given the nature of
their low yielding return relative to other assets, and as such they would have a neg-
ative effect on profit. Therefore, taken together, it is expected that liquid assets will
exhibit a non-linear relationship with bank profitability. The expected bankruptcy
cost hypothesis and the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis will take effect as
long as the marginal benefit of holding additional liquid assets outweighs the oppor-
tunity cost of their relatively low yielding return.
4.2.3 Other determinants of bank profitability
In the literature, bank profitability is usually expressed as a function of a number
of other internal and external determinants. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) find that bank specific factors, financial structure
and macroeocnomic factors may explain changes in bank profitability. Bank size
is often used to account for any existing diseconomies and economies of scale that
may be present in the market. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2001) find that the extent
to which various financial, economic and legal factors affect bank profitability is
closely linked to firm size. Smirlock (1985) finds evidence suggesting that there is a
positive and significant relationship between size and profitability. Albertazzi and
Gambacorta (2009) also find a positive association between bank profitability and
size. In contrast, Tan (2016) suggests that there is a negative impact of bank size
on return on assets, net interest margin and pre-tax profit. Whilst Athanasoglou
et al. (2008) find no explanatory power in size determining bank profitability.
Most studies dealing with internal determinants tend to include risk as a control.
Theory suggests that increased risk exposure (particularly credit risk) is usually
associated with reduced profitability. Miller and Noulas (1997) find that higher
exposure to risk has a negative impact on the profitability for commercial banks in
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the US. Similarly, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find that credit risk negatively impacts
the profit levels of Greek banks.
Another commonly used internal or bank-specific determinant of profitability is
bank capital.3 Athanasoglou et al. (2008) suggest that capital is positively related
to expected earnings when the assumption of perfect capital markets is relaxed.
They argue that this positive association is related to the fact that capital is the
amount of own funds that is available to maintain and support the bank’s business,
as such, bank capital serves as a safety net in the event that there are any adverse
developments.
Other commonly used internal determinants include leverage (see for e.g Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999)), cost management (e.g. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011),
Liu and Wilson (2010) and García-Herrero et al. (2009)), and diversification (e.g.
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998)).
Turning the focus to the external determinants of bank profitability, these vari-
ables are typically employed as macroeconomic controls. The variables commonly
used are the inflation rate, unemployment rate, and a few studies also include the
long-term interest rate (see for e.g. Anbar and Alper (2011), Dietrich and Wanzen-
ried (2011), Sufian and Chong (2008)). GDP is also typically employed as a control
for the level of economic development. This is discussed separately in section 4.2.4.
One of the first papers to address the issue surrounding the relationship between
inflation and bank profitability was Revell (1979). He argues that the effect of infla-
tion on profitability largely depends on whether banks’ operating expenses increase
at a faster rate than inflation. The issue then becomes how mature an economy
has to be so that future inflation can be accurately forecasted to allow banks to
manage their operating costs accordingly. Along similar lines, Perry (1992) argues
3Other work and hypotheses related to relationship between capital and profits were discussed
in the previous section.
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that the extent to which inflation affects bank profitability ultimately depends on
how well inflation expectations are forecasted. Banks that fully anticipate inflation
can adjust interest rates accordingly in order to maximise revenues and minimise
cost, and as such increase profitability. Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton
(1992) both find that the relationship between profitability and either inflation or
long-term interest rate is positive. Bordeleau and Graham (2010) state that the
level of unemployment negatively impacts profitability due to a higher probability
of default on loans.
4.2.4 Bank profitability and the cycle
Amidst concerns over the potential pro-cyclicality of Basel’s capital accords, it is
interesting to discern the degree to which, if at all, bank profitability is correlated
with the business cycle. There are a number of channels through which the business
cycle could impact banks’ profit. For example, the downturn phase of the cycle could
cause a decreased demand for credit and stock market transactions, or provisions
necessitated by the deterioration of existing loans. Against this background, it is
extremely relevant to analyse how and to what degree is bank profitability affected
by the phase of the cycle. Such an analysis could provide a contribution to the
ongoing debate about the pro-cyclicality of bank activities. For instance, higher
profits provide the ability for banks to increase their capital buffer and subsequently
increase lending.
As it stands, there is no general consensus within the literature regarding the
association between banks’ profitability and the cycle. In an early study, Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (1998) use bank-level data for 80 countries over the period 1988-1995
to assess various macroeconomic determinants of commercial bank interest margins
and profitability. Their results suggest that the cycle is not statistically important
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in determining the profitability of banks. Specifically, they find that per capita GDP
and the growth rate of real GDP per capita has no significant impact on realized
net interest margins and profit. Similarly, Arpa et al. (2001) assess the effects of
macroeconomic developments on risk provisions and earnings of Austrian banks for
the 1990s and find that net interest income is uncorrelated with real GDP growth.
It is quite reasonable to argue that the variables used (or at least how they
are used) by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998) and Arpa et al. (2001) are not the most
accurate way of capturing the business cycle, and as such could lead to incorrect
conclusions. Further, it is risky to rely on the accuracy of these estimates when the
series is relatively short.4 The latter of these two issues is addressed in Bikker and
Hu (2012). They use real GDP data for the period 1979-1999 to assess its impact on
bank profits. Their findings indicate that both contemporaneous and delayed real
GDP growth positively impact bank profit margins. Albertazzi and Gambacorta
(2009) also find that bank profits are pro-cyclical. That is, GDP influences banks’
ROE, net interest income, and profit before taxes in a positive way.
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) attempt to assess which variables best deter-
mine bank profitability before and during the crisis - finding that real GDP growth
positively impacts banks’ ROA when using the entire sample period. However, GDP
appears insignificant in determining profits in the pre-crisis (1999-2006) and crisis
periods (2007-2009) when estimated separately. Another interesting finding from
this paper is the role of loan growth in determining profits. The growth of total
loans positively impacts bank profitability across both pre crisis and crisis periods,
and is also significant across all years. This finding raises the question about a pos-
sible role for the credit cycle in influencing bank profits. Kohlscheen et al. (2018)
document similar results on the growth of bank loans, with GDP carrying no such
4Both Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998) and Arpa et al. (2001) use less than 10 years of data to
capture the business cycle. These series are not sufficiently long to capture the various peaks and
troughs in the cycle.
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significance. The authors conclude that the financial cycle plays a more important
role in determining bank profits than the business cycle.
In light of these recent findings, this essay will also build on these studies and
address the role of both the business and the financial cycle in explaining bank
profitability. Importantly, this essay will address the issues regarding how the cycles
are estimated and use sufficiently long time series. These particular findings will
contribute to the debate surrounding the cyclicality of bank profitability.
4.3 Data
The main data source for the bank-specific characteristics is the SNL Financial
Database which is maintained by S&P Global. The database provides comprehensive
annual financial information for banks in over 150 countries around the world.
To use the data from the SNL Financial database for empirical analysis, the
data had to be edited in the following ways. Given that the focus of the study is
on commercial banks, I start by excluding all central banks, investment banks, non-
banking credit institutions and securities houses. I limit the study to commercial
banks, as different bank types have various characteristics and portfolios that may
affect profitability. Next, I eliminate duplicate information. If SNL reports both
consolidated and unconsolidated statements, I drop the unconsolidated statement
to avoid double counting. Consolidated statements are used in line with the view
that internationally active banks take strategic decisions on their global assets and
liabilities. Finally, I select banks that have data available for at least three quarters
of the sample period on all main variables used throughout the analysis.
In addition to the bank-specific data, the study uses a set of macroeconomic
variables to explain bank profitability. The real GDP and inflation were retrieved
from the OECD database. The data on credit–to–GDP, property prices, and private
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credit were all taken from the BIS database. Table 4.1 provides further details on
the description of the variables used and their respective sources.
Table 4.1: Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Bank level
Return on assets Ratio of net income to assets SNL
Return on equity Ratio of net income to equity SNL
Pre-tax profit Net profit before the effect of income taxes and any after-tax items SNL
as a percent of average RWAs
Liquidity Liquid assets as a percent of assets SNL
Leverage Ratio of total assets to total shareholder’s equity SNL
Risk Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans SNL
Size Natural logarithmic of total assets SNL
Capital ratio Total regulatory capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets SNL
Country level
Short-term market rate Interbank rate OECD
Long-term rate 10 - year bond yield rate OECD
CPI Change in consumer price index OECD
Private credit Credit to the private, non-financial sector BIS
GDP Gross domestic product OECD
Credit-to-GDP ratio Ratio of private credit to GDP BIS
Property prices Residential property prices BIS
The sample is then an unbalanced panel dataset of 843 banks from 33 advanced
and emerging market economies over the period 2005–2017.5 The main aim of this
study is to assess the impact of liquid assets on bank profitability while controlling
for the relevant idiosyncratic bank and macroeconomic variables, particularly those
capturing the business and financial cycles. The study considers three profitability
indicators: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and pre-tax profit as is
standard in the literature.
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression
analyses. The statistics highlight a few interesting facts about the profitability of the
banks in the sample. On average, the sampled banks have a ROA of 0.47% over the
entire sample period 2005–2017. The relatively small difference between the mean
and the median would suggest that there is not a large profitability difference among
the banks in the sample. The second profitability indicator (ROE), however, shows
a slight difference. The mean of 6.31% and median of 5.28% would indicate that
5Table A10 provides details on the number of banks from each country.
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there is some differences in profitability among the banks in the sample. Differences
between the ROA and ROE usually reflect factors such as the underlying changes in
leverage. The banks in the sample exhibit an average pre-tax profit of 1.33%, with
a median amount of 1.29%. Turning to the independent variables, the key bank
variable of interest (liquidity) shows that on average, the liquid assets holding of
banks in the sample is 28.56%. On average, the capitalisation of banks is 17.16%,
which, however, differs among banks, as shown in the median. The log of total assets,
which is an indicator of bank size, amount to 16.22% on average. The median of
16.65% would suggest that all the banks in the sample are of similar size, as it
relates to total assets. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, which is an
indicator of the riskiness of banks, amounts to 4.60%, but similar to other variables,
there exist large differences among the banks in the sample with respect to this
variable. As it relates to the macroeconomic factors, average short and long-term
interest rates are 2.12% and 3.36%, respectively. The average inflation rate over the
sample period is approximately 0.01%. The correlation matrix for the independent
variables can be seen in Table A11.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Dependent variables: bank profitability Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 9,405 0.469 0.479 0.963 -6.412 4.038
ROE 9,403 5.275 6.313 13.265 -167.240 33.610
Pre-tax profit 7,450 1.329 1.292 2.078 -10.022 12.461
Independent variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Liquidity 9,034 28.555 24.986 17.131 0.019 100
Leverage 9,418 20.759 12.940 394.451 -1289.872 35567
Capital ratio 8,459 17.158 14.607 14.649 -5.029 450.350
log of total assets 9,420 16.218 16.652 2.567 4.442 22.022
NPL/loans 8,352 4.596 2.637 7.384 0.000 99.725
Short-term rate 10,820 2.123 0.868 2.507 -0.784 14.757
Long-term rate 10,872 3.364 3.136 2.300 -0.362 22.498
CPI rate 10,577 0.007 0.016 0.058 -0.574 0.155
Hamilton cyclical components
GDP 10,959 0.008 0.005 0.057 -0.248 0.313
Credit-to-GDP ratio 10,959 0.008 0.008 0.059 -0.312 0.271
Property prices 10,594 0.005 0.003 0.034 -0.100 0.174
Private credit 10,959 0.014 0.016 0.057 -0.195 0.250
ROA is the most commonly used measure of bank profitability. It shows the
profits earned per unit of assets and reflects the management ability to utilise banks’
financial and real investment resources to generate profits Hassan and Bashir (2003).
As such, ROA has emerged as the key ratio for evaluating bank profitability in
the literature (Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Shaffer (2004), Athanasoglou et al.
(2008), García-Herrero et al. (2009), Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016)). Figures 4.1
to 4.3 show the evolution of bank profitability for banks in both advanced and EMEs
over the examined period.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of banks’ ROA in Advanced and Emerging economies
Source: SNL & Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of bank profitability, ROA, for EMEs and advanced
economies over the sample period 2005 - 2017. ROA is expressed as the ratio of net income to total assets.
Figure 4.2: Evolution of banks’ ROE in Advanced and Emerging
economies
Source: SNL & Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of bank profitability, ROE, for EMEs and advanced
economies over the sample period 2005 - 2017. ROE is expressed as the ratio of net income to total equity.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of banks’ pre-tax profit in Advanced and Emerg-
ing economies
Source: SNL & Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of bank profitability, PTP, for EMEs and advanced
economies over the sample period 2005 - 2017. PTP is net profit before the effect of income taxes and any after-tax items as a percent
of average Risk-weighted assets.
Banking sector performance for both advanced and EMEs, as measured by the
average ROA, ROE, and pre-tax profit was exuberant during the period preceding
the global financial crisis (Figure 1). This is not surprising considering risk was often
neglected – rewarding short-term gains over long-term sustainable returns – and not
properly assessed in bank strategies. Credit standards were relaxed, and many banks
relied on short-term wholesale markets to fund activities (Buch et al., 2018). As such,
banking system assets, credit and profits were at very high levels. However, since
2009, profitability has remained below pre-crisis levels. In what follows, this essay
analyses the impact of banks’ liquidity on these indicators of bank profitability,
controlling for other bank and country idiosyncrasies, particularly the extent to
which profitability is affected by the business and financial cycle. The study relies
on the ROA as the benchmark profit indicator, however, it checks whether results
hold for ROE and pre-tax profit.
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4.3.1 Constructing the business and financial cycles
As previously mentioned, there is no clear consensus within the literature regarding
a definitive relationship between banks’ profitability and the cycle. Furthermore,
the potential role of the financial as opposed to the business cycle in predicting
banks’ profitability is largely ignored. Against this background, this current study
constructs estimates for both the business and financial cycles to evaluate their
respective impact on the profitability of banks.
The study takes GDP as the representative variable for the business cycle. I
recognise and acknowledge that a multivariate approach would probably be more
suitable, such as the finance-neutral output gap of Borio et al. (2016) or the finance-
augmented cycle of Montagnoli et al. (2018). However, for simplicity, and conforming
to common practice in this literature, this study will utilise the univariate approach.
Unlike the business cycle, the financial cycle has been far less researched and
defined. Further, there is no agreement on the most reliable econometric method
to analyse its statistical properties, this is usually left to the preference of the re-
searcher. Therefore, this study looks at a number of series to attempt to characterise
it. Studies such as Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012), Jordà et al. (2013) and Taylor (2015)
have used credit to capture the financial cycle, on the grounds that credit captures
the boom-bust of the financial sector. A variable commonly used in policy analysis
is the credit-to-GDP ratio. More often, researchers tend to look at measures of
credit and asset prices, most notably real estate prices (see for example Claessens
et al. (2011) and Claessens et al. (2012)). In Drehmann et al. (2012), credit aggre-
gates (particularly the credit-to-GDP ratio) are used as a proxy for leverage, while
property prices are used as a measure of available collateral. Stremmel (2015) finds
that the key ingredients of the best fitted financial cycle measure for Europe include
credit-to-GDP ratio, credit growth, and house prices to income ratio.
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This study follows Drehmann et al. (2012), Borio (2014), and Stremmel (2015)
in using three financial variables to approximate the financial cycle.6 These are: (i)
credit to the private, non-financial sector; (ii) credit-to-GDP ratio; and (iii) prop-
erty prices. All the macroeconomic data used to construct the business and financial
cycles span the period 1980–2017. Using such long series allows for capturing var-
ious peaks and troughs, and thus better approximates the cycles. The series used
to approximate the cycles are all in real terms (CPI deflated) and in natural log-
arithmic form. This of course excludes the credit-to-GDP ratio which is expressed
in percentage points. Further, they are all normalised to their respective values in
2010 to maintain comparability.
To construct the cycles, the study uses the recent filter-based method proposed
by Hamilton (2017). The most commonly used technique in literature is the HP-
filter. However, despite its popularity, it comes with several drawbacks that must
be considered when deciding whether to use this approach. For example, Hamilton
(2017) argues that the HP-filter involves several levels of differences, so for a random
walk process, subsequent observed patterns are a mere by-product of having applied
the filter rather than reflecting the underlying data generating process. He further
suggests that the filtered values at the end of the sample vary significantly from
those in the middle, and as such are characterised by spurious dynamics. Hamilton
(2017) finally adds that the HP-filter typically produces values for the smoothing
parameter which are vastly at odds with common practice.
In light of this, Hamilton (2017) suggests an alternative concept of deriving the
cyclical component of a possibly nonstationary series. Specifically, he imposes that
the cyclical component of a possible nonstationary series should address the question
of how different is the value at date t+h from the value that would be expected based
6In extending this paper, I will adopt a multivariate approach where all three variables will be
combined in a single measure to construct a proxy of the financial cycle.
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on its behaviour through date t.7 Therefore, he suggests that if an OLS regression
of yt+h is regressed against some constant and the p = 4 most recent values of y as
of date t,
yt+h = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3yt−2 + β4yt−3 + vt+h (4.1)
the residuals
v̂t+h = yt+h − β̂0 − β̂1yt − β̂2yt−1 − β̂3yt−2 − β̂4yt−3 (4.2)
provide an acceptable approach to gain the transient component for a broad class
of underlying processes.
Hamilton (2017) argues that this proposed procedure holds a few advantages
over the much used HP-filter. First, unlike the cyclical component of the HP-filter,
the value of v̂t+h will be difficult to predict from variables that pre-date time t.
Second, the value of v̂t+h is a model-free and assumption-free summary of the data.
Thus, regardless of how the data was generated, as long as (1 − L)dyt ≤ 4, there
exists a population projection of yt+h on (yt, yt−1, yt−2, yt−3, 1)’, which can be used
to consistently estimate a cyclical component from the data. Therefore, borrowing
from Hamilton (2017) approach, this study extracts the cyclical component from real
GDP, property prices, private credit, and credit-to-GDP ratio, in order to provide
proxies for the business and financial cycles.
7This concept is related to the definition of the trend component of yt as gt =
limh→∞ limp→∞E(yt+h|yt, yt−1, ..., yt−p+1) in Beveridge and Nelson (1981). This limit exists and
can be calculated provided that (1− L)yt is a mean-zero stationary process.
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4.4 Stylised facts
In Figure 4.4, banks’ average return on assets is plotted against each series represent-
ing the business and financial cycle.8 The experiment clearly suggests that cyclical
patterns exist in the evolution of banks’ profitability over the sample period. There
appears to be a positive co-movement between profitability and the business cycle
(upper left panel of Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Cyclical evolution of banks’ profitability
Source: SNL & Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure plots the movement of bank profitability (ROA) vs measures of the macroe-
conomic cycles over the sample period 2005 - 2017.
A positive co-movement is also evident between ROA and property prices (bot-
tom left panel). The relationship is far less discernible between ROA and private
credit (top right panel) and the credit-to-GDP ratio (bottom right panel), respec-
tively. As these graphs merely represent a simplistic approach to understanding the
8See Figure A2 and Figure A3 in the appendix for other measures of profitability plotted against
macroeconomic cycles.
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cyclical behaviour of banks’ profitability, further empirical investigation will seek to
provide a better analysis of the relationship.
Figure 4.5: Bank liquidity and the macroeconomic cycles
Source: SNL & Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of bank liquid assets and measures of the macroeconomic
cycles.
Bank liquidity and measures of the business and financial cycles are depicted in
Figure 4.5. Measures of the cycle are constructed using the previously mentioned
Hamilton (2017) filter. In general, a useful starting point would be to examine the
dynamic cross-correlations between liquidity and each of the macroeconomic series.
It turns out that liquidity is weakly correlated with all four of these macroeconomic
series (see Table A11). Looking at the movements between liquidity and GDP (top-
left), it appears that flows of liquidity leads the business cycle, up until about 2011.
A similar evolution takes place between liquidity and property prices (bottom-left)
up to the same period. Beyond this point, the relationship appears to be negative,
particularly between liquidity and GDP. The depictions of the relationship between
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liquidity and the remaining two cyclical measures (private credit, credit-to-GDP)
are far less discernible.
Also in Figure 4.5, it appears that banks’ holding of liquid assets were on a
decline leading up to the financial crisis. Banks in EMEs in particular appeared
to swiftly relinquish these low yielding assets leading up to the crisis.9 Bordeleau
and Graham (2010) find similar movements in the liquid assets of US and Canadian
banks in the period leading up to the crisis. Committee et al. (2009) suggests
that this behaviour might reflect the fact that, in the build up to and during the
crisis, liquid assets were associated with mortgage-backed securities that quickly
became illiquid because of the asset quality deterioration. However, following the
liquidity shock that occurred during the 2007–2009 period, banks began adjusting
their holdings of cash and other liquid assets. In fact, it was during the midst
of the crisis that various regulatory authorities recognized the need to develop a
consistent standard to monitor and improve banks’ liquidity position. Consequently,
the G20 suggested that the BCBS should implement a global framework to promote
stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions, including cross-border institutions.
The consultations led to the introduction of two regulatory standards aimed at
addressing liquidity risk both in the short and long term. The liquidity coverage
ratio aimed at ensuring that banks hold sufficiently high quality liquid assets to
withstand acute stress scenarios lasting one month. In the longer term, the net
stable funding ratio would increase incentives for banks to fund themselves using
more stable sources on a structural basis. In broad terms, these tools are designed
to ensure banks are equipped to withstand idiosyncratic and system-wide liquidity
shocks. The calibration of this regulatory standard is key to its impact on banks
and the financial system as a whole. As such, it is important to understand the
9See Figure A1 in appendix for individual series of liquid asset holdings for EMEs and advanced
economies.
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impact that a change in banks’ liquid asset holdings has on its profitability.
Figure 4.6: Banks’ liquid assets holdings and profitability (ROA)
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of average bank liquidity holdings and profitability (as measured
by return on assets) over the sample period 2005 - 2017. Liquidity is the ratio of banks’ liquid assets to total assets, while ROA is
the ratio of net income to assets.
Figure 4.7: Banks’ liquid assets holdings and profitability (ROE)
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of average bank liquidity holdings and profitability (as measured
by return on equity) over the sample period 2005 - 2017. Liquidity is the ratio of banks’ liquid assets to total assets, while ROA is
the ratio of net income to equity.
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Figure 4.8: Banks’ liquid assets holdings and profitability (PTP)
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: This figure shows the movement of average bank liquidity holdings and profitability (as measured
by pre-tax profit) over the sample period 2005 - 2017. Liquidity is the ratio of banks’ liquid assets to total assets, while PTP is net
profit before the effect of income taxes and any after-tax items as a percent of average Risk-weighted assets.
Combining the information gathered from Figures 4.6 to 4.8, it is unclear through
graphical representation what the impact of additional liquid assets has been on
the profitability of the sampled banks. As such, the study provides an empirical
approach to investigate this relationship while accounting for other relevant factors
at the bank and country level.
4.5 Methodology
To carry out the empirical investigation, profitability is regressed against a non-linear
expression of liquid assets, along with a set of other bank specific and macroeconomic
control variables. Liquid asset holdings is modelled as a non-linear polynomial of
order two against the background that, despite being credit risk-free, they are low
yielding and therefore have a significant opportunity cost. That is, they represent a
‘lost’ opportunity for more income from more rewarding uses of funds. The baseline
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model is therefore given by:
pii,j,t = α + φ1pii,j,t−1 + β1liquidityi,j,t−1 + β2liquidity2i,j,t−1 + β3leveragei,j,t−1 + β4riski,j,t
+ β5sizei,j,t + β6capitali,j,t + λ1SRi,t + λ2LRi,t + λ3CPIi,t + λ4cyclei,t + i,j,t
(4.3)
where
• i represents each bank in the sample;
• j represents the country in which each bank is located;
• t denotes each year in the sample, spanning 2005 to 2017;
• thus, pii,j,t represents the profitability measure of bank i, located in country j,
at time t;
• pii,j,t−1 is the one-period lagged profitability;
• thus φ will inform the speed of adjustment to equilibrium;
• i,j,t is the disturbance.
A value of φ between 0 and 1 suggests that profits are persistent, but will eventually
approach normal levels. Liquidityi,j,t−1, along with its squared term, which are the
main bank specific control variables of interest, is the ratio of bank liquid assets to
total assets. Both these variables enter with a lag since creditors usually observe the
relative liquidity position of a bank before making a judgement on its credit risk.
leveragei,j,t−1 is the ratio of total assets to shareholder’s equity. Riski,j,t is included
to proxy banks’ credit risk and is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
Size is included to help answer the question of which size optimizes bank profitability
and it is measured as the log of total assets. Capitali,j,t represents the ratio of
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regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets of the respective bank. SRi,t represents
the short-term interest rate and is proxied by the interbank rate. LRi,t is the long-
term rate and corresponds to the 10-year bond yield rate. CPIi,t is the inflation
rate. The final macroeconomic control, cyclei,t, will be crucial in explaining the
cyclical behaviour of bank profits and inform whether it is the business or financial
cycle that explains the variations in profitability.
In static relationships, the literature normally applies least squares techniques
on fixed effects or random effects models. However, for dynamic relationships these
methods produce estimates that are biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2008). There-
fore, this experiment uses techniques for dynamic panel estimation that are able to
deal with the biases and inconsistencies of the estimates. In addition to issues of
inconsistencies and biases, the estimation of bank profitability also raises concerns
regarding endogeneity. For example, García-Herrero et al. (2009) argue that more
profitable banks might be able to increase their equity more easily by retaining
profits. Along similar lines, they could also spend more on advertising and increase
their size, which in turn could affect profitability. Endogeneity may also be present
with regards to liquidity on the grounds that profits could be a potential source of
additional liquidity for banks.
Taking the above issues into consideration, this study employs the generalised
method of moments (GMM) following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998), also known as the system GMM estimator. The estimator is designed
for short, wide panels, and to fit linear models with one dynamic dependent vari-
able, additional controls, and fixed effects. The system GMM estimator exploits an
assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain
informative even for persistent series, and has been shown to perform well in sim-
ulations. Additionally, the method accounts for endogeniety. Lagged values of the
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dependent variable both in levels and in differences are used as instruments, as well
as lagged values of other regressors which could potentially suffer from endogeneity.
Specifically, I treat bank capital, risk and leverage as endogenous variables. This
is against the background that more profitable banks could increase capital easier
by retaining profits. Lee and Hsieh (2013) further argue that under the moral haz-
ard hypothesis, risk and the level of capital should be treated as endogenous when
investigating profits.10 The macroeconomic controls - GDP, inflation, and interest
rates are treated as exogenous.
GMM estimators offer both one- and two-step variants. This study uses the two-
step estimator, which is generally more efficient, particularly for the system GMM.
The study employs Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the reported stan-
dard errors, without which they tend to be severely downward biased. Finally, two
post-estimation tests are reported to validate the appropriateness of the GMM es-
timations. The first is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation of
errors. An important point to note is that the consistency of the GMM estimator
depends on the errors being serially uncorrelated, i.e., E(∆i,j,t,∆i,j,t−2 = 0). Thus,
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest testing that the second-order auto-covariances for
all periods in the sample are zero. The other test is the Hansen (1982) J test statis-
tic for over-identifying restrictions. The J-test is related to the order condition of
identification and tests the null that instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term. Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the chosen instruments are
exogenous.
10Athanasoglou et al. (2008) suggest that credit risk should be modelled as a predetermined
variable in assessing profitability.
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4.6 Empirical results
Table 4.3 presents the empirical results from estimating Eq(4.3) for the main prof-
itability measure, ROA. In Panel A, estimates of the business and financial cycle
are presented separetly in columns I through to IV. In Panel B, the study performs
a “horse race” between the business cycle and each measure of the financial cycle.
The first column includes a business cycle measure, which is the cyclical component
of GDP derived using the Hamilton (2017) filter. Columns II through IV include
credit-to-GDP ratio, private credit, and property prices, respectively, as measures
of the financial cycle.
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Table 4.3: Empirical results - Return on Asset (ROA) as profit indi-
cator
Dependent variable (ROA) Panel A Panel B
I II III IV V VI VII
ROAi,j,t−1 0.458*** 0.514*** 0.482*** 0.498*** 0.488*** 0.444*** 0.441***
(0.053) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.047) (0.054) (0.053)
Liquidityi,j,t−1 0.094** 0.080*** 0.045* 0.075*** 0.064** 0.087** 0.083**
(0.040) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.041) (0.037)
Liquidity2i,j,t−1 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Leveragei,j,t−1 -0.009 -0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.009** -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Risk -0.024** -0.023** -0.022*** -0.018** -0.019*** -0.024** -0.027***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Size -0.012 -0.007 -0.001 -0.017 -0.000 -0.009 -0.010
(0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Capital ratio -0.003 0.030** -0.002 0.033* 0.015 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.020) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Short− term market rate -0.020 -0.073*** -0.017 0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.018
(0.034) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.035) (0.032)
10− year bond yield 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.099*** 0.120*** 0.095*** 0.114*** 0.131***
(0.038) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.039) (0.038)
CPI -5.589*** -3.823** -5.420*** -5.386** -5.987*** -6.055*** -5.465***
(1.563) (1.682) (1.501) (2.123) (1.465) (1.567) (1.509)
GDP 1.425 0.252 1.164 0.926
(0.907) (0.573) (0.885) (0.922)




Property prices 5.801*** 2.848**
(1.316) (1.443)
Constant -0.645 -1.412*** -0.137 -1.424** -0.726 -0.536 -0.626
(0.581) (0.538) (0.364) (0.612) (0.492) (0.575) (0.552)
No. of banks 760 760 760 760 760 760 760
Observations 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,542
No. of instruments 76 73 77 73 78 76 75
AB test for AR(2) 0.85 0.36 0.94 0.44 0.71 0.89 0.74
Hansen J test 0.28 0.10 0.32 0.12 0.16 0.43 0.49
This table analyzes the impact of banks’ liquid asset holdings on profitability using the system GMM estimator of Arellano-
Bover. Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Leverage is
the ratio of assets to total shareholders’ equity. Risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Size is the log of total
assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Short-term market rate is proxied by the 3-month
interbank rate. 10-year bond yield is a proxy for long-term market interest rate. CPI measures the rate of inflation. GDP is
the cyclical component of real GDP. credit-to-GDP is the cyclical component of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Credit is the cyclical
component of credit to the private non-financial sector. Property prices is the cyclical component of residential property prices.
All the cyclical components of the aforementioned variables are derived using the Hamilton (2017) filter. ***, ** and * denote
p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 respectively.
The highly significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable validates the
dynamic character of the model specification. φ takes a value of approximately 0.46,
which suggests that bank profits persist to a moderate extent. Turning to the main
bank variable of interest, the estimated relationship between liquid assets and bank
profitability is positive and significant. However, its quadratic term (liquidity2)
enters with a negative coefficient, and also statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Collectively, these results would suggest that, ceteris paribus, profitability increases
for banks holding some liquid assets, however, at some point, holding further liquid
assets reduces the banks’ profitability. This finding is consistent with Bordeleau and
Graham (2010) who find similar results for commercial and bank holding companies
in Canada and the U.S. The authors argue that this finding is line with the idea
that funding markets may reward banks for holding some liquid assets, however at a
certain point this benefit starts being outweighed by the opportunity cost of holding
these lower-yielding assets.
The coefficient on the cyclical indicator in column 1 turns out, unexpectedly,
to be statistically insignificant. This suggests that the business cycle is not impor-
tant in explaining variations in bank profitability. This contrasts various studies in
the literature such as Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Dietrich and Wanzenried
(2011), and Bikker and Hu (2012), among others. Yet, it lends support to the ear-
lier findings of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998), Arpa et al. (2001), and most recently
Kohlscheen et al. (2018). While there are evident drawbacks in how Demirguc-Kunt
et al. (1998) and Arpa et al. (2001) construct and estimate their business cycle
measure, this current study identifies those limitations and tries to adjust for them
accordingly. As such, the findings of this essay are consistent with studies in the
literature that fail to find any significant association between the business cycle
and bank profitability. The coefficients on the financial cycle measures in the other
columns could provide some evidence of the cyclical behaviour of bank profits.
Before examining the financial cycle indicators in the remaining columns, the
other control variables in column I provide some interesting findings. As expected,
the risk variable, which is a non-performing loans ratio, enters with a negative
and significant coefficient. This implies that banks attempting to maximise profits
adopt a risk-averse approach. This is usually through effective screening and moni-
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toring credit risk. As for bank size, the coefficient appears statistically insignificant.
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) similarly finds that the effect of bank size on profitability
is not important for a sample of Greek banks. They argue that small banks usually
try to grow faster, sometimes even at the expense of their profitability. They also
present the argument that newly established banks are not particularly profitable in
their first years of operation, as greater emphasis is placed on gaining market share
rather than improving profitability. Along similar lines, Berger et al. (1987) suggest
that little cost savings can be had by increasing the size of a banking institution.
However, a number of studies including Rime and Stiroh (2003) and Smirlock (1985)
argue that growth in bank size is positively associated with bank profitability.
The introduction of financial cycle measures in columns II to IV provides inter-
esting insights on the cyclical behaviour of bank profits. All three financial variables
(credit− to−GDP , private credit, and property prices) appear to have a positive
and highly significant association with profitability. Thus, in contrast to the effects of
the business cycle on ROA, which appeared statistically insignificant, banks’ prof-
itability responds positively to measures of the financial cycle. Furthermore, the
results in Panel B support this claim. In a horse-race between GDP and each of the
financial cycle measures, the latter outperform GDP in terms of explaining changes
in bank profitability. This finding is somewhat similar to that of Kohlscheen et al.
(2018). They find that, in a horse-race between GDP growth and credit growth in
explaining profits, credit growth comes out ahead. In other words, they find that
GDP growth provides no explanatory power in bank profits, while credit growth
seems to positively impact the profitability of the sampled banks.
Another interesting finding coming out of Table 4.3 is the role of interest rates.
As shown in columns I through IV, long-term interest rates have a positive impact
on profitability, while the impact of short-term interest rates is less clear. In column
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II, a negative impact of short-term rates on profits is observed, however, the asso-
ciation is insignificant in all other specifications. The findings of a positive effect
of long-term rates on profitability are consistent with Albertazzi and Gambacorta
(2009) and Kohlscheen et al. (2018). Kohlscheen et al. (2018) argue that reducing
short-term rates reduces funding costs, while an increase in long-term rates usually
increases revenues, as banks can charge borrowers higher rates. For short-term rates,
the conclusions in the literature are ambiguous. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999) find a positive impact of short-term rates on profits, the findings in
Hancock (1985) and Kohlscheen et al. (2018) are negative, while for Albertazzi and
Gambacorta (2009) the impact is insignificant. In a recent paper, Borio et al. (2017)
find that short-term rates can negatively impact net interest income. They argue
that changes in the level of market rates will also have quantity effects, therefore in-
fluencing the volume of loans and deposits. This they argue could cause the demand
for loans to become more responsive (elastic) to interest rates than for deposits, and
at some point higher interest rates will erode profitability.11
Meanwhile, the results suggest a negative and significant impact of the inflation
rate on profitability. This finding contrasts most in the empirical literature (e.g.
Bourke (1989); Molyneux and Thornton (1992); Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998)) which
typical reports a positive relationship. More recently, Bordeleau and Graham (2010)
find that inflation exhibits a negative relationship with profitability for a sample of
Canadian and U.S banks. They argue that since banks typically lend long and
borrow short, it is to be expected that higher inflation would decrease their profit
margins.
The Hansen and the serial-correlation tests do not reject the null hypothesis
of correct specification, which means that the chosen instruments are valid and no
11Another explanation of the differing impact of short and long-term interest rates on bank
profits is related to the notion of maturity transformation (the fact that banks typically have
assets with longer duration than their liabilities; see Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
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serial correlation exists.
Table 4.4 reports the regression results for the second profitability measure, ROE.
The results of these regressions confirm to a large extent the key results discussed
for ROA above. The sign and significance of most variables remain consistent with
those in the baseline specification of Table 4.3.
Table 4.4: Return on Equity (ROE) as profit indicator
Dependent variable (ROE) Panel A Panel B
I II III IV V VI VII
ROEi,j,t−1 0.275*** 0.352*** 0.283*** 0.347*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.253***
(0.071) (0.056) (0.074) (0.061) (0.067) (0.073) (0.069)
Liquidityi,j,t−1 1.181** 0.980** 0.854* 1.010** 1.201** 1.096** 1.016**
(0.535) (0.473) (0.466) (0.438) (0.488) (0.552) (0.497)
Liquidity2i,j,t−1 -0.016** -0.012** -0.011* -0.011** -0.016** -0.015* -0.013*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Leveragei,j,t−1 -0.116 -0.001 -0.092 0.011 -0.102 -0.124 -0.065
(0.079) (0.004) (0.090) (0.008) (0.085) (0.080) (0.091)
Risk -0.380*** -0.395*** -0.381*** -0.260** -0.333** -0.390*** -0.403***
(0.125) (0.123) (0.118) (0.109) (0.137) (0.127) (0.126)
Size 0.086 0.244 0.120 0.047 0.102 0.153 0.125
(0.264) (0.286) (0.246) (0.287) (0.256) (0.261) (0.223)
Capital ratio 0.019 0.523*** 0.024 0.575* 0.044 0.013 0.012
(0.117) (0.203) (0.108) (0.317) (0.112) (0.109) (0.108)
Short− term market rate 0.057 -1.130*** 0.189 0.624 0.109 0.128 -0.065
(0.492) (0.408) (0.489) (0.458) (0.466) (0.484) (0.417)
10− year bond yield 1.155** 1.663*** 1.032** 1.253*** 0.979** 1.069** 1.312***
(0.469) (0.429) (0.473) (0.368) (0.439) (0.458) (0.411)
CPI -6.692*** -3.322 -8.710*** -8.299*** -7.914*** -7.089*** -6.596***
(1.764) (2.197) (1.960) (3.012) (1.898) (1.798) (1.741)
GDP 16.920 8.785 10.997 12.964
(10.952) (9.961) (10.331) (9.949)




Property prices 1.197*** 0.175*
(0.211) (8.985)
Constant -12.693 -25.393*** -8.598 -26.367*** -13.446* -11.594 -11.769*
(7.794) (7.372) (7.083) (8.321) (7.645) (7.812) (7.102)
No. of banks 760 760 760 760 760 760 760
Observations 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,542 4,553
No. of instruments 76 73 74 73 78 79 81
AB test for AR(2) 0.86 0.57 0.86 0.72 0.80 0.88 0.69
Hansen J test 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.13
This table analyzes the impact of banks’ liquid asset holdings on profitability using the system GMM estimator of Arellano-Bover.
Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of
assets to total shareholders’ equity. Risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Size is the log of total assets. Capital
ratio is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Short-term market rate is proxied by the 3-month interbank rate.
10-year bond yield is a proxy for long-term market interest rate. CPI measures the rate of inflation. GDP is the cyclical component
of real GDP. credit-to-GDP is the cyclical component of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Credit is the cyclical component of credit to the
private non-financial sector. Property prices is the cyclical component of residential property prices. All the cyclical components of
the aforementioned variables are derived using the Hamilton (2017) filter. ***, ** and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1
respectively.
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More specifically, similar to the ROA, the coefficient on the one period lag of
ROE suggests that this profitability indicator is also mildly persistent. As it relates
to the key bank variable of interest, the sign and significance of the linear and
quadratic liquidity term confirms the non-linear relationship between liquidity and
profitability. The impact of bank risk remains negative and significant throughout,
whilst there is still no evidence of a significant impact of either leverage or bank size
on profitability. A positive impact of bank capital on profitability is again observed
in columns II and IV.
Similar to ROA, the relationship between long-term rates and ROE is positive
and significant. For short-term interest rates, a negative and significant coefficient
can be seen in the second specification, however, all other specifications report no
significant impact of this variable on bank profitability. Again, the inflation rate
negatively impacts bank profitability when ROE is used as the profit indicator.
The cyclicality of ROE in Table 4.4 is broadly in line with the cyclical behaviour
identified for ROA in Table 4.3. That is, the proxy for the business cycle in column
I has no significant effect on profitability. On the other hand, the credit-to-GDP
ratio, private credit, and property prices all have a positive and significant impact
on ROE. In addition, Panel B of Table 4.4 demonstrates that each financial cycle
indicator comes out ahead of the business cycle measure in explaining profitability.
This serves to buttress the previous findings that bank profitability responds to the
financial cycle and not the business cycle.
Once more, the regressions pass both the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation
of order 2 and the Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions.
Table 4.5 reports the regression results for another profitability measure, pre-tax
profit. Overall, the results of these regressions confirm to a large extent the results of
the previously discussed profitability indicators. The only notable difference is the
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insignificance of the financial cycle indicator in column II. The cyclical component
of private credit does not appear to have any statistical significance in explaining
changes in pre-tax profits. This finding is also borne out in the horse-race in column
VI. That aside, all the other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables are largely
in line with those reported in the previous tables, in terms of sign and significance.
Table 4.5: Pre-tax profit as profit indicator
Dependent variable (Pre-tax profit) Panel A Panel B
I II III IV V VI VII
Pre− tax profiti,j,t−1 0.538*** 0.495*** 0.513*** 0.506*** 0.519*** 0.499*** 0.533***
(0.090) (0.077) (0.078) (0.082) (0.087) (0.082) (0.098)
Liquidityi,j,t−1 0.230* 0.239** 0.310** 0.290** 0.192* 0.171* 0.116
(0.136) (0.108) (0.137) (0.142) (0.104) (0.094) (0.096)
Liquidity2i,j,t−1 -0.003* -0.003** -0.004** -0.004* -0.003* -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Leveragei,j,t−1 -0.018 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.021 0.003 0.008
(0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Risk -0.033 -0.054** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.028 -0.047* -0.049*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
Size 0.046 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.050 0.019 0.054
(0.057) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) (0.054) (0.048) (0.047)
Capital ratio 0.092*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.020 0.019
(0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.040) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019)
Short− term market rate -0.020 -0.234*** -0.095 -0.144** -0.068 -0.043 -0.086
(0.072) (0.075) (0.070) (0.065) (0.075) (0.079) (0.081)
10− year bond yield 0.121 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.359*** 0.123 0.163* 0.193*
(0.082) (0.088) (0.103) (0.099) (0.076) (0.099) (0.100)
CPI -3.142 -7.723 -16.238*** -14.246* -6.416* -9.280** -7.794**
(4.196) (6.192) (6.179) (7.383) (3.586) (3.731) (3.587)
GDP 4.376 0.712 -1.068 -2.943
(3.025) (2.076) (2.201) (2.517)




Property prices 2.852** 3.606**
(1.380) (1.757)
Constant -4.425** -5.004*** -5.934*** -5.600*** -4.140*** -2.017 -1.781
(1.788) (1.636) (2.063) (1.975) (1.523) (1.351) (1.365)
No. of banks 734 734 734 734 734 734 734
Observations 4,730 4,730 4,730 4,730 4,730 4,730 4,730
No. of instruments 72 71 71 71 73 79 79
AB test for AR(2) 0.16 0.79 0.28 0.43 0.36 0.18 0.17
Hansen J test 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.27 0.30
This table analyzes the impact of banks’ liquid asset holdings on profitability using the system GMM estimator of Arellano-Bover.
Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of
assets to total shareholders’ equity. Risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Size is the log of total assets. Capital
ratio is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Short-term market rate is proxied by the 3-month interbank rate.
10-year bond yield is a proxy for long-term market interest rate. CPI measures the rate of inflation. GDP is the cyclical component
of real GDP. credit-to-GDP is the cyclical component of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Credit is the cyclical component of credit to the
private non-financial sector. Property prices is the cyclical component of residential property prices. All the cyclical components of
the aforementioned variables are derived using the Hamilton (2017) filter. ***, ** and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1
respectively.
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In the final set of regression results, the study tests the heterogeneity of the
findings by separating banks from EMEs from those in advanced economies. These
regression results are presented in Table 4.6. The environment in which banks in
EMEs and advanced economies operate can differ substantially. Further, while the
profitability of banks in Europe and North America have been heavily researched,
far less is known about banks’ profitability in emerging economies. Therefore, it
is worth identifying whether this relationship between liquidity and profitability
holds regardless of the general economic condition under which the bank operates
or whether it is being primarily driven by either group. By and large, the results are
consistent with the main findings of the study. That is, irrespective of the country’s
economic development status, the response of bank profitability to liquidity is the
same. Further, the impact of the cycles are largely in line with the main findings.
The financial cycle appears more important in explaining variations in bank profits.
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Table 4.6: Test for heterogeneity of results
Dependent variable (ROA) Advanced Economies Emerming Economies
I II III IV V VI
ROAi,j,t−1 0.401*** 0.478*** 0.481*** 0.622*** 0.554*** 0.563***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.105) (0.106) (0.099)
Liquidityi,j,t−1 0.042** 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.044 0.054* 0.058
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.033) (0.028) (0.042)
Liquidity2i,j,t−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leveragei,j,t−1 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.070* 0.052 0.072
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.041) (0.042) (0.058)
Risk -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.012 -0.005 -0.013
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Size -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.045 0.045 0.047
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.067) (0.068) (0.085)
Capital ratio 0.014* 0.007*** 0.007** 0.096** 0.087 0.094
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.044) (0.054) (0.061)
Short− term market rate 0.054* 0.029 0.007 -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.232***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.045) (0.044) (0.056)
10− year bond yield 0.009 0.024 0.026 0.306*** 0.274*** 0.397***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.062) (0.048) (0.069)
CPI -3.002* -1.643 -2.573** -6.974** -6.406* -8.933**
(1.784) (1.580) (1.245) (3.465) (3.794) (3.619)
GDP 0.222 0.971** 0.542 0.764 0.357 -1.215
(0.685) (0.428) (0.336) (1.219) (0.925) (1.195)




Property prices 1.070** 2.603*
(0.431) (1.447)
Constant -0.209 -0.350 -0.101 -3.869* -3.670* -4.227*
(0.341) (0.238) (0.210) (2.032) (2.058) (2.243)
No. of banks 628 628 628 132 132 132
Observations 4,115 4,115 4,115 600 600 600
No. of instruments 78 80 83 80 80 76
AB test for AR(2) 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.21
Hansen J test 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08
This table analyzes the impact of banks’ liquid asset holdings on profitability using the system GMM estimator of
Arellano-Bover. Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total
assets. Leverage is the ratio of assets to total shareholders’ equity. Risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans. Size is the log of total assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Short-term
market rate is proxied by the 3-month interbank rate. 10-year bond yield is a proxy for long-term market interest rate.
CPI measures the rate of inflation. GDP is the cyclical component of real GDP. credit-to-GDP is the cyclical component
of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Credit is the cyclical component of credit to the private non-financial sector. Property prices
is the cyclical component of residential property prices. All the cyclical components of the aforementioned variables are
derived using the Hamilton (2017) filter. ***, ** and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 respectively.
4.7 Conclusion
This essay examines the relationship between liquid asset holdings and bank prof-
itability for 843 banks from 33 advanced and emerging market economies over the
period 2005–2017. To the best of my knowledge, only one paper within the empir-
ical literature focuses on this specific relationship. Further, the essay also presents
empirical evidence regarding the cyclical behaviour of bank profits. Similarly, there
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exist very few papers that investigate the possible role of the financial cycle in ex-
plaining variations in bank profits. In this regard, the empirical results presented in
this essay contribute to two areas of the literature that are largely unexplored.
The study uses a dynamic model specification that allows for profit persistence.
The first key set of results suggest that a non-linear relationship exists between
liquid asset holdings and profitability. That is, profitability is improved for banks
that hold some liquid assets, however, there exist a point beyond which holding
more liquid assets diminishes a banks’ profitability. In theory, this finding is in line
with the notion that funding markets will reward banks for holding liquid assets
as they are less susceptible to liquidity risk. However, the benefit gained from this
reward will eventually be redressed due to the opportunity cost of holding these
comparatively low-yielding assets.
The other key result coming out of this study is that measures of the financial
cycle appear to be more crucial for bank profits than the business cycle. Using
three highly recommended proxies of the financial cycle from the literature, the
study establishes a strong positive association with profitability, suggesting that
developments in credit may be more important than output growth in explaining
variations in bank profits.
In addition to the financial cycle, long-term interest rates also demonstrate a
positive impact on the profitability of banks. Higher levels of long-term rates tend
to increase profitability by increasing net interest margins. The impact of short-term
rates is less clear. Instances where it appears significant suggests that it may raise
funding costs which in turn reduces bank profits.
Important policy implications emerge from the empirical results of this study.
First, as policymakers try to develop a global framework for promoting stronger
liquidity buffers at financial institutions, they should also consider the trade-off be-
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tween achieving resilience to liquidity shocks and the cost to banks for holding these
low-yielding liquid assets. While the financial system as a whole might benefit from
banks being less susceptible to liquidity risks by maintaining higher liquidity buffers,
holding too many liquid assets comes with the cost of reducing the profitability of
these banks. In fact, this might have a spiralling effect on the real economy as with
less profits, banks may become less able to supply credit to the rest of the economy.
Therefore, it is important that regulators and policymakers find the right balance
between addressing liquidity risk and maintaining bank profitability.
Second, countercyclical policies aimed at smoothing credit cycles will have far
greater implications on bank profitability than those geared toward smoothing the
business cycle. If implemented effectively, such policies could reduce the likelihood
of a significant decline of profits during a crisis. Finally, if interest rates have a
systematic effect on bank profitability, and if in the short run profitability is a major
determinant of bank capital, it follows that monetary policy may have implications
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5.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis uses advanced micro-econometric techniques to explore and address is-
sues that have far reaching implications not only for the banking system, but for the
economy as a whole. Following the recent financial crisis, bank capital requirements
have become one of the main instruments of banking regulation, providing a cushion
during downturns and serving as a preventative mechanism for risk taking. Against
this background, the first essay of this thesis answers the following questions:
• Are banks’ capital buffers pro-cyclical?
• Do financial variables exacerbate the cyclical behaviour of capital buffers?
• Is there heterogeneity among banks in holding capital buffers?
To answer these questions, the study applies the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator
to control for various characteristics of the panel, in order to examine the cyclical
behaviour of banks’ capital buffers. The study relies on the widely used business
cycle measure (GDP), and also introduces a novel approach in the form of a finance-
augmented cycle to capture this cyclicality.
The results emanating from the study suggest that a negative relationship exists
between banks’ capital buffers and the business cycle. This means, during stress
periods banks increase their capital buffer, whilst in booms they tend to reduce
it. More importantly, the study finds that these capital buffers are even more pro-
cyclical when using a finance-augmented output gap. Further, it finds that this
negative relationship is exclusively related to large banks, consistent with the “too
big to fail” hypothesis.
The findings from the first essay add to the strand of literature which focuses on
the cyclicality of banks’ capital ratios (for e.g. Repullo and Suarez (2013), Estrella
(2004), Coffinet et al. (2012), and Shim (2013)). However, it builds on these papers
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by including financial sector developments in the business cycle and getting more
reliable estimates of said cycle.
The second essay exploits the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity
in Italy which provides a unique way isolate and examine the impact of a tax shield
on bank capital structure. In particular, this essay attempts to answer the following
questions:
• Does the introduction of a tax shield for equity increase bank equity ratios?
• Does the allowance for corporate equity cause banks to reduce their level of
riskiness?
Using a difference-in-differences method this essay makes a comparison between
the change in capital structure for Italian banks with a closely related group of
European banks that did not experience a similar change in their corporate tax
system. The results suggest that, following the introduction of the ACE, the equity
ratio of the average Italian bank increases by approximately 8.5%. Since the ACE is
a tax shield for equity, equity funding becomes more attractive and banks increase
their equity ratio. The results provide further evidence that the increase in equity
ratios is being driven by an increase in bank equity rather than a reduction in any
loan activity by banks. Additionally, the study finds that this tax relief for equity
reduces risk taking for weakly capitalized banks.
The findings from the essay contribute to ongoing discussions surounding bank
capital regulation and bank capital structure decisions. It importantly adds to the
developing body of literature surrounding the introduction of tax shields for equity
to reduce the relative tax advantage of debt (see for e.g. Schepens (2016) and
Célérier et al. (2017)). To the best of my knowledge, a similar study has not been
done for financial institutions in Italy. Furthermore, the nature of Italy’s banking
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system and the timing of the tax reform make the findings of this essay even more
relevant, especially for regulators.
The third essay explores the relationship between liquid asset holdings and bank
profitability for banks in emerging market economies and advanced economies. In
addition, it also attempts to some shed some light on the cyclical behaviour of profits
by testing whether the financial or the business cycle is a better predictor. As such,
the essay sets out to address the following questions:
• Is the relationship between liquid asset holdings and bank profitability non-
linear?
• What is the role of the business cycle in explaining bank profits?
• Does the financial cycle predict bank profitability better than the business
cycle?
• Is the reaction by banks homogeneous across countries with different develop-
ment status?
Considering the persistence of the profitability indicator much discussed in the
literature, the essay utilises the system GMM estimator to provide empirical answers
to these questions. The first key resulting emanating from the empirical analysis
in this chapter is that the relationship between banks’ liquid asset holdings and
profitability is non-linear. Specifically, it shows that, in the first instant, banks are
rewarded profitably for holding some liquid assets, however, profits eventually start
to decrease as banks continue to hold these generally low yielding assets.
The other major result coming from this empirical experiment is that measures
of the financial cycle appear to be more important for bank profitability than the
business cycle. This finding is consistent for all three of the proxies used to cap-
ture the financial cycle. Finally, the study also shows that long-term interest rates
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consistently predict bank profitability better than short-term rates. Specifically,
higher levels of long-term interest rates tend to increase profitability by increasing
net interest margins, whilst the impact of short-term rates is mainly insignificant.
This essay makes an important contribution to the literature by exploring a
determinant of bank profitability that has been largely ignored. It also adds to the
strand of literature that analyses the cyclical behaviour of profitability, and explores
a phenomenon that has also been largely ignored.
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5.1.1 Policy Implications
Several important policy implications can be drawn from this thesis. From the first
essay, and consistent with the literature, it is clear that on average banks capital
buffers exhibit a pro-cyclical behaviour. This reinforces the need to effectively imple-
ment the Basel Accord proposed countercyclical buffer tools. Regulators might need
to adopt more flexible instruments to mitigate credit risk in banks globally. This
recommendation is motivated by the fact that even with the prudential framework
set out in the new Basel accords (Basel III), the pro-cyclical behaviour of banks’
capital buffers will still persist. The finding of a greater degree of pro-cyclicality of
banks’ capital ratios would suggest that the approach to setting the countercyclical
capital buffer rate for banks might need to be more rigid. That is, it might be nec-
essary to set the CCB rate above the current minimum requirement for individual
banks and the banking sector.
Another implication related to the use of countercyclical policy tools is their flex-
ibility. The analysis in the first essay shows that it is not always safe to assume that
regulatory or supervisory capital standards automatically constrain banks. Market
power, for example, may induce banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum
required, thereby reducing the power of capital requirements as instruments of fi-
nancial stability. Given the fact that big and small banks behave differently and
banks with different specialisation also treat capital buffer differently, these vari-
ations should be taken into consideration when employing efforts to revamp the
regulatory landscape. This could be achieved by creating more flexible and cycle-
sensitive capital regulations.
The second essay also provides important implications in terms of the proposal
of regulatory tools to address the capital structure decision of banks. The key policy
implication coming out of this chapter is the recognition that an ACE system that
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eliminates or significantly reduces the tax-induced distortions in banks, might be
worth considering as a macroprudential policy tool that targets capital standard.
This sort of instrument becomes even more important due to the shortcomings
of previous policy attempts to address this bias towards debt. For instance, many
countries have implemented measures that place a ceiling on interest deductibility,
often referred to as thin capitalisation rules. Buettner et al. (2008) document that
the share of OECD countries applying these rules grew from less than 50 per cent to
more than 75 per cent between 1996 and 2004. Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008)
report that these rules have reduced debt ratios. However, Buettner et al. (2008)
argue that they also seem to reduce investment. Further, De Mooij (2012) suggest
that these rules are only imperfect solutions to the debt bias problem and come
along with other costs. They argue that these rules are not properly designed so
firms often find loopholes by exploiting hybrid instruments cross-order differences
in the definitions of equity and debt.
The third essay provides evidence of a non-linear relationship between liquidity
holdings and bank profitability. Thus, regulatory authorities such as the BCBS
may need to take this into consideration when setting the liquidity requirements
for banks. As these policymakers attempt to develop a framework for promoting
stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions, they should also consider the
opportunity cost to banks for holding a considerably high amount of these low
yielding assets. Though the global financial system benefits from banks becoming
less susceptible to liquidity shocks, holding too much liquid assets comes at a cost
of reduced profitability. In fact, this reduced profitability might even affect banks
ability to provide credit, hence affecting the economy as whole. It is therefore
important that regulators try to find some optimum liquidity buffer or other means
of balancing liquidity risk and profitability.
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Another policy implication coming out of the third essay surrounds countercycli-
cal regulation. With the essay documenting evidence of a significant relationship
between the financial cycle and profitability, and no evidence of the business cycle
significantly predicting profitability, regulators may need to target the credit cycle
with countercyclical policies. Based on the evidence in this essay, countercyclical
policies aimed at smoothing credit cycles will have far greater implications on bank
profitability than those geared toward smoothing the business cycle. If such policies
are effectively implemented, they could reduce the likelihood of a significant loss in
profits during a crisis.
Finally, if interest rates have a systemic effect on bank profitability, and in the
short-run profitability is a major determinant of bank capital, it therefore follows
that monetary policy also has important implications for the resilience of the finan-
cial system.
5.1.2 Limitations and Scopes for Future Work
Notwithstanding the important implications coming out of the analysis in this thesis,
there were a number of limitations and the thesis also serves as a stepping stone for
additional work.
The analysis in the first essay indicates that our assessment of the business
cycle and the pro-cyclicality of capital buffers changes when financial information
is added to the filter representing the output gap. Apart from the fact that the
unavailability of sufficient financial cycle data limits this particular part of the study
to only the G7 countries, there are other important caveats to this finding. From a
measurement perspective, the results would be more robust and persuasive if both
measures of the cycles were multivariate. As it stands, it would not be completely
accurate to suggest that it is financial factors in particular that are truly important.
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Therefore, an extension to this work could be to add other standard variables (for
e.g. unemployment) to the business cycle filter to allow for a more fair comparison.
Continuing with the findings in the first essay, the study concludes that cap-
ital buffers are more pro-cyclical based on the magnitude and significance of the
coefficient on the output gap. Whilst the significance provides a good indication,
the magnitude of the coefficient depends on how large the estimated business cycles
swing are. This on its own is not sufficiently strong to confidently make a claim
of more or less cyclicality. Future work could use other evaluation metrics such as
a “horse-race”, that is, to include both gaps in the model at the same time and
see which comes out ahead. A more sophisticated approach could be to estimate a
phase shift between the capital buffer and the outputs gaps. However, this approach
would be a lot more technical and require a bit of time.
The second essay also provides scopes for further work and extensions. An ideal
experiment would have been to examine the equity ratios for a few more years
beyond the treatment period of 2012-2013 to see whether the trend continues. Due
to the unanticipated removal of the database used in this study, this was not done.
However, this could be carried out using data from a new database, for example the
SNL database maintained by S&P Global.
As the third essay is one of the first to empirically investigate the relationship
between liquidity assets and profitability, it has opened up avenues for future work.
Having identified that a non-linear relationship exists between liquid assets and
profitability, it is my intention to extend this work by attempting to find optimal
liquid asset holdings. That is, I will attempt to find the turning point of liquid assets.
Another possible extension could be to carry out the study focusing on countries
with and without pre-existing bank liquidity requirements. A further suggestion,
which is highlighted in Bordeleau and Graham (2010), would be to explicitly model
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the determinants of bank liquid assets or even establish a general equilibrium model
including bank profitability and liquidity.
In terms of the relationship between bank profitability and the cycles, an ap-
proach akin to what is used in chapter one could be adopted. That is, the study
could use a multivariate approach to model both the financial and business cycles.
Overall, the analysis in this thesis addresses important developments in the fi-
nancial sector that have implications for the economy as a whole. Various factors
including data and time have limited the extent to which this thesis could address
these developments. Nonetheless, this thesis marks a first attempt to address these





Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A1: Countries and number of banks
Country Total no. of banks Commercial bank Cooperative banks Savings banks
AUSTRALIA 10 9 1
AUSTRIA 16 9 5 2
BELGIUM 9 6 1 2
BRAZIL 25 25
CANADA 6 5 1
CZECH REPUBLIC 5 5
DENMARK 16 12 4
ESTONIA 5 5
FINLAND 5 4 1
FRANCE 16 13 3






ITALY 38 17 16 5
JAPAN 116 109 7
LATVIA 8 8
LUXEMBOURG 5 5
MEXICO 15 13 1 1
NETHERLANDS 13 12 1
NEW ZEALAND 5 5
NORWAY 26 4 22
POLAND 12 10 1 1
PORTUGAL 7 6 1
SLOVAKIA 5 4 1
SLOVENIA 7 7
SPAIN 17 9 2 6
SWITZERLAND 5 4 1
TURKEY 18 18
U.K 15 15
U.S.A 71 60 3 8
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No. of instruments 132
No. of banks 281
Notes: This table provides a specifica-
tion uisng the Christiano-Fitzgerald fil-
ter as the cyclical indicator. The esti-
mation is once again based on the Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) difference GMM
estimator. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses, α(1) and α(2)
are first and second order residual au-
tocorrelation tests. The null hypothe-
sis of the AR(2) test is that errors in
the first-difference regression exhibit no
second-order serial correlation. The null
hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the
instruments are valid. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A3: Estimation using G7 countries (Standardised cycle coeffi-
cients)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP Hamilton UC Model Multivariate UC Model Multivariate UC Model
Buffi,j,t−1 0.636*** 0.644*** 0.501*** 0.692*** 0.630***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
ROE 4.371*** 4.454*** 4.875*** 5.114*** 4.456***
(1.089) (1.059) (1.230) (1.171) (1.164)
Risk 0.219** 0.223** 0.242*** 0.264** 0.207***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.084) (0.107) (0.067)
Size 0.483 0.348 0.436 0.250 0.540
(0.375) (0.356) (0.434) (0.485) (0.570)
∆Loan -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)






α(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α(2) 0.65 0.56 0.36 0.28 0.86
Hansen J 0.94 0.98 0.12 0.92 0.34
Observations 2,540 2,540 2,540 2,324 2,324
No. of instruments 132 132 132 132 118
No. of banks 281 281 281 281 281
Notes: This table replicates Table 2.5 using standardised versions of all the cyclical measures. All estimations are once again based
on the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, α(1) and α(2)
are first and second order residual autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) test is that errors in the first-difference
regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are valid. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A4: Marginal effects
Delta-method
ey/ex Std. Error Z P>|Z|
HP -0.0007698 0.0005189 -1.48 0.14
Hamilton 0.0034495 0.0016830 2.05 0.04
UCM 0.0033691 0.0025392 1.33 0.19
FACa -0.0054781 0.0030563 -1.79 0.08
FACb -0.0019543 0.0011422 -1.71 0.09
Notes: This table presents the marginal effects of each cyclical compo-
nent in specifications 1 through 5 in Table 2.5.
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Table A5: Correlation matrix
HP Hamilton UCM FACa FACb
HP 1
Hamilton 0.57 1
UCM 0.45 0.61 1
FACa 0.49 0.65 0.55 1
FACb 0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.50 1
Notes: This table presents the cross-correlation matrix of the cyclical
variables used throughout chapter one.
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A6: Country list
Country No. of banks Country No. of banks
Austria 42 Latvia 16
Bulgaria 13 Lithuania 7
Croatia 8 Luxembourg 18
Cyprus 13 Malta 6
Czech Republic 11 Netherlands 34
Denmark 28 Poland 22
Estonia 8 Portugal 22
Finland 18 Romania 9
France 112 Slovakia 7
Germany 55 Slovenia 9
Greece 8 Spain 46
Hungary 13 Sweden 22
Ireland 11 United Kingdom 85
Italy 65
This table gives information on the number of banks in each country.
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Table A7: Variable definitions
Variable Description Source
Bank-specific variables
Equity ratio Total equity over total assets Bankscope
Return on assets Profits over total assets Bankscope
Risk Raito of non-performing loans over total loans Bankscope
Diversification Non-interest income over gross revenue Bankscope
Loan ratio Total loans over total assets Bankscope
Total assets Total assets (in millions of US dollars) Bankscope
Loans Total loans (in millions of US dollars) Bankscope
Equity Total equity Bankscope
Z-score Ratio of equity plus ROA over std. dev.(ROA) Bankscope
Retained earnings Retained income over post-tax profit Bankscope
Country-specific variables
GDP per capita growth Growth in gross domestic product per capita WDI
CPI rate Change in consumer price index WDI
This table provides definitions of the variables used throughout the analysis in Chapter in 3. The table also documents the data source for
the variables.
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Table A8: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect and bank risk be-
haviour
Low-capitl banks High-capital banks Low-capital banks High-capital banks
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(Risk) ln(Risk)
DiD 0.115*** 0.207*** -0.248** 0.941
(0.040) (0.019) (0.102) (0.598)
Post -0.047** -0.204*** 0.339*** -0.180
(0.021) (0.018) (0.036) (0.250)
Constant -8.024 -1.747 91.797*** 14.396
(5.390) (2.564) (10.705) (29.025)
Observations 883 165 842 109
R-squared 0.439 0.911 0.467 0.204
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
This table illustrates the difference in the impact of the ACE on high and low capitalised banks. The sample period is again
2008 to 2013. The Post dummy equals one in 2012 to 2013, the Treated dummy takes the value of one for the Italian banks. The
first two columns show the the impact of the ACE on (ex-ante) high and low capitalised banks. Here high capitalised banks are
those whose equity ratio fall in the highest decile of the size distribution within each country. Low capitalised banks are those
that fall in the bottom 30 percentile of the size distribution within each country. The sample for the highly capitalised banks
now comprises of 8 treated banks and 56 untreated banks. For the low capitalised sample, there are 16 treated banks and 177
untreated banks. In the third and fourth column, I examine the ex ante risk-taking behaviour of these high and low capitalised
banks. I use the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans as the left hand side variable. All regressions include bank fixed
effects, standard errors are clustered at the level. ***, **, and * denote the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.
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Table A9: Placebo tests
Panel A Austria Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA)
DiD 0.019 0.027 0.037 -0.139 0.096 -0.023 -0.165 0.023
(0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.142) (0.105) (0.035) (0.101) (0.054)
Post -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 -0.020* -0.017 -0.016 -0.018
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -2.372 -2.416 -2.462 -2.070 -2.428 -2.363 -2.994 -2.443
(2.255) (2.252) (2.258) (2.349) (2.251) (2.266) (2.256) (2.255)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.451 0.451 0.450 0.452 0.450
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Panel B France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA)
DiD 0.018 0.002 -0.542*** -0.010 0.055 -0.102* -0.094 0.070
(0.020) (0.028) (0.208) (0.050) (0.047) (0.062) (0.120) (0.051)
Post -0.021 -0.018 -0.006 -0.018 0.029 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -2.406 -2.404 2.081 -2.413 3.340 -2.751 -2.700 -2.509
(2.249) (2.339) (1.774) (2.264) (3.888) (2.284) (2.284) (2.255)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 1,367 2,113 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.412 0.451 0.451 0.450
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Panel C Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden UK
ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA) ln(ETA)
DiD -0.009 0.022 0.102* 0.067 -0.102 0.060 0.118 -0.059 -0.020
(0.076) (0.041) (0.054) (0.061) (0.065) (0.055) (0.099) (0.055) (0.030)
Post -0.018 -0.019 -0.021* 0.015 -0.016 0.028 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.030) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant -2.429 -2.456 -1.593 -2.777 -2.313 3.509 -0.823 -2.455 -2.370
(2.252) (2.257) (2.331) (2.271) (2.269) (3.884) (3.715) (2.255) (2.278)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 1,756 2,113 1,367 2,455 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.450 0.450 0.451 0.421 0.451 0.412 0.465 0.450 0.45
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
This table provides an extension to the robustness check done in Table 3.6, with regards to the placebo test. Banks from each of the remaining
countries in the control group are used as fake treated banks. For each of these specification, Italy is removed from the sample. ***, **, and
* denote p <0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.
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Table A10: Banks by country



























South Africa EME 6





United Kingdom Advanced 37
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Table A11: Cross-correlation matrix of independent variables
Liquidity Leverage Capital Size NPL/loans Short-term rate Long-term rate CPI GDP Credit-to-GDP Property prices Private credit
Liquidity 1
Leverage 0 1
Capital ratio 0.14 -0.01 1
Log of assets 0.22 0.03 -0.20 1
NPL/loans -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.12 1
Short-term rate -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.12 1
Long-term rate -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.28 0.79 1
CPI rate -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.46 0.41 1
GDP 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.14 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 1
Credit-to-GDP -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.39 0.32 0.18 0.19 1
Property prices -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 0.42 0.02 1
Private credit -0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.33 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.18 1
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Figure A1: Banks’ liquid assets holdings over time
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Figure A2: Bank profitability (ROE) and the macroeconomic cycles
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